There are three main narratives underpinning most discussions on the future of work. The first is that the formalisation of work is gathering pace, whereby products and services are increasingly being produced and delivered by the formal economy. Conversely, informal work, such as subsistence production, informal exchange and/or mutual aid, is rapidly becoming less relevant to everyday life. The second, known as the ‘commodification thesis’, suggests that capitalism is spreading into almost every corner of human activity. For example, this could include the marketisation of state functions or the pricing of environmental pollution such as carbon trading. The final narrative is that globalisation is gaining pace and that the path to development is the way of the free market, with nation states declining in economic importance. In other words the formal market knows the best course of action. Simultaneously, informal work, here taken to mean work that is not declared to the state but is legal in all other aspects, is seen as a brake on development and a residue of previous times.

Thus a binary division is constructed whereby the formal economy is seen as a positive, and thus the way to economic prosperity, while informal practices are cast in a negative light. For example, Hernando de Soto, the Peruvian economist, argued that the best way to formalise Latin America’s informal economies was to legally establish property rights (to allow people to borrow against them) and for the state to withdraw from everyday life. This echoes the policy prescriptions given in the late 1980s and early 1990s to Latin America and the former Soviet states by organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Central to these policies, which became known as the Washington Consensus, was that the formal market ‘knows best’ and as it grew people would be drawn into it. Formal work is also equated to ‘decent work’ as a recent report stated: “On the balance: The informal sector is dominant in developing countries … though its reduction is crucial for securing decent work”. This is, of course, not to say that all informal work is positive, as will be discussed further below, but such statements demonstrate the persuasiveness of the formal economy. Indeed the very terms used to describe informal work demonstrate its negative construction. Such practices are commonly referred to as ‘non-official’, ‘non-organised’, ‘hidden’, ‘black’, ’shadow’, ‘non-visible’, ’submerged’, ‘irregular’, etc. Thus informal work is almost always defined by what it is not, ie its lack of engagement with the formal economy.

Despite the widespread acceptance of the above narratives there is a growing literature that refutes such discourses. The prime reason for this is the recognition that in fact the informal economy is not disappearing and for many plays an important role in everyday life. Across the world informal economies are a significant percentage of GDP and there is evidence that their size is in fact growing. Friedrich Schneider estimated in 2006 that the size of the global shadow economy (as a percentage of GDP) was 35.2%, an increase of 1.6% from 1999/00. Of course within these figures there are wide variations between countries, ranging from the United States with a figure of 8.4%, to Bolivia with 68.3%. Only two countries have a single digit figure (the USA and Switzerland) with the vast majority over 20%. Very few countries have experienced a significant decrease in their shadow economy over this period. While the averages for the OECD countries are lower than the global figure, they still demonstrate the importance of informal economies in ‘developed’ regions of the world. Furthermore, Schneider states that between 1989 and 2002 the average size of the OECD countries’ informal sector rose by over a quarter. The International Labour Organisation has gone so far as to say that in the last thirty years the growth of informal economies has been ‘phenomenal’.

Most commentators accept that such figures are probably underestimates as people are, understandably, reticent to reveal the scale of their informal work due to fear of detection. Furthermore, surveys often fail to observe the full range of informal work, as respondents are unaware that some of their practices could be included. For example, people who provide unpaid care for others rarely state this in informal work surveys. What is clear, however, is that non-formal work is not decreasing in relevance: as Table 3 shows, in relation to the percentage of total work time devoted to unpaid work many major economies are moving towards informalisation.

Thus it can be seen that the formalisation and commodification theses are rather problematic. Not only do they ignore the fact that the informal economy is still significant but they also take a very narrow view on what constitutes economic activity. The following section demonstrates the wide variety of informal work practices, and some of the motivations behind them, in operation today.

The spectrum of informal work

As noted above, work is often split into a binary division, formal and informal. Such a narrow definition is very unhelpful when conceptualising informal practices, as it often leads to the assumption that it is only referring to ‘cash in hand’ work. However, forms of informal work are much broader than this. Discounting illegal activities the spectrum of informal practices includes unpaid work, volunteering, the exchange of goods, intergenerational transfers, mutual aid, ‘not for profit’ schemes, subsistence production (which includes not only growing your own food but also making/repairing clothes, etc), informal micro-enterprises and, of course, ‘cash in hand’ work. Gibson-Graham (two prominent geographers who critiqued the nature of the formal economy from a feminist perspective) developed an ‘iceberg’ analogy to show the diversity of the economy beyond the formal.

Within many of these practices profit is not the main goal, if it is a goal at all. Environmental and social justice concerns are often given priority and there is a sense that people wish to operate outside the mainstream economy. There are many reasons why people wish to do so. Of course the state, and most economists, would argue that people undertake such actions simply to avoid tax and/or that people from economically marginalised communities have no choice but to undertake such work. Again we can see that binary divisions are in operation (tax payment/avoidance, rich/poor); however, the motivations for engaging in such practices are far more diverse. Williams and Windebank have shown that in many instances it is those in higher income brackets who undertake cash in hand work (both as consumers and providers) as a means of increasing their income. Furthermore, it is not just about saving money. While the reduced cost of cash in hand work is a major attraction, other issues, such as reliability or not being able to afford the formal price, are important.

Enterprise formation is a major driver of the informal economy and again it is assumed that firms that operate in this manner are doing so solely to avoid taxation payments. Many micro-enterprises operate informally in the first instance, as the entrepreneur wants to see if the idea will work and become profitable before taking the step into the formal sphere. This is mainly due to the bureaucracy, time and costs involved in registering a formal firm. Migrants, for example, might find it difficult to obtain the information needed to register a firm or they might be unsure of the length of time they will be in the region. If the firm does become a success then the initial period of informality becomes a barrier to formalisation, as the entrepreneur might be unable to pay back taxes or is fearful of prosecution. Often enterprises that are not motivated by profit do not see the reason for formal registration as they do not want to spend time filling out forms or to be monitored by the state.

At the household level again there are many motivations for undertaking informal practices. Often it can be to save money; for example, there has been a reported increase in domestic food production in response to the recent rises in food prices. But in reality the motivations go much deeper than this. Growing one’s own food can have environmental and social considerations as well as cost benefits. It is also reported that there is a significant increase in intergenerational transfers and mutual aid, for example, parents helping their children raise a deposit for their first home or helping out with repairs. Although services such as childcare and household repairs are increasingly commoditised (right word??) many people prefer to keep such services within their social networks. Again the issue of cost is important but people also wish to ‘employ’ people they know and to use such exchanges as a way of building their social capital. For example, if you undertake some unpaid work for an acquaintance then they will be obliged to do some for you in return in the future. There is evidence that informal intergenerational support is increasing with young adults increasingly dependent on their parents. A study in the USA by the Institute of Social Research, found that between the ages of 18 and 34, young adults receive, on average, $38,000 in cash transfers, and perhaps more surprisingly, the equivalent of two years worth of full time labour. These figures, the researchers found, have increased dramatically over recent years.

Unpaid work within the home must also be considered within this spectrum. Such activities can take many forms such as childcare, caring and household jobs. While there has been some commodification of these processes, with, for example, an increase in ‘live-in childcare’ it is still not the norm. It is common for friends to group together to provide childcare to allow the other members to undertake formal work, an unofficial form of kindergarten, and there is an observed rise in the number of people providing ‘long distance granny nanny’ assistance. A time use survey conducted in 2005 by the Office of National Statistics found that on average people in Great Britain spent 142 minutes per day on unpaid housework. The survey found that 77% of men and 92% of women spent time each day undertaking such practices. This demonstrates both the gendered aspect of this informal economy and its importance to households.

Unpaid care giving provides perhaps the clearest example of the scale, and importance, of the informal economy within households. The Carers UK organisation estimates that almost six million people provide unpaid care within the UK and that the number grows by over 6,000 people every day. Buckner and Yeandle (2007) have calculated that this informal care giving has an economic value of over £87 billion per year. This is considerably more than the cost of formal health care in the UK with the cost of the National Health Service audited at £81 billion for 2006/7. Thus there is clear link between the formal and informal economies as the state, and the tax payer, would find it extremely difficult to provide health care without this informal support. As one of their interviewees states ’society would collapse without carers …’.

Volunteering outside the home is also an important factor in the relationships between the formal and informal economies. The 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey found that 39% of people had volunteered formally in the previous 12 months and that 67% had done so informally. These are obviously significant figures and again demonstrate that for many people the formal economy is not their sole sphere of activity. The Community Service Volunteers organisation, applying the minimum wage to the unpaid work their volunteers undertook, estimated that the commodified value of their unpaid work was over £28 million in 2006/7, a significant input into local communities.

This necessarily brief overview of the forms of informal economic practices demonstrates that rather than a formal/informal economy there exists, as noted by Gibson-Graham in table below, a ‘diverse economy’. Many individuals/households employ a ‘livelihood jigsaw’ that comprises a range of both formal and informal practices. This is not a static relationship, as people move in and out of formal and informal spheres on a constant basis. However, it is clear that the informal economy is of vital importance to many people and often it provides the platform from which individuals are enabled to operate in the formal economy.

Sites of resistance or exploitation?

Although the above discussions detail the often positive aspects of informal work practices, when moving away from the traditional formal/informal definition care must be taken not to over romanticise informal work. Within the social sciences there is a trend to see informal work as an alternative, or resistance, to capitalism. While for some people this might be the case, for the majority of people the formal sphere still plays an important role in their everyday lives. By merely highlighting the positive another over-simplified dichotomy is put in place. As Smith and Stenning (2006, p3) state, ‘existing work on diverse economies … runs the risk of failing to problematize the forms of exploitation and inequality within the alternative, “non-capitalist” economies, despite theoretical cautions to the contrary’. Thus it is even more important here to realise that informal economies take many forms. Many of the practices described above can often be personally rewarding but they take up a great deal of time and, particularly in the case of care giving, there is little support and relief.

In many cases people wish to move their informal work into the formal sphere. Although intuitively it might seem a positive to avoid tax payments, in reality it provides many barriers. Such workers, or entrepreneurs, find it difficult to obtain credit and the lack of social security is a constant worry. In a similar theme it must also be remembered that in numerous cases workers have little choice but to work in an informal manner due to the actions of their employers. It might be that they are forced to accept cash in hand wages so the employer can avoid payroll taxes, or that informal payments are demanded to secure employment. The negative aspects of such work are numerous. Firstly, the worker has very little long-term security as he/she can be dismissed at will and there is no recourse if wage payments are not made. Secondly, such work is often exploitative, characterised by long working hours with no holiday or sick pay entitlements. Migrant workers might find that large deductions are made from their wages for their accommodation or they find themselves ‘tied’ to an employer to repay a transport or arrangement fee. Perhaps most seriously, however, is that such work often breaches Health and Safety regulations and is not subject to inspections. This can often lead to tragedy such as the deaths of twenty three Chinese cockle pickers in Morecombe Bay. While this is an extreme example, across the globe vast swathes of production are undertaken by economically marginalised ’sweatshop’ workers in dangerous conditions. By no stretch of the imagination could any of this paid informal work be construed as an alternative to capitalism in a positive way.

This is not to say that all informal work is negative. For many people it does provide a positive alternative to the formal sphere, be it for economic, ideological or environmental reasons. However, these positive/negative aspects again demonstrate the need for a much broader approach to the relationships between formal and informal spheres.

Virtual economies

In recent times new phenomena have developed in the informal economies – one of the most visible has been the rise of the car boot sale. This is semi-commodified as people have to pay for a pitch but the sale of goods is informal. This has also coincided with an increase in ’second hand’ shops on the high street – either for charity, exchange or sometimes profit.

Increasing internet use has led to the rise of sites such as eBay where people can sell goods on an informal basis. Often though such sites become mirrors of the formal economy with people setting up virtual shops – though of course one can speculate how much of the trading is still done informally (ie no tax is paid). There are numerous sites, however, dedicated to unpaid exchange and informal selling such as Craig’s list and Freecycle which demonstrate the importance of informal economies within virtual communities.

An interesting link between informal and formal economies is provided by online virtual world games such as Second Life, Entropia Universe and IMVU, for example, whereby currency earned in the game can be transferred out and converted to real currency – thus allowing people to earn money in virtual worlds. Conversely, items for game play, such as virtual ‘clothing’, ‘weapons’ etc can be purchased online on sites like eBay and transferred into virtual worlds. Also there is evidence of people being paid to play games in order to accrue experience and items for their ‘employee’ – thus the distinction between virtual and real formal/informal economies is becoming increasingly blurred. Furthermore, many real world firms are setting up online in Second Life, as are advertisers, etc. Universities also have a presence both in order to attract new students and teach current ones – therefore an informal space can easily become a formal site of commerce. Of course informal real world activities such as the distribution of pornography also take place in virtual worlds.

Probable futures

As the above has demonstrated, the informal economy is much more than merely a leftover from a previous time. It is clearly still of importance to many households and there is little evidence that it is declining in size. Given that informal economies have flourished during an era of rapid globalisation and the alleged commodification of everyday life, there is no reason to assume that they will diminish in importance over the next twenty-five years. If the current ‘credit crunch’ leads to a long period of recession then it can be expected to grow. This might be linked to formal work, such as ‘cash in hand’ work, in order to maximum household income. More likely, however, it will involve practices such as domestically produced food, the mending or making of clothes and an increase in domestic work, caring and childcare. Even when the economy grows rapidly as during the period from the early 1990s to 2007, this sustained economic growth has not led to a decrease in informal activity.

Despite the fact that the informal economy is not going to disappear it is probable that the state will continue to struggle to conceptualise the various forms of informal work and their relationship to the formal economy. This is somewhat understandable given the negative connotations of some spheres of the informal economy, as discussed above, and the fact that in certain situations it is exploitative, dangerous and illegal. Therefore, the relationship between the formal and informal will continue to be seen in binary terms, positive and negative respectively, for the foreseeable future. It would be very hard, for example, for any government to state that micro-entrepreneurs who are working ‘off the books’ have a positive impact upon the formal economy. Hence it is probable that government policy will concentrate on ’stick’ methods for trying to contain the informal economy, such as penalties for ‘cash in hand’ work and fines for previous tax evasion, rather than using incentives, such as ‘forgiveness’ for the previous non-payment of tax or ‘tax free’ or ‘tax deferment’ periods, to encourage micro-enterprises to move into the formal sphere.

Demographic changes will also impact upon the nature of informal economies. As Europe’s population ages then more people will perform unpaid caring roles as parents and friends require assistance in their later life stages. Furthermore, as life expectancy increases people will have more time to devote to informal activities post-retirement age. This will see an increase in grandparents providing childcare and other assistance to their children. Intergenerational transfers between parents and children will become even more important as student debt levels increase and first-time buyers continue to struggle to raise a deposit to purchase a house. Therefore, it is probable that children will remain at home for longer, often returning after university, receiving the informal support of their parents. This trend can also be seen in the rise of what is termed ‘helicopter parenting’ where the recent rise in communication technology has made it much easier for parents to remain in contact with their children, and conversely, children find it much easier to contact their parents if they need their support or a job done.

It is probable that there will be a growth in the importance of informal economies in, and around, virtual worlds. This will involve the growth of games such as Second Life and Entropia and the continuing importance of social networking sites. Sites such as Facebook will be used to share information and to alert people to opportunities in both the formal and informal economies. As environmental concerns grow over the next 25 years, the recycling and sharing of goods, such as the gifting of unwanted goods or car-pooling, will become increasingly common and will be facilitated by online communities and websites. Although the expected rise in home working, as a result of more effective ICT, has not materialised it can be expected that in 25 years time more people will be able to work from home. This, if working time does not increase correspondingly, will reduce the amount of time required for formal work (for instance, commuting will no longer add to the working day), leaving people with more time for leisure and informal activities. Such home working will also spur the creation of consultancies and micro-enterprises, which may begin in an informal fashion.

On a more negative note, if economic polarisation continues to grow at current rates then over the next twenty-five years increasing numbers of people will turn to informal economies in order to ensure the economic security of their household. This will be a mix of illegal and legal activities and will see people move even further from the formal sphere, and will possibly see an increase in levels of exploitation and unsafe working conditions.

Preferable futures

The most preferable vision is one where the meta-narratives surrounding the informal economy are broken down. It is hoped that there is a more widespread realisation that there is a wide spectrum of informal activities and that there are both positive and negative aspects to many of the practices. Perhaps the most important recognition is that in many cases the informal economy supports the formal economy. For example, without informal childcare some people would be unable to undertake formal work. It must also be realised that there is a deep social aspect to many informal practices that strengthen networks and often fulfil the formal role of the state, such as unpaid care giving.

If the varied nature of the informal is unpacked then it will be much easier to develop appropriate blanket policy responses rather than a ‘catch all’ approach. At one end of the spectrum, dangerous, criminal and large-scale informal activities such as drug and people smuggling should, obviously, be targeted with the full force of the law, while at the same time informal micro-enterprises should be incentivised into moving into the formal sphere. This could be facilitated by various policy measures such as a longer period where they can go unregistered, tax forgiveness or deferment, greater support, advice centres, access to accountants and tax advisors, etc.

A shift in culture towards rewarding entrepreneurship would also support such measures. For example, in the USA and Japan, entrepreneurs and innovators have a much higher public standing and as a result there is more of an entrepreneurial culture. The informal economy has an important role here as there is much less risk in operating informally in the gestation period of an enterprise – ie less money is invested, payments/time for registration are much lower. Furthermore, less punitive bankruptcy laws (and reduced stigma, which would arise from the culture change) would encourage people to take the steps into entrepreneurship and to try out ideas in the informal sphere before moving them into the formal.

In this preferable future employers who force employees into informal practices are clamped down upon, allowing those who wish their work to be formalised to do so. Furthermore, those undertaking informal work to support those in formal work, such as childcare or care provision, should have their efforts recognised and rewarded. This could be through direct payments or tax credits. Moving these roles into a more formal sphere would allow for training and support to be given. This is particularly important for those undertaking such work, such as school age children supporting parents. Increased social support facilities, such as childcare, would allow people to undertake formal work who otherwise would not have the time to do so – or who would be spending so much of their formal income on support as to not make it worthwhile to do so.

The preferable future would harness a more socially orientated economic model, where profit is not the main goal, which would assist all sections of society and harness the activities of both the formal and informal spheres. Volunteering and mutual aid would be promoted as key functions of society and Local Exchange Trading schemes (LETs) would flourish. While some of these actions might seem utopian in thinking and would cost the state money, the increase in tax revenue from the formalisation of informal enterprises would go some way to covering these costs. In short, informal economies are here to stay and the preferable future will be one that is able to harness their positive aspects for all of society.

The implications of the growth of the informal economy on education

The informal economy has a number of implications for education, especially in relation to lifelong learning. It can be argued that within schools there needs to be more discussion on the nature of informal economies and work. This would help promote the positive aspects of practices such as volunteering, mutual aid and the role of family and friendship networks in everyday life. On a more practical note as discussed above, there are a significant number of school age children who have to provide care to family members. The Education Network estimated in 2005 that there were around 175,000 school children who are devoting a significant amount of their time to caring for others. The Princess Trust for Young Carers notes that there are many problems that these carers face, such as a lack of time to do school work, limited social opportunities, unhealthy lifestyles (such as a lack of sleep due to night time care or limited shopping opportunities), amongst many others. All of these issues impact on their ability to enter the formal workplace when they leave school. While there is some attention paid to this problem there needs to be a greater understanding of the issue; for example, some schools believe no one attending their institution has to perform these roles.

Within the Higher Education sector, especially in Business and Management Schools, more attention needs to be paid to the varied nature of the informal economy. Business education would be an ideal place to start a broader rethinking of the ways in which informal economies could be drawn into the formal spheres. For example, entrepreneurs and managers in the formal sphere act as mentors to micro-enterprises, providing guidance on how they can formalise their work.

Arguably the biggest implication of the growth in informal economies on the education sector is in relation to lifelong learning. Workers in the informal economy develop many important skills that are relevant to the formal economy but often they are not recognised by formal employers. Furthermore, it can be difficult for informal workers to access courses aimed at developing different skill sets, for example the use of ICT in the workplace. While the government has set up numerous schemes aimed at helping people develop such skills they are often aimed at people who are not in work. This means it can be difficult for people who are working informally to access them, for example, because of a lack of time or childcare problems. This issue has been identified by the International Labour Organisation, which argues that such training must fulfil the following criteria:

• Training must be demand-driven
• Training must be targeted and needs-led
• Skills training for the informal economy needs to go beyond technical skills training
• Training has to be short, modest, and competency based
• Training should recognize complex livelihoods
• Training should be monitored and evaluated on an ongoing basis
• Trainers themselves should be adequately trained and capable of delivering quality training
• Both public and private training providers have important roles to play
• The level of skill adaptation impacts on the extent to which new technologies can increase productivity in the informal economy.

Another form of education/training that informal micro-enterprises would benefit from is the provision of centres that could provide confidential guidance on the procedures needed to move into the formal economy. This would include, for example, advice on tax, employment rights, and health and safety regulations. The confidential nature of such guidance would encourage entrepreneurs to come forward without the fear of penalties.

This document has been commissioned as part of the UK Department for Children, Schools and Families’ Beyond Current Horizons project, led by Futurelab. The views expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation.

Norwegian report on informal work

see Gershuny,2000; ILO, 2002a, b; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Williams, 2004a, b, 2005a, b; Williams and Windebank, 1999a, b)

2315 Schneider, F., Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: What Do We Really Know?

Schneider, F., (2002) The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 22 Transition and 21 OECD Countries

http://www.cinterfor.org.uy/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/temas/informal/

On the Frontier of Adulthood: Theory, Research, and Public Policy (MacArthur Foundation Series) (Hardcover) by Richard A. Settersten Jr. (Editor), Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. (Editor), Ruben G. Rumbaut (Editor)

listen to http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/womanshour/02/2008_19_thu.shtml

Oughton, E., Wheelock, J. and Baines, S. (2003) ”Micro-businesses and Social Inclusion in

Rural Households: A Comparative Analysis,” Sociologia Ruralis 43(4): 331-348

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/north_east/4088650.stm

Bender, 2004; Castree et al, 2004; Espenshade, 2004; Hapke, 2004; A. Ross, 2004; R. Ross, 2004

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/apr/13/schools.children

http://www.carers.org/professionals/young-carers/articles/transitions-to-adulthood-for-carers,3167,PR.html

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/apr/13/schools.children http://www.t-e-n.co.uk/index.php

http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/details.asp?pubID=793

Children and their parents

For many years in the UK along with other Western Countries a family could be thought of in terms of a household where children, their married parents and, on occasion, other close relatives such as grandparents live together. However, a number of factors have more recently converged and changed the ’shape’ of such families and households and led to alternatives to the nuclear model outlined above.

Demographic factors such as population ageing and migration, an increase in the breakdown of parental relationships, together with same-sex couples attaining equal; rights to those enjoyed by married ones, have all had an impact on household and family structures and living arrangements (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006).

Lone parent families.

Over the 30-year span between to the 1960s and the mid 1990s the number of nuclear families in the UK fell from 38 to 25% of all households (Clarke, 1996; Office of National Statistics, 1999). Although children living in two-parent households still form the majority, the proportion living in lone parent households (most of which comprise lone mothers) has doubled to around 23% over the last thirty years (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006).

While divorce is regarded as the main cause of lone parent families (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006), further effects on the number of lone parent families also arise from the large number of births to unmarried mothers. The proportion of women who cohabit in their first partnership has risen from about 25% for those born in the 1950s to around 80% for those born in the 1980s (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006). The number of children born outside of marriage has risen dramatically from 9% to 43% 1975 to 2004 and, importantly, the likelihood that cohabiting mothers will eventually form a longer lasting married relationship is less than for women without children. This has implications for intergenerational contact bearing in mind that, since the 1960s, one-parent families have tended to live solo rather than communally (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006). Even if some relationships do remain stable and monogamous, the occurrence in those who choose to ‘live apart together’ can also contribute to restricted parental contact.

The increase in divorce rates and cohabitation also gives rise to more complex arrangements such as reconstituted family households in which some children are the natural offspring of both parents, while in other cases are from just one (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006). On the one hand, an increase in step parenting could suggest a move away from norms expressed through kinship or marriage and could be seen as a social problem or deficit in terms of moral values and any stability that might be associated with these. On the other hand, it is also possible to see such alternatives to the nuclear model as a development of a different kind of social order (Silva and Smart, 1999; Smart, 2004). In terms of the potential for intergenerational contact, McCarthy et al’s (2003) work with step families or ‘clusters’ found that the wellbeing of children was nevertheless maintained in different ways. For example, while some working-class parents formed new non-kinship groupings within single households, middle class parents might maintain kinship links across different households. In all cases there was a sense of sustained relationships with children’s needs at heart. Although parental separation on the one hand can reduce the opportunity for intergenerational encounter, on the other hand, if parents split up and form new relationships this can also increase the range of adult contact available (Dench and Ogg, 2002).

Ethnic diversity

Further scope for diversity in families arises from immigration. For example, Prout (2008) cites a nine-fold increase in the total number of migrants in Western countries from 1965 to 1990 (International Labour Office, 2003, p26) with general agreement that this is an increasing trend (eg, Commission of the European Community, 2001; Ermisch and Murphy, 2006). However, interpreting sources such as UK census data is problematic. While 8% of those living in the UK are recorded as non-white ethnic minority, this could be an under-estimate because many, in particular younger, ethnic minorities are unlikely to register this affiliation (Harper and Levin, 2003). There is also the further issue regarding estimates of the age-distribution of minority groups (Harper and Levin, 2003). In short, the growth in ethnic diversity and concomitant effects of religious affiliation can be seen to have implications for diversity of childhood, children’s lived experience and formation of identity (Connolly, 1998; Garcia-Coll et al, 2004; Orellana et al, 2001 – all cited in Prout 2008,) Family size is a further factor that can vary substantially by ethnic group as suggested from data in the Second Survey of the Millennium Cohort Study. For example, ‘children in Bangladeshi families were most likely to have three or more siblings (32.6%) while White (8%), Mixed (8%) and Indian children (4.8%) were least likely (Hansen and Joshi, 2007).

Effects of an ageing population

It is well known that longer life expectancy coupled with a decline in birth rates have resulted in an ageing population. A recent analysis based upon data from the Office for National Statistics (Falkingham and Grundy, 2007) indicates that in the three decades from mid-1971 to mid-2004 the proportion of people under 16 fell from 25% to 9% while those aged 65 and over increased from 13% to 16% of the total population. It was also reported that while declining fertility played an initial part in population ageing for the UK, increased lifespan has now become a major factor. This is apparent in the current relatively large increase in number and proportion of those aged 85 and over. In addition to the above trends, age distributions are also modulated by earlier fluctuations in birth rates such as the bulge in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This will mean an increase in the numbers of the ‘younger elderly’ who will be in their 60s by around 2020 and who will, of course, eventually become the ‘older old’ (Falkingham and Grundy, 2007).

More specifically and with regard to opportunities for intergenerational encounters, using data from the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey, Dench and Ogg (2002) have also noted that women giving birth to children in the late 1960s and early 1970s did so at a relatively early age. This has led to a high proportion of young grandparents with more than half of the British population becoming grandparents by the age of 54. When this is taken together with women currently having fewer children a living family can span a number of generations while the number of members belonging to each generation is relatively few. This demographic ‘beanpole’ effect (Hagestad, 2000) is also reflected more generally across Western societies (eg, Letablier and Pennec, 2003).

The availability of grandparents

Although parents and children may be seen as the centrepoint within families, other important roles have been ascribed to other close relatives, in particular grandparents.

In 2003, 26% of all dependent children in Great Britain received childcare from their grandparents (Social Trends, 2006, cited in Broad, 2007). Because grandparents live longer and healthier lives and parents are having children when they are younger, the role of grandparents is increasing (Jerrome, 1993). This also has the effect of increasing the length of time spent as a grandparent, often to around a third of the lifespan (Dench and Ogg, 2002).

Crucial factors influencing the role and level of involvement of grandparents have been identified as being proximity and lineage. Clarke and Roberts (2004) found that the distance grandparents lived from their children was the main factor relating to contact. Furthermore, they found that lineage, regardless of whether the grandparents were maternal or paternal, was more significant than family type in predicting contact: paternal grandparents generally seeing less of their sons’ children, particularly in cases of family breakdown.

The availability of grandparents is also influential in that today’s working mothers often do not have mothers who themselves have careers of their own. If women continue to take on greater career responsibilities and this is coupled with increasing population mobility, then the activity of grandparents in the role of childcare is likely to diminish (Broad, 2007).

In spite of the above concerns recent studies indicate that the level of involvement and frequency of contact of grandparents with their grandchildren is generally far greater than might have been expected. Dench and Ogg (2002) found that 95% of grandparents had seen their grandchild within the last two years and 73% were in physical contact at least once a month, whilst Clarke and Roberts (2004) found that 60% of grandparents saw their grandchild on a weekly basis and 60% also reported having other types of contact including telephone, letter and e-mail. A study carried out by Quadrello et al (2005) has examined the different forms of contact between grandparents and grandchildren between 10 and 15 years of age in the UK, Finland, Spain and Estonia. Face-to-face and landline phone contact were found to occur more frequently in comparison to contact using mobile phones. Texting, letters or cards and e-mail were used less frequently, although e-mail was used more often in the absence of face-to-face contact. Overall, however, the take-up of new communication modes between grandparents and grandchildren was in the minority, about one in eight, and less than might be expected in terms of technological availability. In view of the increasing availability of different channels of communication afforded by new technologies and the control that both young and old have with regard to their use, the effects of these as well as proximity of grandparent-grandchild contact may need further investigation.

Roles taken by grandparents

The roles undertaken by grandparents within the family are varied and their significance has been recognised for some years (DfES, 2003). Clarke and Roberts (2004) have put these into three main groupings: practical, emotional and financial. They found from their survey that childcare, especially with working parents, was a key practical feature with over half of the grandparents babysitting their grandchildren and around 60% looking after a grandchild aged under 15 in the daytime. According to Age Concern (2004), one in four grandparents care for their grandchildren on a regular basis, again, when the children’s parents are working or studying. Looked at from the point of view of children whose mothers are in employment, grandparents take a 34% share of informal childcare, followed by ‘other relatives’ (8%), ‘friends or neighbours’ or childminders (each 7%) (ONS, 2002). This has also been reflected in the first survey of the Millennium Cohort Study (Dex and Ward, 2004) where 33% of parents said that grandparents look after the first child all or most of the time whilst they were at work and carry out 78% of childcare at other times. Grandparents can play a number of important roles such as keeping wider sets of relatives connected and providing a bridge to the past by acting as a source of family history, heritage and traditions; the latter often carried out by telling stories that keep grandchildren aware of their own family experiences and culture (Ross et al, 2005).

While much of the care that is evident for children in their early years may decline as grandchildren get older (Dench and Ogg, 2002; Soule et al, 2005), there is evidence for the importance of the continuing support that is provided by grandparents (Hodgson, 1992). From a more recent study involving young people between the ages of 10 and 19 and their grandparents ranging from their early 50s to late 80s it was found that relationships were more likely to revolve around talking, giving advice and support as grandchildren grew older (Ross et al, 2005). Listening to grandchildren was generally regarded as a key role with many of the young people reporting that they could share problems and concerns with their grandparents who could also act as go-betweens in the family when there were disagreements with their parents (Ross et al, 2005).

Geographical proximity, as noted by Smith and Drew (2002), has been found to be a key factor, not only in the frequency of contact, but also in the closeness in grandparent-grandchild relationships. For example, Hodgson (1992) examined this by comparing those grandparents and grandchildren living within 25 miles of each other (almost half) with those living up to and beyond 500 miles away. A similar finding with grandfathers and grandchildren was obtained by Kivett (1985). Some indication of the prevalence of this closeness might be gained from figures reported by The National Centre for Social Research (1999) which suggest that, in the UK, between 30 and 40% of grandparents lived less than 15 minutes away from a grandchild. However, the extent to which physical distance alone reflects the degree of upbringing and emotional closeness is less clear and Ross et al (2005) have noted that, regardless of proximity, some children contact their grandparents independently of their parents. A further consideration is that it is middle class families who tend to be more geographically separated. While this may result in less frequent contact the deficit is offset by shared holidays, gifts and financial support. Moral values are also shared across generations in these cases (Dench and Ogg, 2002). Again, our knowledge of the effect of the increasing availability of new communication technologies such as e-mail mobile phones on the nature and role of grandparent-grandchild contact may benefit from continued review.

Class, educational and economic influences

The above effects concerning the availability and roles of grandparents are modulated by class and education. For example, divorce rates for those less educated were found to be some 30% higher than for those more educated (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006). A further demographic factor currently influencing intergenerational contact has been identified by Newman and Hatton-Yeo (2008). In response to changing economies families are likely to move to areas where there are better job prospects. Moreover, such economic demands are also accompanied by the increase in single-parent and two-working-parent families.

In addition to the above overall trends, families, of course, vary. There are class, cultural and economic factors. The age of women at their first partnership has also increased from 22 to 25 but the extent to which marriage and motherhood occur later in life has been found to be greater for women who have a higher education (statistics to be checked). Less educated women have children younger (around 24) while more educated women tend to have children when older (median in excess of 30) (Ermisch and Murphy, 2006).

Intergenerational Programs

The scope for intergenerational exchange and support between families can be seen to be compromised in view of some of the above factors such as children with lone or working parents, migration and economic relocation. In view of this there have been developments in provision aimed at purposeful extra-familial support that do not rely on the family. Newman and Hatton-Yeo (2008), for example, characterise these in terms of either educating the young or being concerned with the welfare of older adults. In particular they focus on the teaching and learning roles that can be played by bringing together the different age-groups. The perceived benefits of this enterprise include shared learning positive attitudes among generations and social cohesion (Newman and Hatton-Yeo, 2008)). The underlying theory is drawn from Erikson’s (1963) idea that parallel developmental needs of young and old result in a special kind of synergy between these generations. In view of this participants in intergenerational programmes are usually populated by those who are younger and older while missing out a middle generation. The idea that a generational synergy can be developed outside the family setting is, of course, fundamental to such programs.

In their review of the literature, Springate, Atkinson and Martin (2008) detail the range of ‘intergenerational practice’ in the UK and the role of those who take part in it. Although, these are extrafamilial enterprises and therefore lie outside the scope of the present discussion, acknowledgement of these is due in that the outcomes may feed back, even if mainly indirectly through any effects that they may have on the social ambience.

The family and intergenerational learning

So far the nature of families and households today and the contact between different generations such as children, their parents and grandparents has been outlined. In view of the impact of the different demographic, social, economic and cultural factors there is considerable diversity in families and how households are formed. It is against this background that the kinds of learning exchanges and personal developments that might occur can now be considered.

The family can be a hub of mutual support, influence and learning in a multitude of ways. Although some of these may be systematic and intentional, much of what may influence each family member can be informal and incidental. Shared values, expectations, aspirations, knowledge, beliefs, skills, behaviours and the language we use develop around the variety of domestic activities that family members engage in. These activities can range from playing together and talking to each other about each other to more specific pursuits such as sport, gardening, reading, shopping and watching TV. We are also living at a time where new information and communication technologies are finding their way into homes and lives at many different levels.

In one sense it is easy to characterise the role that older family members can play in handing down knowledge and wisdom as if these are fixed entities that can be passed down through generations. While certain skills and knowledge may be passed from one generation to the next, other things are continually changing. Not only are we living at a time of rapid scientific and technological development but we are also living at a time of rapid social and cultural change. In turn the demands made by society change in relation to these and what is valued and seen as relevant can influence how each individual develops.

The above resources of networks and norms of shared values are among the individual and community assets underlying the concept of social capital (Balatti and Falk, 2002). Social exclusion and disadvantage result in negative social capital (Bostrom, 2002) and the importance of the family as the individual’s initial source of social capital has been argued by Kerka (2003). She has registered concerns arising from social changes such as increased life expectancy, greater mobility, increased reliance on non-familial caregivers at both ends of the lifespan and a more age-segregated society such as retirement communities and youth culture and the potential for inequities working against characteristics of positive social capital (Schuller et al, 2002, cited in Kerka, 2003).

What is meant by ‘transfer’ and how this complements what else goes on between family members can lie at the heart of what is understood by learning. The phrase ‘intergenerational transfer of learning’ carries with it the idea that learning results from something that is transferred from one generation to another or, at least, a series of such acquisitions. Taken on its own this, of course, reduces learning to a quantitative increase in knowledge or procedures familiar to behaviourists; a one-way transaction thereby ignoring the agency of the learner. Constructivist or sociocultural approaches are well known in that they allow for learners acting on what they receive in their own way; building, modifying, and often discarding earlier mental structures so that learning can also become a way of seeing and understanding things differently; a qualitative change (eg, Fosnot, 1996; Wertsch and Tulviste, 1996). Acknowledging this creative potential in the learner not only transforms the idea of learning and what can go on amongst family members but also what society contributes to families as well as what families can contribute to society.

Family members respond to each other, each in their own unique way. In view of this there is a contribution that all family members, regardless of their generation, can make towards each other’s development as well as to the family as a whole. Even if a more experienced other plays a scaffolding role (Vygotsky, 1978) so that with this assistance a task can be carried out by a learner that would otherwise not be attempted successfully alone there is still scope for mutually helpful collaboration. This is, for example, inherent in Rogoff’s (1990) use of the term ‘guided participation’ which suggests a more active role played by children so they can collaborate with, as well as be guided by others. Intra-generationally, research carried out amongst siblings by Gregory (2001) suggests an evenly balanced interplay or ’synergy’ where understandings can be developed mutually rather than primarily in one direction. If the idea of transfer is to be considered more generally in the family setting then, firstly, its scope as a multi-way intergenerational phenomenon should be taken into account and, moreover, its relationship to learning considered in relation to a creative interplay or synergy.

Dissatisfaction with the idea of learning as acquisition has been expressed by Hodkinson and his co-workers (Hodkinson, 2005; Hodkinson et al, 2007) who see this as separating the learner from the process of learning and what is learned. In particular, they argue that ‘the processes and products of learning are deeply intertwined, and neither can be understood without considering the positions, dispositions, and identities of [the] learner’ (Hodkinson et al, 2007, p14) with no clear separation between learning and identity. For some people, each is part of the other with learning not just about becoming but also about being. A more recent characterisation of this has been cited by Plumb (2008) in the phrase ‘learning as dwelling’. Here it is also argued that learning is not about the intake of external knowledge into the mind of an isolated individual but a ‘process through which learners forever weave themselves into the fabric of their natural, social and cultural worlds’ (Plumb, 2008, p62).

A view of learning occurring as part of practice and the social interactions that take place in the associated settings has been developed by Lave and Wenger (1991). They argue a distinction between the approach to academic learning taken in schools or other education institutions and learning that occurs more naturally as part of day -to-day social activity. Academic approaches towards learning focus on representations of the world that have been abstracted from the real life setting where they would normally occur. These representations can then be manipulated theoretically and can be helpful in developing explanations and predictions about the world. As McCormick (1997) has noted, knowledge derived in this way is applicable more generally to a variety of situations whereas practical knowledge is limited to particular situations. While academic approaches can focus on more conscious systematic forms of teaching, by way of contrast learning may arise within the practice occurring in an everyday setting (Lave, 1989). In this way learners engage less formally from their own perspective rather than from an external perspective that might otherwise characterise a teaching curriculum. In this way learning is situated within, rather than isolated from, the practical setting and the social relations that form part of this (Lave and Wenger, 1991).

Learning also occurs within a community comprised of participants who make a range of contributions. A key point is that the contributions can be at different levels depending on those who happen to be participating in an activity where understandings and purposes are shared. Lave and Wenger (1991) use the term ‘community of practice’ in relation to individuals who participate in a common purpose and share understandings about their actions in relation to this.

The family can be likened to a community of practice in the sense that there is mutual support with members playing complementary roles in the practice of day-to-day living without any external systematic learning agenda. Even with children growing up as part of a family in business their early experiences of the social practice within the family and the knowledge and skills associated within this are inextricably linked (Hamilton, 2006). On some occasions what is shared and learnt can be more systematic and focused while in many other respects learning can be incidental and informal.

From her ethnographic study of working class children between the ages of 8 and 10 Maddock (2006) has drawn attention to the unique range of experiences and opportunities provided by families for their children. Through this, children may come to value some activities rather than others. Underlying these differences, though, was a common but subtle agenda for children’s learning linked to personal human concern into which children fit activities and experiences in terms of what makes ‘human sense’ (Donaldson, 1978). This she has contrasted with the more externally driven and overtly goal-directed learning agendas that can be imposed by adults.

Families are not formal learning institutions and although they are populated in part by adults the learning space can be very different from the more uniform and target-driven demands that have to be managed within the confines of a learning initiative. If intergenerational programmes and extrafamilial paradigms (Newman and Hatton-Yeo, 2008) are being implemented in response to a perceived deficit in some children’s lives then a key challenge for the future is to preserve some of those qualities of the family learning space and the associated diversity.

Some insight into the learning dynamics that go on within families can be gained through the work carried out by Kenner et al, (2005) in homes in East London. Although there was a focus on the learning that evolved through interactions between children and their grandparents, the position of parents in this context was also considered. The focus was on the role of grandparents in view of the significant role they play in childcare.

Time constraints upon parents

In contrast to parents who were working and busy with a variety of day to day responsibilities, grandparents could spend more time with their grandchildren and develop a special bond (Weissvourd, 1998). Children and their grandparents each had their own vulnerabilities and were able to offer mutual support for each other. There was scope for a more relaxed and hands-on relationship when engageing in activities (Jessel et al, 2004). The home setting, then, could offer scope for a more evenly balanced learning relationship, or ’synergy’ (Gregory, 2001) than might occur in more formal educational contexts. In particular, synergistic learning relationships occurred between children and their grandparents. This gave scope for reciprocal social relationships and joint interaction in learning and contrasts with the role of the teacher as controller rather than as learning partner (Bruner, 1985). In the context of the family, mutual trust and respect for each member’s perspective (Rommetveit, 1974, 1979) was regarded as important to this process. The value given to an activity within a culture in which learners identify can also influence learning interactions (Goodnow, 1990).

Reading and language

Families can play a key role in the development of literacy. A parent reading books to children is an everyday part of life in many families. Although this can involve both mothers and fathers, it has been found that mothers tend to do this more (Nichols 2000; Connie and Sharen, 2004). Grandparents also make important contributions to their grandchildren’s education (Strom and Strom, 1995) and with regard to literacy performance, grandparents’ reading skills and practices are reflected across generations (Parsons and Bynner, 2006). This was also evident from the work carried out by Kenner et al (2005). A further focus on the story-reading within Bangladeshi families revealed how the multiple worlds inhabited by a grandchild during story-reading were transformed ’syncretically’ on a number of levels (Gregory et al, 2007). The idea of syncretism as a creative process where people reinvent culture, drawing on familiar and new resources is argued to be of central importance in that it allows for cultures to develop rather than remain frozen. This was evident within the books that were used, such as through the pictorial illustrations, as well as linguistically in the story reading (Gregory et al, 2007).

The role of new technologies

Although the parts taken by human beings as key players in family life have been outlined, there is another element that is finding its way into people’s relationships: new information and communication technologies (ICTs). If we regard these solely in terms of such functions as storing and retrieving information and communication to others then they may not appear to be so new. However, what marks out the present day developments in this field are their portability, accessibility and affordability.

New technologies and family communication

The number of older as well as younger people using mobile phones and the internet to communicate has increased in recent years (Haddon, 2004; Age Concern, 2002; Mobile Data Association, 2005). Attitudes amongst elderly towards internet use have been found to vary from the ‘users’ who were open to learning something new regardless of their age and ‘non-users’ who did regard age as an obstacle (Blit-Cohen and Litwin, 2004). Health factors such as deteriorating eyesight also marked out users from non-users. Active social communication was found to take place over the internet. The extent to which people own and use technology also has a bearing on the availability of social support. From their European study Mante-Meijer et al (2001) found that in countries where the technologies have penetrated less there was greater reliance on settings where the relevant skills could be learnt formally. Informal learning, more evident in high-penetration countries, was found to take place in a variety of contexts such as within families and between work colleagues. Although Selwyn (2004) has found that the extent to which children influence their parents’ take-up of computers was slight, children were able to play a more active part in this with their grandparents. The situation has, of course, been rapidly changing over the last few years as new technology has penetrated and proliferated. More recently, Gatto and Tak (2008) have reported increasing use by older adults of computers for communication as well as entertainment and access to information.

New technologies and family learning

Based on a survey of the views of parents of children from 3 to 5 years of age attending nurseries in Scotland, McPake et al (2005) have identified three types of competence developed through the use of ICT: technical (basic operational skills), cultural (understanding of the social roles that ICT plays) and learning. The latter, seen to be of particular significance to young children, refers to their ability to use ICT for social and cultural purposes, including communication, self-expression and entertainment as well as their work. ICT was used in the home to support early literacy and numeracy, communication and musical skills, as well as in helping children learn how to learn. Importantly, the degree of competence children had acquired appeared to depend on such factors as access to equipment, support in learning to use it, and the particular interests and aptitudes of older family members. The authenticity seen to be afforded by technological activities can aid learning (Murphy and Hennessy, 2001). This has been followed up in the family context by Jane and Robbins (2004) who have also reported on the potential benefit of such activities to grandparents in that it allows them to revisit and explore technology in a new and fresh way as a result of interacting with their grandchildren. Kenner et al (2008) noted the role of the computer as mediating artefact (Crook, 2001) and participant in learning activities with grandparents and grandchildren. In this context, however, the importance of the role of the grandparent in structuring the approach to the activities was also noted (Kenner et al, 2008).

The future: changes and challenges

We can look into the future in different ways. At one level the predicted patterns of ageing might not surprise us. People will live longer and healthier lives and assuming the reduction in fertility rates continues, then in the coming decades over half the population in the UK will be over 50. Although there will be transient effects such as the ‘age wave’ resulting from the high fertility rates of the 1960s, there will continue to be a large representation of older people and different generations of families with relatively few offspring co-existing. We may also be unsurprised about the forecast that with continuing rates of migration, ethnic diversity will also become more widespread within the UK. We might also make a reasonable guess at the career involvement and the prevalence of working mothers as well as fathers increasing within the system with the consequent reduction of availability of within-family childcare. We might also be quite comfortable predicting that technology may not only change but become more available.

What may be more difficult to predict, however, is how the different trends might interact. For example, while there is more scope for ethnic diversity within families, the cultural effects are not certain. It is not certain, for example, to what extent immigrant groups will become assimilated, nor how acculturation will take effect, so that the values, the culture and the customs merge with the majority population with time. Conversely, some communities might retain a strong heritage and cultural identity. There may be further tensions in retaining identity if family members are dispersed geographically because of economic demand and globalisation. While information and communication technologies have the power to enable younger family members to become independent and lose their cultural identity they can also, at the same time, facilitate cultural contact within and across national boundaries. It is likely that the continued weakening of horizontal household ties through divorce and other instabilities in relationships will mean that vertical intergenerational links and influences will become more important (Owen et al, 2004). However, this will also be in a context where an increased active lifespan together with employment rights for the elderly may mean that those family members who in the past have played this role may become more likely to take on the pivotal role of working and supporting those both younger and older than themselves (Dench and Ogg, 2002). We do not know how family members will continue to balance these demands and whether families can remain as coherent cohesive units. We do not know whether grandparents will continue to have the time for childcare and that special bond and, for that matter, whether grandfathers rather than grandmothers will have to play a greater role.

The challenge for some minority communities could be in terms of maintaining a heritage identity. Even if there are collective communal initiatives that support this, the role of the family could be crucial in this respect. While grandparents have been an active source of cultural knowledge and practice in the past, how this role might be picked up by future generations is less certain. In addition, particular occupations and the associated skills are less likely to remain stable within a given family and so learning needs could become less predictable. In turn this could affect the status of older generations as authoritative sources of information and skills. We are also living at a time when information is not only much more readily accessible but also is there in greater variety, quantity, detail and abundance.

Work patterns will affect what goes on within families. Apart from the possibility of a longer active life which has career implications, the demands of the labour market in response to shortages of particular skills will mean that patterns in work, training and education will change when viewed from a life-long perspective. The blurring of boundaries between living, working and learning currently experienced may continue to progress; particularly as new technologies, mobile communications, and global business practices can keep people electronically connected at all times of the day and night regardless of whether they are at a place of work, at home, or on holiday (Harrison, 2008). Perhaps the biggest challenge to families in relation to this context is managing the balance between work and leisure – or, indeed, a new order of family life. Although flexible working patterns could assist this process there is also the possibility that the more traditional opportunities for family and intergenerational interaction, such as in the evenings and at weekends, may disappear.

A report carried out by the Future Foundation (2004), has suggested that up to 23 million people in the UK may be at risk of digital exclusion in 2025. While in the past a ‘digital divide’ has been framed in terms of a lack of availability of digital resources, more sophisticated notions of digital inclusion or exclusion also consider broader problems of social inclusion and engagement (Warschauer, 2004). Selwyn (2002), for example, argues that access to technology in itself is insufficient in promoting a digitally inclusive society and results from an adult continuing education survey carried out with his co-workers (Gorard et al, 2000) support his contention that access should be meaningful, functional, and of perceived relevance. In terms of social capital this also presents a challenge that belongs as much to the family as in the public domain. The use of ICT in the home can reduce the time that families interact as a whole. Sanger’s (1997) work suggests that, in contrast to a family watching the same programmes on the one and only television receiver in the house, the increased availability of technology such as video games has segregated families; parents, for example, know very little about what their children are doing when they are each in their own rooms in different parts of the home. We are, perhaps, living at a time when families could be encouraged to negotiate rules around the use of new technologies. On this basis there is a need for parents to talk to children about the dangers of the internet and encourage them to look critically at the information they find on the internet and other media. Similarly, as more mobile phones become available, it is timely to address questions on how such technology is shaping family life and how families are shaping the use of technology.

While this article began with a characterisation of the family in terms of the space delineated by a household and relatively monogamous relationships, the possibility exists for the development of more complex relationships involving different generations including parents and children. What we regard as a ‘virtual’ space today may take on a more tangible coherent and connected life of its own as we are able, through communication technologies, to maintain, sustain and develop relationships. The space in which we live and learn may no longer be defined by four walls and a roof. In this context the challenge for ‘family’ members may be one of identifying and contributing to a group identity, even if this identity is dynamic in nature. The syncretic processes (Gregory, 2001) noted earlier could have a role to play here.

The implications arising from the possible blurring of chronological divisions of education (Harper, 2008) for intergenerational learning are widespread. Segmentation of education may be less distinct. For example, the role of the university could become a more continuous one where people remain connected as part of a life long learning community. With regard to children’s learning and development, another challenge is for teachers to know more about the learning that goes on within families so that they can learn from this as well as allow their own institutional approaches (which will be different) to interface in a sensitive way. This is still an under-researched area. While studies such as the Teaching and Learning Research Programme’s Learning Lives (Hodkinson et al, 2008) have begun to contribute to the literature on the kind of learning going on throughout peoples lives both formally and informally, further attention will still be needed in understanding the different kinds of learning, cultural practices and development taking place in a variety of out-of-school settings including the family.

Older people, of course, are not fixed entities. The older people of 2050 will have been the younger people of today who will have taken with them not only the practices we associate with young people today but also some of the attitudes to change and flexibility that we may consider a hallmark of our time. Assuming the infants of today will be the elders of the future then, to survive as a responsive and flexible community in a changing world, what they will take with them into that future will not just be the transferred remnants of yesterday but also the ability to play their part in creating the culture of tomorrow.

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This document has been commissioned as part of the UK Department for Children, Schools and Families’ Beyond Current Horizons project, led by Futurelab. The views expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation.

There are two types of trend to examine (a) the numbers of employees and (b) the percentage of the eligible workforce employed.

Total numbers of employees in GB and the UK have continued to increase steadily in the past 25 years since 1983. But within this overall total there are a number of different trends. Men’s numbers in full-time employment dipped from 1990 and stayed lower until the end of the century, but have since picked up to early 1980s level and are now stable again. The number of men in part-time employment has been on a very gradual but steady increase.

The percentage of working age men in employment fell between 1975 (87.8%) and 1993 (74.8%) but has since risen and remains fairly stable around (80%). The employment rate for older men fell substantially between 1950 and 1995. Men’s employment rates have remained above women’s employment rates, but women have been progressively closing the gap.

The picture of men’s employment has been one of relatively little change, some fluctuations with the business cycle, and some decline through a restructuring of the economy in which men’s jobs felt the brunt of the change. The restructuring of the economy away from manufacturing to predominantly services hit men the most and produced the decline in their employment after 1980 and the concomitant growth in men being economically inactive, long term-sick and increasingly in receipt of incapacity benefit. This trend also had strong regional differences.

More recent trends among men have been an increase in men working part time, especially at the youngest and oldest (50+) ends of the lifecourse, and a slight increase in both men’s employment rates beyond 65, and women’s beyond 60 since 1993.

The number of women employed has been on a steady upward trend for the past 25 years and longer. Numbers of women in full-time employment mirror the total in that the trend is consistently upwards. Numbers of women in part-time employment only increased very slightly in the 1980s and 1990s, after much faster increases in the earlier decades, and since the turn of the century appears to have levelled off.

The percentage of women in employment has also been on an upward trend for four decades, and has shown no fluctuations with the business cycle as was evident in men’s trend employment figures. Over the post-war period the proportion of jobs held by women has shifted from one third to nearly one half. A strong driver of the increase in women’s employment has been the growth in women obtaining degrees, and women in partnerships with young children spending less time out of work to have children. The gap to have children has declined over each successive generation of women reaching working age and then giving birth. In 1979, 25% of female employees having a baby resumed paid work within a year of the baby’s birth. By the Millennium the proportion of mothers returning by 9-10 months was approximately 50%.

The increase in women going into higher education has meant that they have not accumulated as much work experience as those from earlier generations, or those who left school at an earlier age. They have also delayed starting their child bearing into their thirties. Spending longer in full-time education, as well as having made larger investments in their qualifications, and being more ambitious than earlier generations, have all contributed to pushing back the age at which women have their first child.

So the big labour market story has been the women’s story. Women now make up half, if not more, of the workforce, but they do not work half of the total working hours since around 44% of women work part-time hours. Women are still over represented in lower level, low paid occupations, compared with men. Although they have increased their presence in the top occupations, they are still under-represented at the top end of the occupational hierarchy.

Underneath these aggregate level and macro trends are a number of other trends of note:

The sectoral restructuring of the UK economy has increased the demand for labour intensive activities but has also pushed many jobs up the ‘value chain’.

A growth in the intensity of work has been occurring, especially in some sectors.

The content of jobs has changed more than their duration over time, suggesting that the claim about ‘no more jobs for life’ is vastly overstated. One job per person has stayed the norm and permanent full-time work remains the dominant pattern for men. Workers are not moving more often from one employer to another.

The type of skill distribution across the economy has changed with a large growth to 40% in the proportion of managerial and professional jobs. Despite this rise in skills, there has also been a decline in task discretion in some jobs, especially among women and those working part time.

The level of qualifications that jobs require has been on an upward trend, as has the extent of qualifications in the workforce. While half the workforce had no qualifications in 1970 now there is a target for half to have a degree. The rapid growth in qualified workers has not been matched by the same rate of growth in jobs requiring the qualifications they hold. There has also been an increase in numbers of people, particularly graduates, holding qualifications at a higher level than those required for getting their job (eg 40% in 2006 had qualifications higher than required compared with 35% in 2001).

There has been a growth in the percentage of jobs where employees say they keep having to learn new things.

There has been a growth in jobs which use automated or computerised equipment, in those who think it is an essential part of their jobs, and in use of the internet at work. However, this growth slowed in the 21st century, and the wage premium attached to such jobs has shrunk over time.

Skill surveys have pointed to there being an increasing deficiency in demand for intermediate skills. This leaves few opportunities for employees who start out in the lowest job rungs to move upwards over their working career, and leads to increasing division in career prospects. Greater polarisation is already being reflected in the widening distribution of earnings that has been seen since the 1980s. It may not be entirely accurate to call this a ‘demand deficiency’. Such results come from surveys of employers, dominated by larger employers. Many of the so-called intermediate skills have traditionally been filled by male, self employed, skilled, manual workers, providing necessary services (plumbing, carpenters, etc.). These are the sort of very small employers or sole traders who do not appear in skills surveys of employers. There is other evidence that such skills are in great demand from the general public, but unfulfilled supply. The problem may be more about the lack of successful training routes to provide both the skills and the capability to run one’s own business in order to supply these skills (and hence the growth in immigrant labour filling this employment gap).

In 1980, 7 in 10 employees (including managers) had their pay set by collective bargaining between employers and trades unions. By 1998 the proportion was only 4 in 10, the majority of whom were in the public sector.

What does the future hold?

Men’s participation rates are likely to stay fairly stable with a slight upward trend. While there is a current push to get more men into paid work, by tightening up on conditions for receiving incapacity benefit, the effects of these measures are likely to be relatively small. Any upward trend in the number of employed men is likely to come from older men working longer but also more flexibility over retirement ages, and immigrant men; the latter, are predominantly all of working age. This employment growth is likely to occur at much slower rates than in the past through the new and more selective conditions for entry for immigrants.

The supply of younger workers, based on current demographics will fall (and in addition current policy is to get more of them to remain in full-time education). However, immigrant workers who brought their families to the UK could boost the balance of young people in the workforce.

Women in employment are likely to continue to increase in numbers and percentages. This is because more women graduates are going to be coming through into the labour market and these are the women with the highest participation rates. There are some groups where gaining degrees is only just starting to increase, meaning that they have some way to go before reaching their natural peak of participation; for example the much improved success rates in schools of Bangladeshi girls will start to increase their presence in higher education and eventually in employment. The gradual spread of family-friendly policies in workplaces is also likely to add to women’s lifetime participation by making the combining of work and caring easier. The incentives for lone mothers to enter employment will also add to the size of the women’s workforce but such inducements are unlikely to get lone mother’s employment rates as high as those of mothers in couples, partly because lone mothers tend to be substantially lower qualified on average than women living in couples. The growth in the rate of childless women may now have peaked since birth rates have been starting to rise again. These increases in women’s employment will all level off before 2025 and probably remain fairly stable for years from then on.

There have been enormous changes in workplaces in the UK with women moving into male dominated positions to make them ‘integrated occupations’. The number of male dominated industries and workplaces has fallen. This has all happened gradually. Occupational segregation is likely to decline further, although I suspect it will not disappear entirely since many men and women prefer doing different jobs. One might say that legislation for equality has opened up these pathways, but all the signs point to legislation and statutory provision following changes in behaviour rather than leading it. However, once enacted, legislation does help to drag along reluctant employers, and it also makes behaviour more uniform (eg peaks in return to work dates after childbirth around the statutory entitlement limits).

Other projections include:

Human interactions will continue to be a growing component of many jobs (containing an increase in time spent interacting with people); this is sometimes called the ‘emotional literacy’, and represents an increase in jobs where interpersonal skills are valued and important. The care economy is one place where these skills are used, but other customer-facing jobs also contain this skill. Life skills are also a growing part of the paid work market

A widening gap between good and bad jobs is likely, with fewer in the middle. Those in low paid jobs will have fewer rungs of the ladder ahead to provide them with upward career prospects, or to motivate their ambitions.

Immigrant numbers are not likely to reduce, and there is likely to be an increasing supply of immigrant labour, and increasing employer demand for more to be admitted. Immigrants will undoubtedly continue to increase the diversity of British society. Migration is also likely to strengthen the informal economy.

Given some evidence points to a growth in the intensity of work, issues of stress at work and occupational health will grow in strength and employers will have to pay more attention to these issues. It is likely that they may even face legal challenges based on health and safety regulations and duties of care.

Job segregation is likely to break down further, especially among the highly qualified, but some job segregation is likely to remain, especially in lower paid jobs. It will be based on differences in preferences of men and women over the characteristics they seek in a job, and their preferences about the culture of workplaces, and employers’ preferences.

It is likely that women will reach men’s employment rates, although this equality will not be in hours of work; women, mothers in particular, are still likely to work part time to a far greater extent than men.

The earnings gap between men and women will shrink further, probably to the point where there is no unexplained gap.

There is likely to be growth in couples where the woman earns more than the man, resulting from girls doing better than boys at school, although this trend may also lead to more single women, and fewer partnerships being formed.

Change is likely to continue to occur more in job content than in frequency of moves between jobs. Workers will continue to want stable employment for financial reasons, and employers will want the same, since high turnover and recruitment is very expensive for employers, especially for highly skilled employees.

Issues for men’s employment

There are a number of issues raised by future trends in men’s employment.

2.1 One issue relates to sub-groups of men who are out of employment and pose threats to society in a number of ways. Lack of employment is very high among some ethnic minority groups of men (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African) and high among younger men in these groups, as well as being concentrated in certain local labour markets in larger cities in London, the North and the Midlands. Among prime age men in partnerships, many Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are working only part-time hours with their wives not being employed. The concentration in certain areas make these breeding grounds of discontent and disaffection with mainstream society.

2.2 The second issue about men’s employment is the feeding through to the labour market of underachieving white working class boys from the education system. The structure of employment has changed towards services, and the need for unskilled work has shrunk. Boys who leave school without any qualifications do not find many opportunities to build a career that would support a family even if they wanted to. However, there is a clear need for skilled manual work and with training, such work would not be outside the competence of these boys who are only without qualifications because of lack of motivation rather than ability.

2.3 Barriers to work beyond retirement are likely to remain in many workplaces and dampen the growth in working for those beyond retirement age. Older workers are usually more expensive workers.

2.4 What can be done to provide career prospects out of low quality jobs?

The opportunities to train in intermediate jobs like skilled manual professions have not been available to young men since the apprenticeship system collapsed by 1980. Nothing has successfully taken its place. There is an excess demand for manual skills in the UK; yet it is very recent EU immigrants who are largely meeting this need and not white working class boys, or young men from minority ethnic groups mentioned above. This problem clearly starts in schools with disengagement from formal education which is disruptive to others.  Britain desperately needs a good quality vocational education option to run along side the academic stream in the schooling system. It also needs a successor to the apprenticeship system to train young working class men (white and minorities) in skilled professions. Such a system needs to start before the end of compulsory schooling to avoid disaffection and low motivation setting in amongst such boys. Solving this problem would also help address some of the other societal challenges in the UK. It would increase the number of marriageable young men who could offer economic support to a family, and reduce the threat of social unrest in certain localities.

Issues for women

2.5. Will women ever reach equality with men in the labour market – and do they mind anyway?

Although there have been enormous changes in women’s position in the labour market, the pace of change of women getting into the Board Rooms, being top executives and top managers is slow. There are now plenty of individual women running their own successful companies who are millionaires. However, most commentators and forecasters about whether and when employed women will match men in their proportions in the top occupations and with equal pay suggest they are still a long way off, even another 20 years. It is clear that such jobs require women to face the cut and thrust of competition, accept the long hours culture in workplaces, and possibly a jet-setting lifestyle, rarely at home. The majority of women do not have ambitions for these types of jobs. Probably there are a few who will want them and probably they will get them. But the ratio of men to women in such jobs is always likely to look bad. But I suspect it is not going to be a problem and will mostly reflect the lack of desire by the majority of women to hold such positions. Women are doing well along side men in the next layer down, and making gradual inroads into the statistics ratios. Even at these lower levels, women and men prefer different types of jobs. This maintains a high degree of occupational and workplace gender segregation, much of it by choice, although less so than used to be the case. Occupational segregation is likely to reduce gradually over time, but not go away completely. However, on pay women are still behind men in the upper part of the wage distribution, but more equal and even better than men at the lower parts of the wage distribution. Again their position at the higher wage levels is likely to be because women are less likely to demand pay rises in an individualised performance reward system, and less likely to use threats to quit in order to get a pay rise. Women will have to learn to be more aggressive about pay rises if they want to match men’s pay. The new pay audits which will be taking place in the public sector will help to equalise women’s and men’s pay in the public sector, but gaps are likely to continue in the private sector.

2.6. Do women have to become like men if they are going to have a chance of full equality? Will they have to accept working long hours, being prepared to travel further to work, and be mobile between workplaces in different geographical locations in order to climb the career ladders? Or is there a chance of changes occurring in the way work is organised such that men and women work fewer hours, with employers stopping the practice of forcing employees to move locality to get wider experience.

I don’t see changes in the way work is organised occurring in the UK economy on the scale required. The Netherlands has moved considerably in this direction, but even there, it is only a minority of men who work part time. Those who feel they have responsibilities for caring will always be less likely to gain promotions, and these are likely to remain disproportionately women and mothers. However, movements toward gender equality in the labour market is still likely to take place, partly due to the current relatively high proportion of childless women who will give men a good run for their money. Also the introduction of pay audits and pay reviews will give women more information on which to make a case for equal pay. However, gender pay ratios at the very top of the occupational and wage distributions will plateau out before reaching full equality since there are fewer employed women than men who want the top jobs and top wages.

2.7. Can there be equality between part timers and full timers in pay and conditions, and can women who work part time reach the top jobs? I think this is something women are likely to push harder for and achieve.

2.8. What can be done to provide career prospects out of low quality jobs? This is an issue for women as it was for men.

2.9. Parents at the low paid end of the wage spectrum will face problems of coping financially and child poverty will remain an issue. In the low paid sectors, employment is more insecure and has higher turnover – and this is likely to continue. This will make coping financially at the low income end even more challenging. Lone parents are likely to remain employed at lower rates than mothers in couples, and in worse jobs as they are less qualified – with a consequently greater risk of their children living in poverty.

2.10 Problems of work life balance among couples who both work full time are likely to increase. There is a tension with women having equality in circumstances where both partners work full time – accepting the male model of labour market participation. Children will not have either quality time or quantity time with over tired (or stressed) parents and may suffer and have poorer relationships.

Education implications

• Solving the need for effective training in skilled manual skills vocational training and in due course starting and managing one’s own business which includes coping with uncertainty and managing fluctuating income.
• Consider welfare system’s response to handling uncertain income flows.
• Considering the proposed expansion of graduate qualifications when the economy is not keeping pace with the need for such qualifications, and the risks of discontent this will create in the workforce as well as potential moves further away from gender equality.
• Preparing the workforce for jobs that require continual learning, and preparing the appropriate training courses.
• Continuing to supply learning on IT skills and internet use.
• Incorporating learning on emotional literacy, interpersonal skills, and negotiating skills into learning curricula or at further and higher education levels.
• Education to tackle bullying cultures
• Particular initiatives in local labour markets with high unemployment among ethnic minorities.
• Education aimed at breaking the cycle of disadvantage – discussed further under section 5 below.
• Majority of children coming into compulsory school (5+) in future are likely to have had childcare from age under one year old. Children entering school may be more socialised in future. It is likely to be still a minority who have had full-time child care from less than one year old. If this turns out to be damaging to children (as debated) there may be more problems for teachers from this trend.
• High divorce rates and high lone parent rates imply (if studies are correct which suggest there is damage to children from marital breakdown) suggest that a high proportion of children, possibly increasing, will have emotional problems during their school life. For same reason, statistical correlations showing intergenerational transfers of marital breakdown also likely to keep the flow high.

3. Trends in homeworking

Going under the heading of ‘mobile forms of work’, there are at least 3 main types of homeworking and the trends of each differ. Employees and some self employed can work from home (eg mobile engineers, sales representatives) using their home as the base. Alternatively employees and some self employed can work at home, carrying out all of their work in their own home. This type of work has a long history of people doing textile work or sewing and garment making in their own home. But modern day working at home can also involve IT use, called teleworking or manual electronics work (eg assembling PCBs). Thirdly, employees who work primarily at their employer’s workplace can have occasional (even weekly) days at home to do their work. Unfortunately, the statistics do not always differentiate between all of these types of homeworking. Nor are they published as a matter of course. They rely on bespoke analyses being carried out by researchers. (There is also the gradual spread of employees continuing to work at home after they have left the office, by checking emails and taking mobile phone calls. In this way the boundary between work and home, and work and leisure are being eroded for some employees. But this type of working at home is not routinely recorded, and is not discussed any further here.)

The trends are as follows:

There has been a steady increase in more mobile forms of work since 1980, both among employees and in terms of the percentage of employers who use these types of working arrangements.

Working mainly at home increased in numbers and as a percentage of the labour force between 1981 and 1992. Since 1992, it has stayed a stable percentage of the workforce (around 2.2%-2.4%), but the numbers employed working mainly at home have grown considerably.

Working mainly elsewhere but also working at least one full day ‘in own home’ has stayed at around 4% of the workforce, although increasing numerically from 1997 to 2002.

Working mainly ‘in different places using home as base’ increase from around 3% in 1981 to nearly 8% in 2002, the numbers of employees growing very substantially over this twenty year period.

One third of establishments had employees who work from home for some part of the week and 8% of establishments had employees who worked all or almost all of normal working hours at home (WERS 98). In 2004 WERS04 found that 6% of workplaces engaged people who worked for the establishment at or from their own homes but who were not employees (Kelsey et al, 2006).

WERS04 found that 26% of employers made homeworking available to some employees in 2004. This was an increase from 12% on the same question in 1998. Homeworking was slightly more common in workplaces where women were not the majority of employees. In 2004, 14% of employees thought that homeworking was available to them, varying by employee characteristics; women with children aged 18 and under were more likely to report having access to homeworking than women without dependent children (Kersley et al, 2006). Men (16%) were more likely than women (12%) to consider they would be able to work at home if they needed to.

The open plan office has clearly replaced the private small office in a large number of workplaces, with hot-desks growing to replace dedicated spaces with shared spaces.

What will the future hold?

Improvements in IT are likely to continue and would make working from or at home as teleworkers increasingly viable. Staying at home can be less stressful, cheaper and reduce transport congestion compared with going to the employer’s offices, if this involves commuting or a long journey. But the isolation this creates for employees also means that most employees will not wish to do this for long periods, or more than occasionally over the week or month. There are also the limitations to the number of people whose homes can be easily converted to be suitable to be office spaces. Working wholly at home is not likely to expand to any great extent.

The indicators suggest that there are limits to open plan and certainly to hot-desking which suggest it will not continue to grow and may even fall back. Employers’ stories about hot-desking describe employees arriving earlier and earlier on their days in the office to claim their favourite spot, and place potted plants and other possessions around to stake out their territory.

On teleworking, the few existing studies suggest there are limits to the use of this form of working by employers. It poses management problems for employers whose managers cannot be sure employees are working. It does not save as much space as employers initially expected and many employees do not like it  (Felstead et al, 2005; Dex et al, 2000).

There are tensions here between employers’ and employees’ interests, but more in periods of growth than during recessions. The extended growth period of the UK economy has pushed up property prices and rents, making employers want to encourage employees to stay at home. But this only saves them money if employees do not need dedicated office space at the employer’s offices. Employees prefer to have their own space at work. Work is part of the identity of most employees and their working location matters to them. The conventional office is unlikely to disappear.

Spheres of work and leisure will become less distinct for those who spend more of their time working at home. New forms of employer management will need to evolve to cope with employees doing more work from home or in mobile locations. This is likely to be part of a more general issue of employers coping with the tension of giving employees more autonomy and retaining control and supervision.  Employees will need more time management skills and be able to manage the boundaries of their work and life as well as work-related health issues.

Issues

3.1 Rises in the price of office space will undoubtedly create pressures to reduce costs by greater sharing of space, especially in large conurbations. This may lead employers to pressurise more employees to use their own homes as offices in a way that may be inappropriate either to their home circumstances or their psychological make up.

3.2 The growth in flexible jobs on the margins of the labour market has not been associated with an overall downward movement in their quality. The growth of the flexible sector has suited the needs of the workforce that has filled these positions (eg students; people coming up to retirement; lone parents with major caring responsibilities). While there are differences in conditions of work between regular and non-standard or flexible working these have not got worse over time, and there are signs that the gap may reduce through legislation. But further large increases from this position are not likely to be filled by voluntary labour supply, except immigrants. This will produce further tensions and ethnic conflicts with existing UK unskilled workers who will see this as a threat, even though they want better jobs for themselves.

3.3 Similarly, the growth of women’s work in the low paid ‘flexible’ periphery segment is nearing its end, due to the large highly qualified workforce of women that is going to increasingly dominate this source of labour supply.

3.4 The class divisions that are already embedded in the labour market division between core and periphery workers is likely to strengthen and become more polarised, with conflicts growing between the white working class, minority ethnic and immigrant workforces.

Educational implications

• Working at or from home relies heavily on time management skills, but also on being able to draw boundaries between work and non-work time to have work-life balance.
• People who do this kind of work need to be psychologically profiled and trained to check they can cope with the isolation and boundary issues and recognise emerging health problems.
• Educating to occupy space rather than possess it.

4. Trends in unpaid work

Unpaid work covers domestic work in the home, and caring work for those inside and outside the home. Domestic work could be broken down further, as can caring work. These forms of work are often aggregated together in discussions and thought to have a gender bias with women doing most of this form of work. But not only is caring work distinct from other domestic chores, there is a range of types of work within domestic work. Information on unpaid work comes from two main sources. Time budget studies provide the most detailed breakdowns, but survey questions are common in which female and male partners are asked about who does the most, or whether there are equal shares of the main housekeeping and caring tasks. The survey question findings are easiest to summarise. The majority of both women and men say that women do more than men in areas of caring for children, cleaning, washing and shopping tasks. However, the proportions of men who give this response is less than the proportion of women who give it. So, women as a whole tend to claim they do more of unpaid work in the home, than men agree they do. It is agreed that men do most of the DIY, gardening and car maintenance work in households. A few small-scale studies have found that women can act as gatekeepers and they can determine which jobs and how much men do. Women also act as the managers of household work, and also do most of the so-called emotion work in households.

Evidence on the trends in unpaid work from time budget studies suggests that:

• Adding up women’s and men’s paid and unpaid work leads to near equality in the amount of total work done by men and women, or men doing slightly more total work than women (Jacobs and Gerson, 2001; Harkness, 2008). Such figures show that claims of the ‘double burden’ carried by women who are employed and do the larger share of unpaid work are not often supported. In fact Sullivan and Gershuny (2000) have shown that there is little evidence that the double burden exists for the vast majority of women. If anything, it is a temporary phenomenon or one based in perceptions rather than in amounts of time spent in total on both paid and unpaid work.
• The average amounts of domestic work and paid work vary by country as by well as by gender (Geist, 2008: Gershuny, 2000).
• Although women appear to do more of the unpaid work hours, and have a larger share, than men, the calculations of the amount of hours spent on unpaid domestic work have also been found to depend on which tasks and work items are included in the calculations. When gardening and maintenance or odd jobs are included, the gap between men and women in number of weekly hours spent on unpaid domestic work narrows substantially (Gershuny, 2000).
• There are no notable gender divisions in time spent in personal care or in shopping (Gershuny, 2000).
• There have been changes over time and by country in the amounts and the shares of unpaid work (Gershuny, 2000; Robinson and Godbey,1997; Jacobs and Gershon, 2001). The time spent on domestic household work by women has been declining over time in many countries (Gershuny, 2000; Harkness, 2008; Bianchi et al, 2000). The time spent on domestic work by men has increased, but not as fast as the increase in women’s paid work.
• Early in the 20^th century, increases in women’s paid work were matched by a decrease in time spent on domestic work. However, for every two hours increase in paid work, domestic work declined by one hour. Later in the century this process continued with every two hours increase in paid work being associated with 1.5 hours decline in unpaid work. More recent 21^st century British data suggest that declines in women’s domestic work are continuing but now the decline in domestic work time exceeds the increase in paid work time (Harkness, 2008).
• Gershuny describes this combination of changes in women’s and men’s paid work and domestic work times as movements towards a convergence in time spent on the different types of work by men and women. He also presents evidence that this move towards convergence is apparent in a large number of countries.

One conclusion we could draw from these detailed analyses of time-use diaries is that over time, and without any particular state policy intervention, women’s unpaid domestic work has been declining while men’s contributions have been growing. The changes in men’s unpaid contributions have admittedly been smaller than changes in women’s paid work, but they have changed nonetheless.

The forces that appear to have brought about these changes, as far as commentators can tell, are as follows. It has been suggested that technological change in household appliances have offered labour-saving efficiency in carrying out some of the core domestic tasks. However, detailed attempts to measure the time gains from labour-saving appliances have not identified definitive gains (Bittman et al, 2004). Another suggestion is that declining fertility has led to smaller families across the industrialised world and this has reduced the amount of unpaid domestic work.  Numbers of children as well as their ages have been found to be positively correlated with amounts of time spent on unpaid work (Gershuny, 2000). It is also possible that women have reduced their unpaid work because of doing paid work, either because they are more tired, have lowered their domestic standards, or can afford to outsource more jobs. However, declines in domestic work are also visible among women who do part-time paid work and among those who are not employed (Gershuny, 2000). Lastly, economic mechanisms have also been offered as part of the explanation of the changes. Here the mechanism is that as women’s wage rates have increased in response to their greater education and human capital, the opportunity cost of doing unpaid work instead of paid work increases and women are likely to switch from one to the other. However, there have, over time, been relative price changes, particularly price increases, in purchased goods and services (paid cleaners or housekeepers). This price rise would lead us to expect that women would substitute their own cheaper housework production for the more expensive purchases of goods and services. But the increasing incomes that have also occurred over time mean that people will prefer leisure to unpaid work and will switch to purchasing goods and services to reduce their own housework. It is the greater effect of increasing incomes that has been winning over substitution effects. This argument, essentially, is that the progress of modern economies has built into it, given technological progress but subject to business cycle fluctuations, forces that are leading to declining work (paid and unpaid) and increasing leisure. These forces are not policy driven and are likely to continue into the future without policy assistance. However, there are groups who do not fit this pattern, especially in the USA and the UK. Increasing weekly hours of paid work are evident among some groups of managers and professionals (Jacobs and Gershon, 2001; Kodz et al, 2003) even if the majority are having greater leisure.

Caring for children is a task that falls predominantly to women. Even when they are working, they are more likely to be the ones to take time off to look after sick children (Dex, 2003). However, caring for older adults is a task that is likely to involve as many men as it does women, although women are likely to do more hours of such caring than men.

Although there is unpaid caring work, substantial amounts of care work has moved into the paid economy, and sometimes into the informal economy where people are paid in cash or kind, but not in such a way that it is recorded in national statistics. The informal economy has been estimated to be 6.8% of the UK economy in 2004. The growth of paid caring has been substantial as families out-source their child care and in some cases their care for older adults. Some of these developments, particularly the growth in care work for older adults is linked to growth in immigration.

What does the future hold?

A further shift in the division and share of domestic work, and caring between male and female partners within households, is likely to grow as more women gain degree qualifications and are in employment and gain higher earnings and more equality with men. Men are likely to continue to do more domestic work with women doing less, and so this will move in the direction of equality.  Gershuny’s idea of lagged adaptation may be used to describe this movement towards equality. This is the idea that it takes time, after women starting doing more paid work, for men to get the idea that they need to share more of the unpaid work in the home. However, equally, the reduction in women’s domestic work could be understood in economic terms as the increase in opportunity cost of domestic work for women as they gain more qualifications, work experience and career prospects which will reduce the quantity of such work they do.

It is unlikely that men’s and women’s amounts of domestic work will always be equal since women are still likely to tend to work fewer paid hours of work than men. Also, there is still likely to be a division between the types of domestic jobs men prefer doing and those women will accept to do – even if they do not prefer them, and women showing they prefer to do caring (Houston and Marks, 2005). Men’s and women’s involvement in caring for children is likely, therefore, to continue to be biased towards women doing more of this.

Men and women are likely to continue to care equally for older adults, although with women likely to continue to care for more hours than men.

There is the general expectation of demographic change with people continuing to live longer due to continuing improvements in the technology of health care, and in nutrition at early ages. This would suggest that caring responsibilities of adults for their elderly parents and relatives will increase. However, this increase is likely to take place after the retirement ages of adults, and in this way, it is not likely to increase the care burdens of the workforce substantially.

Increases in migration are likely to continue as a way of doing some of the less desirable care work in the UK, for example, caring for the elderly, as the volume of such work grows through the ageing of the population. Migration is also likely to strengthen and increase the informal economy

Issues

4.1. The provision of a paid workforce to do the increasing care work for older adults is a major challenge. Imported labour is currently being used to fill this growing labour force gap. The issues relate to providing both the quantity and quality care workers. Immigrants whose English language skills are poor do not make ideal carers for elderly, vulnerable and confused people. It is arguable whether it is genuine care that is provided in such instances.

4.2 Issues relating to the quantity and quality of the child care workforce are also not fully resolved, but these are much further advanced than is the case for care for older adults.

Educational implications

• Training up a care workforce for older adults, which might be heavily dominated by immigrant labour, for quality care provision.
• Educating the younger generation about the costs of care for older adults, what care is, and society should solve this growing problem of care in an ageing society.
• Educating for a more equal gender balance in the amounts of informal care hours for older adults provided by households.
• Formal flexible working arrangements for employees to cope with care needs of older adults.
• Some attention to child care provision to make sure quality grows and becomes more uniform and accessible in all areas, through systems of quality control, or licensing or inspections.
• Attention to the uniformity across local areas in quality and quantity of after-school and holiday care for school aged children, 

5. Living off state benefits

The extent of living off state benefits, either because of being unemployed, sick or inactive tends to be cyclical with the business cycle. However, there are some notable trends which have not followed a cyclical pattern as set out in the volume by Dickens et al (2003) and they include:

• A substantial rise in men’s inactivity rates since the 1970s, alongside a notable fall in women’s inactivity rates which previously were much higher through women looking after their families.
• The rise in men’s inactivity rates has been seen in many age groups although higher rises were visible in 25-54 year old men than in under 25 year olds and there were also higher rates in the bottom of the skill distribution.
• The majority of inactive men (70%) reported themselves as having a limiting health problem.
• Analyses have linked this rise in inactivity rates to the substantial decline in male manufacturing industries in some areas, with a lack of replacement jobs, and where the former industries left a health scar on the working population, for example in mining areas. However, the operation of the invalidity benefit system is also cited as a reason for the growth in men’s inactivity rates. Since the government changed the benefit rules, inactivity rates among men have started to fall.
• Unemployment rates have risen among older workers since 1998, despite unemployment among other groups being low in a buoyant period of the UK economy. The higher unemployment rates occurred disproportionately among those in their 50s, women and the more highly qualified.
• New Deal for Young People policies also appear to have had some success getting unemployed young people out of unemployment – although they have been operating over a period of economic growth which has undoubtedly helped their progress. While some of the young people targeted have gone into work, the largest decline in unemployed young people has been as a result of getting them into education and training.
• Unemployment among ethnic minority men is still persistently high, and higher than unemployment rates among equivalent white men. During the recent period of economic growth, while the unemployment rates of some minority ethnic men fell, the gap between white and both Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean men did not reduce.

Another group who have had high rates of living off state benefits are lone parents, the vast majority of whom are lone mothers. Their rates of employment have been much lower than those of women living in couples. The Working Families Tax Credit from 1999 followed by the Working Tax Credit in 2003 were attempts to remove any disincentives lone parents had to stay out of the labour market. These schemes were presented as aiming to tackle child poverty, by getting parents into paid work. These were financial attempts to make work pay for the low paid and they have gone alongside tax credits for child care and other personal assistance from DWP’s Job Centre staff. This battery of measures does appear to have had some success in getting lone mothers into work, and their employment rates have doubled since the benefits and other schemes were initiated.

Up to 1996, the number and percentage of workless households grew at the same time that there was a growth in two-earner households. Workless households reached approximately one fifth of working age households by 1996. This represents a growing polarisation in the distribution of work across UK households. However, government measures to intervene and get people back into employment reduced the workless household figure after 1996. This fall is mainly due to single parent (workless households) moving into employment.

What does the future hold?

It is unlikely that employment rates of the over 50s will fall voluntarily in the future as discussed under paid work above, given changes in demographics and pensions. (However, they are likely to be affected by cyclical changes in the business cycle, and fall in the short and possibly medium term for reasons of recession.)

Higher male unemployment rates among minority ethnic groups, especially Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi men, are unlikely to be resolved and may grow even worse in future recessions, assisted by their concentration in local labour markets with typically high unemployment rates.

The battery of policies to reduce workless households is likely to hold any increase at bay, but is not likely to be able to reduce the size of this group substantially.

Issues.

5.1 High unemployment rates among some minority ethnic groups of men is a worrying element since it is located in certain geographic areas and it can lead to social unrest or fuel discontent and even terrorism.

5.2 The UK is likely to experience growing unemployment rates for a period following the credit crunch and associated global recession. The severity and length of this downturn may be more difficult to cope with than earlier downturns, partly because many of the current generation have hardly experienced recessions and have expectations linked to continual growth.

5.3 At the same time that the government is successfully trying to get more of those on benefits into work, they are not stemming the inflow into these categories (eg. divorce rates being high thereby fuelling a flow into lone parenthood).

5.4 One of the biggest remaining issues acting as a barrier to getting more people off benefits into work is Housing Benefit. Qualitative studies have shown for some time that Housing Benefit offers valued security to people and families who are out of work in the long term, and who have low levels of skills such that they would only be likely to gain low paid, insecure work were they to enter the labour market. Although the tax system has been changed to make work pay for such groups, giving up the security of Housing Benefit for a low-paid insecure job is not seen as rational by those being encouraged to make this transition. This is especially the case where they have larger families and benefit more from the Income Support system’s child multiplier.

Educational implications

• Education aimed at breaking the cycle of disadvantage
• Some suggest parenting classes are key to tackle low achievement and the effects of disadvantage in the young. This might have implications for all age schools. (Some churches practice this where all age groups attend a Sunday School class.) This could also foster a culture of lifelong learning among the young as well as among adults.
• Parenting classes made mandatory for prospective parents when pregnant, as part of their antenatal ‘clinic’.
• Proportion of children from disadvantaged background coming through school likely to be increasing since the poor are having more children and the rich are having fewer, if any. Similarly, for the same reason, children from teenage pregnancies may increase in percentage share, even though past trends show there is not much change in their numbers over time.
• Current policy case for early intervention into the cycle of disadvantage at pre-school ages 3-4 is not likely to go away, and it may be necessary to spend more on this if the percentage of such children from disadvantaged families goes up, as is quite possible.

6. Work attitudes and motivation

There have been a number of trends in attitudes towards work and motivation of workers. Young people display the largest amounts of change in attitudes at any one time and older people display the least. There is a general recognition that the many changes in workplace practices and policies, as well as changes in employment contracts outlined above, have had their impact on employees’ subjective experiences of work, although not always as much as might have been clarified.

Trends in the quality of work experience

The quality of work experience can be measured by job involvement, work strain, and psychological distress. Some studies also use job satisfaction as a measure and this gives a different picture than job involvement measures of the trends occurring.

In the 1960s it was forecast that there would be a decline in the traditional work ethic, and this would be replaced by an instrumental approach to work (jobs then would be seen primarily as a way of generating income to have better family income or higher cost leisure activities). There is no evidence that this change occurred. There has been no change since the 1980s in the extent to which people were committed to paid work, irrespective of the financial benefits, sometimes called work as a central life interest. Choosing jobs has continued to place high importance on intrinsic aspects of work and having interesting work. Having a job with high income was ranked much lower down the scale. This continuing relationship is thought to have been upheld by increases in the qualifications held by the workforce, since higher qualifications are associated with higher job involvement. Also higher levels of task discretion are also associated with higher levels of job involvement. These changes are thought to be responsible for the stable or upward trend in quality of work experience for many employees.

Rates of job satisfaction appear to have been on a downward trend over time.

Alongside the trend increases in job involvement and job discretion has gone a trend increase in work strain (mental tension, physical fatigue or worry), due to work intensity and the pressure for higher levels of work effort. This has been more marked among women employees.

One consequence of unemployment rates widening to include professional workers in the early 1990s was that there has been a growth in worries about job insecurity even among those in work, and a growth in the importance school leavers attached to having a secure job. This is manifested in increased physical distress among people in work, not just people out of work.

Studies suggest that rates of organisational commitment, or commitment to the organisation’s values, are very low among employees in Britain around the turn of the Millennium, despite, or possibly because of, increased efforts by management to generate such feelings. This low commitment was evident in organisations were there was little employee participation in decision making, or lip service was paid to participatory employee involvement. Contrary to this general state of affairs affecting both public and private sectors, employees were more committed and loyal where they felt employers cared about the welfare of their employees, or where they saw their activities as having use and value for society.

Trends in attitudes to work and skills development

By 2006, the vast majority of employees ranked intrinsic elements of their jobs essential or very important, much higher than the rank given to having good pay. Felstead et al (2007) found no evidence of a decline over time in the importance attached to intrinsic features of jobs by employees and rather found the reverse, that expectations and importance attached to these elements of jobs had grown from 1992 to 2006.

There is evidence of growing convergence in men’s and women’s preferences about jobs, from 1992 to 2006, on the importance attached to being able to use initiative in your job, and have good training provision. Nonetheless, initiatives for training came mainly from employers.

In 2006, three quarters of employees wanted training in the future but only one quarter expressed a strong desire for it. The type of training most commonly wanted was acquiring new vocational or professional qualifications – primarily in order to offer job mobility, a sense of achievement and improved performance in their job.

There has been a general societal decline over time in deferential attitudes towards authority figures. This has its counterpart within workplaces in attitudes towards managers. The top down model of command and control now feels uncomfortable, and has been replaced by flatter organisational structures, greater autonomy and discretion for many employees. This change has also gone alongside changes in human resources policies and practices which encourage and reward employees who have internal and individual motivation to work hard and show commitment to the organisation.

The overall decline in union membership, despite an increase in women members, is evidence of a decline in the value attached to collective representation. The decline in male manufacturing industry employment, which were trade unions’ traditional strongholds, was a major contributory factor to membership decline. Commentators suggest this is part of a more general rise in individualism in society.

Evidence has started to emerge more recently that suggest cultures of bullying are growing in workplaces. This may not be a change in the extent of bullying. It is likely that this new trend is, in part, a feature of employee aspirations and expectations having changed such that they are less prepared to accept workplace bullying than in the past, they place a greater emphasis on having good interpersonal relations at work, and they are more prepared to voice their concerns in a climate that proclaims commitment to equal opportunities.

Trends in women’s attitudes towards women working

In the early 1980s the British were fairly conservative in their views about women working. While attitudes have changed among both men and women, the change is modest on many measures. One of the larger changes has been in attitudes towards women engaging in paid work. It is now accepted and even advocated that women with children should be allowed, even expected, to do paid jobs. Men are slightly less likely to hold such views than women, but this view is held by the majority of both women and men.

There was a shift between 1980 to 2002 towards greater egalitarianism in both nurturant and instrumental roles of women at work. Nurturant roles are those indicated by questions about whether women’s employment is harmful to children, whether family life will suffer if women work, or whether women will be happier if they go out to work. Instrumental attitudes indicate the level of agreement with whether work is really what women want (or mainly a home), whether a husband’s job is to earn money and a wife is to look after the family, or whether both husband and wife should contribute to family income, and whether a job is the best way for women to be independent.

There was evidence of a slowing down of the move towards egalitarian attitudes in nurturant roles in the 1990s, reaching a peak in 2002, from where it has now fallen back a little, especially with the movement away from egalitarian views on whether pre-school children suffer from mothers going out to work. There is also increasing doubt about whether jobs allow women to be independent.

By 2002 there is still considerable support for a gender-role divide and concern that maternal employment may compromise family and child well being. There has also been mounting concern about work-family balance.

Trends in men’s attitudes towards women working

Women have tended to be more egalitarian than men, with one exception. Support for dual earner households started out with women more in favour than men, but since the mid 1990s, men are as likely as women or even more likely to support two earner households.

What does the future hold?

It is unlikely that commitment to the intrinsic value of work will decline in future, but more likely it will be upheld by the majority of the workforce. (Workless households are a group where such values may be absent.)

Movement towards egalitarian attitudes in the labour market seems to have stalled and may reverse further among both women and men. This may be due to the growth in work strain among employees, particularly women.

Further decline in trade union membership is forecast. This may also symbolise a further increase and acceptance of individualised values and concerns with an equivalent fall in support for collectivism at work and in society.

The growth in jobs needing to have constant learning is likely to increase, so workers who are eager to embrace learning at work will also need to grow.

The trend towards so-called humanization of work is likely to continue with more jobs having increased autonomy and opportunities for self development, alongside greater employee involvement.

The seeming shift from control to commitment is already showing signs of strain, and it is likely that, in future, these new management methods will become more obviously new forms of control and work intensification. At that point there will be a downward turn in motivation and commitment and even more decline in employee participation in workplace decision making. Growing affluence among the top half of the workforce will also increase the desire for time for leisure and fewer working hours.

Feelings of job insecurity are likely to increase among the workforce with the financial uncertainty, redundancies and global recession following after the stock market crashes and financial crises.

Issues

6.1 Conflict between creating jobs with higher employee involvement and the increased work strain that goes with such jobs, or between better quality jobs but with higher work intensity. This creates the challenge of generating jobs with higher demands on skills and performance but which have tolerable levels of work strain.

Educational implications

• The loss of deference in society is already showing itself in schools, but this is likely to continue and has implications for how schools are organised, how they are run, the aims and manner of conducting school inspections. Evidence from the workplace suggests that participatory models produce better results.
• Balancing control and autonomy in the classroom will equip children better for the world of work.
• Educating for identifying and handling stress.
• The premium on learning and self direction will be high in the workplace
• Education to promote personal development and lifelong learning 
  

ANNEX

Evidence and references

1. General

Moynagh, M. and Worsley,R. (2005) Working in the twenty-first century. Swindon: ESRC and The Tomorrow Project.

2. Trends in paid work

2.1 Women’s and men’s paid work

2.1.1 References

Aston, J., Clegg, M., Diplock, E., Ritchie, H. and Willison, R. (2005) Interim update of key indicators of women’s position in Britain. London, Women and Equality Unit, Department of Trade and Industry.

Dex. S. (ed) (1999) Families and the Labour Market: Trends Pressures and Policies. York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York Publishing Services, p.88.

Dex, S. (2003) Families and work in the twenty-first century. Bristol, The Policy Press and York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, p.84.

Dex,S. and Joshi, H. (2005) Children of the 21^st century: From birth to nine months. Bristol, The Policy Press, p.281.

Dex,S. and Smith, C. (2002) The Nature and Patterns of Family-Friendly Employment Policies in Britain. Bristol, Policy Press and Joseph Rowntree Foundation, p.49.

Dex, S. and Forth, J. (2009) Equality and Diversity. In Brown, W., Whitfield, K., Forth, J. (eds.) (2009) A quarter century of industrial relations in Britain. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Felstead, A., Gallie, D., Green, F. and Zhou, Y. (2007) Skills at work 1986-2006. Oxford and Cardiff, ESRC Centre of Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance.

Moynagh, M. and Worsley, R. (2005) Working in the twenty-first century. Swindon, ESRC and The Tomorrow Project

Scott, J., Dex, S. and Joshi, H. (eds) (2008) Changing patterns of women’s employment over 25 years. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

2.1.2 Datasets

Quarterly Labour Force Surveys

Workplace Employee Relations Survey WERS, 1998

Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 2004

2.2 Ethnic differences in paid work

2.2.1 References

Dale, A., Lindley, J. and Dex, S. (2006) A life-course perspective on ethnic minority differences in women’s economic activity in Britain. in European Sociological Review, 22 (4), pp.459-476

Dale, A., Lindley, J. and Dex, S. (2008) Ethnic differences in women’s employment. In: Scott, J. Dex, S. and Joshi, H. (eds) Changing patterns of women’s employment over 25 years. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

Lindley, J. Dale, A. and Dex, S.(2004) Ethnic differences in women’s demographic, family characteristics and economic activity profiles, 1992-2002. Labour Market Trends, 112 (4), pp.153-65.

Lindley, J. Dex, S. and Dale, A. (2006) Ethnic differences in women’s labour force participation: The role of qualifications. Oxford Economic Papers, 58-2, pp.351-78.

2.2.1 Datasets

Quarterly Labour Force Surveys

2.3 Employers

2.3.1 References

Gallie, D. White, M. Cheng, Y. and Tomlinson, M. (1998) Restructuring the employment relationship. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

White, M. Hill, S. Mills, C. and Smeaton, D. (2004) Managing to change? British Workplaces and the Future of Work. Basingstoke, Palgrave.

2.3.1 Datasets

Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys

Workplace Employee Relations Survey WERS, 1998

Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 2004

Employment in Britain Survey, 1992, 1998

Working in Britain, (WIB) 2000

Change in Employer Practices Survey, (CEPS), 2002.

2.4 Skills

2.4.1 References

2.4.2 Datasets

Social Change and Economic Life Initiative, SCELI ,1986

Employment in Britain Survey, 1992

1997 Skills Survey, 1997

2001 Skills Survey

2006 Skills Survey

3. Homeworking

3.1 References

Allen, S. and Wolkowitz, C. (1987) Homeworking: Myths and Realities. London, Macmillan.

Bisset, L. and Huws, U. (1984) Sweated Labour: Homeworking in Britain Today. London, Low Pay Unit.

Cully, M. Woodland, S. Reilly, A. and Dix, G. (1999) Britain at work as depicted by the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. London, Routledge.

Dex, S. Scheibl, F. Smith, C. and Coussey, M. (2000) New working patterns. London, Centre for Tomorrow’s Company and Pertemps.

Felstead, A. and Jewson, N. (1999) Global Trends in flexible labour. Basingstoke, Macmillan.

Felstead, A. and Jewson, N. (2000) In work at home. London, Routledge.

Felstead, A. Jewson, N. and Walters, S. (2005) Changing places of work. Basingstoke, Palgrave.

Haddon, L. and Lewis, A. (1994) The experience of teleworking: an annotated review. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 5 (1).

Huws, U. (1994) Teleworking in Britain. Employment Gazette, 102 (2), pp.51-60.

Huws, U. (1994) Home truths: Key findings from the national survey of homeworkers. National Group on Homeworking, Report No.2.

Huws, U., Denbigh, A. and MITEL (1999) Virtually There: The Evolution of Call Centres. Monmouthshire, Mitel Telecom Ltd.

Incomes Data Services (1994) Teleworking. IDS Study 551.

Industrial Relations Services (1994a) Diversity and Change – Survey of Non-standard working. IRS Employment Trends No.570, October.

Industrial Relations Services (1994b) Non-standard working under review. IRS Employment Trends No.565, August.

Kelsey, B. Alpin, C. Forth, J. Bryson, A. Bewley, H. Dix, G. and Oxenbridge, S. (2006) Inside the workplace: Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. London, Routledge.

Moynagh, M. and Worsley, R. (2005) Working in the twenty-first century. Swindon, ESRC and The Tomorrow Project

Reed (1995) The Shape of Work to Come. Tolworth, Reed Personnel Services.

3.2 Employers and teleworking

A survey of a random sample of employers found that one in twenty had at least one staff member dependent on working at home and dependent on IT. A survey of a random sample of 1000 employers in 1994 found that 1 in 10 had at least one home-based worker (Huws, 1994). The Reed (1995) survey found that 14% of firms were using teleworkers in 1995. IDS (1994) suggested that between 5% and 15% of firms were using teleworkers and the size depends upon the definition used. There are often relatively few teleworkers in any one firm. Telecottages, largely in rural areas are increasing but they are in their early stages of development (IDS, 1994). In 1994 there were 90 but it is not clear how many have a long-term future.

Some studies have found telework to be concentrated in financial and business services (IRS, 1994b), and in the public sector (IRS, 1994b) whereas others have found most use of teleworking in manufacturing (Reed, 1995) and least in health. Teleworkers are also concentrated in the South East. Studies agree that the larger the organisation, the more likely it is to use this as well as other forms of non-standard forms of employment. The differences between the results on the size of teleworking show up the problems of generalising from what, in some cases, are very small sample sizes and the extremely low response rates which characterise these surveys.

Self employed home workers were used by relatively few employers in each industry. The highest proportions using self employed home workers were found in manufacturing (16%) and construction (17%). The proportions of employees working mainly from home were similarly small and the largest proportions of establishments were found in transport and communications (11%) and again in manufacturing (7%).  Much larger proportions of establishments were found who used employees working from home some of the time in 1998; between 24% of establishments in the distribution industry and 25% in construction up to 74% in energy and water and 47% in banking and finance.

Telework

The advantages to employers of teleworking are reviewed by IDS (1994) and Haddon and Lewis (1994). They pointed to the reduction in overheads, productivity improvements, and help in recruiting and retaining staff as the main benefits. Huws’s (1994a, 1994b) survey of employers’ use of teleworking found its main advantage to be its flexibility and convenience and its ability to reduce costs and solve travel problems. Managers expressed high levels of satisfaction with teleworkers whom they thought were more productive, more reliable, more loyal, produced better work and had lower rates of turnover and absenteeism than on-site workers (Huws, 1994a, 1994b).

There have been some notable attempts to try out teleworking and it is from these studies we have the most information about this form of work. The EU has also been promoting teleworking (IDS, 1994). The IDS (1994) study and Haddon and Lewis (1994) review the trials instigated by British Telecom, a leading insurance group, Digital Equipment and others. Whilst many were satisfied with the outcomes and thought the advantages to employees were significant other lessons were learnt from these exercises. Teleworkers need to be restricted to those who can work alone in a motivated way and to those who do not miss the social relationships at work too much. There is often less saving on office space and overheads than might at first appear since employees still need to come into the workplace regularly. Also, some managers obviously find the management issues more difficult to handle. ployers’ reasons for Teleworking

The main advantages of telework for employees have been argued to be savings on commuting time and increased flexibility or autonomy at work. However studies have shown that the disadvantages are also significant, namely those of feeling isolated at home and missing the social contact of office life (IDS, 1994; Haddon and Lewis, 1994).

3.3 Employees

3.3.1 Statistics from the 1998 Labour Force Survey:

4.7% of employed women and 2.9% of men worked at home in 1998; 3.3% of employed women and 9.5% of men  worked from home, in 1998; 6.5% of employed men and 3.8% of women were teleworkers for some of their work time in 1998.

* Teleworking as a share of total employment is greatest amongst men working in banking finance and insurance (13.4%) followed by men working in other services (11.7%). Teleworking is relatively uncommon amongst men working in manufacturing (3.8%), and in transport and communication (3.8%). The share of teleworking in total employment is greatest amongst women working in agriculture (11.1%), construction (10.9%) and banking, finance and insurance (7.5%). Teleworking is relatively uncommon amongst women working in distribution (1.8%) and transport and communication (2.7%).

* Teleworking as a share of total employment was highest for men and women working in professional occupations; 14.1% of men’s and 9.1% of women’s professional employment. Teleworking was also well represented amongst men’s associate professional and technical jobs (11.5%) and amongst managers and administrators (8.8%). Women in associate professional occupations (7.2%) and  managers and administrator occupations  (6.6%) also had amongst the highest shares of teleworking jobs amongst women. Teleworking is relatively uncommon in men’s clerical and secretarial (2.2%) and plant and machine operative (1.2%) jobs and amongst women’s employment in personal and protective services (1.1%) and sales (2.1%).

3.3.2 Employees’ reasons for homeworking

The reasons that women, the main homeworking group, are homeworkers include:

it is work they can perform whilst they have dependent children at home or whilst they are in ill-health (Huws, 1994)

it is suitable employment when language or cultural reasons make it difficult to go to a workplace

it can be part of the traditions of communities (Allen and Wolkowitz ,1987).

The disadvantages of working at home to these women were the very low pay, the isolation, the environmental hazards, and the mess it creates. One in ten of these homeworkers also suffered health problems from homework; neck or back ache and eye strain were commonly cited. Bisset and Huws (1984) found that some new homeworkers attached importance to the less tangible benefits of homeworking than those in more traditional homeworking jobs. For example, they appreciated the flexibility to schedule their work and the reduction in the stress of commuting to work.

3.4 Employers’ data

Table 1.  Prevalence of flexible working patterns among British and UK employers by source and date.

Per cents of employers in sample

** Sample: Establishments with 5+ employees.

* Sample: Establishments with 10+ employees

+ In the case of WERS data, on the question indicated, the availability is for non-managerial employees only.  

Table      Percentage of Employers using Non-Standard Employment (weighted data)

n/a: not available

Table      Non-standard employment by industry (WERS’ 98, weighted data)

Table      Percentage of Employers of a Certain Size who use the Stated Pattern of Employment

(WERS ‘98, weighted data)

3.5 Employees’ data

Table 1.  Prevalence of flexible working patterns among British and UK employees by source and date.

Per cents of employees in sample

LFS – Quarterly Labour Force Survey

* LFS has three questions covering the amounts of work at or from home. If aggregated they give the closest comparable definition to the less well defined questions in the other surveys.

** Employees in workplaces with 5+ employees.

++ Employees in workplaces with 10+ employees.

Table        Prevalence of flexible working patterns among British employees by source and date.

++     Employees in workplaces with 10+ employees in Workplace employee Relations Survey.

**      Employees in workplaces with 5+ employees. (Results quoted for first and second survey are those published in the second 2004 publication (Stevens et al, 2004) adjusted to be as comparable as possible for definition and sample population changes based on populations of all employees and including those who said they worked using this arrangement as well as those who did not use the arrangement but said it was available

Table Estimates of working at home and working on the move 1981-2002.

Source: Felstead et al (2005) Table 3.3 p.55. Labour Force Survey data

Table.  Percentages of employed mothers/fathers with access to flexible working arrangements, by country.

Sample: All Millennium Cohort Study main respondent mothers and partner respondent fathers (natural, foster, adoptive, step) who are in paid work. A oneway anova for each flexible working arrangement offered by country, the majority of values are less than or equal to p=0.01 suggesting systematic differences in the extent of working arrangements offered to both employee mums and dads by country.  # These values are not significant at p=0.05 suggesting that there are no significant differences in the extent of working arrangements offered to employee mothers and fathers by country.

Table      Men’s and women’s homeworking employment as per cent of all employed, 1998

Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1998

Table      Men’s and women’s homeworking employment by industry, 1998

Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1998

Table      Men’s and women’s homeworking employment by occupation,

Per cent of gendered employees in occupation , 1998

Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1998

Table . Access to flexible and family-friendly working arrangements, by sector and gender.

Base: All employees in workplaces with 25 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based on responses from 25,491 employees. Source. Cully et al (1999)

4. Informal and Unpaid work

4.1 References

Bittman, M., Rice, J.M. and Wajcman, J. (2004) Appliances and Their Impact: The Ownership of Domestic Technology and Time Spent on Household Work. British Journal of Sociology, 55, pp.401-442.

Corti, L. and Dex, S. (1995) Informal caring. Employment Gazette, 103 (3).

Dex, S. (forthcoming) Policy interventions to equalise men’s and women’s time spent in unpaid work: Are they possible and realistic? In: Treas, J. and Drobnic, S. (eds). Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Geist, C. (2008) Gendered views of Domestic Labour: Cross-national variation in men’s and women’s reports of housework. In: Treas, J.K. and Drobnic, S. Men, women and household work in cross-national perspective.

Gershuny, J. (2000) Changing Times: Work and Leisure in Post Industrial Society. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Gershuny, J. and Jones, S. (1987) The changing work-leisure balance in Britain, 1961-1984. Sociological Review Monograph, 33, pp.9-50.

Gershuny, J and Sullivan, O. (2008) Time use, gender and public policy regimes. In: Gender Work and Organization.

Gerson, K. (1985) Hard choices: how women decide about work, career, and motherhood. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Gerson, K. (1993) No man’s land: men’s changing commitments to family and work. New York, Basic Books.

Harkness, S. (2008) The Household Division of Labour: Changes in Families Allocation of Paid and Unpaid Work. In: Scott, J. Dex, S. and Joshi, H. (eds.) (2008, forthcoming) Changing patterns of women’s employment over 25 years. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

Houston, D.M. and Marks, G. (2005) Working, caring and sharing: Work-life dilemmas in early motherhood. In: Houston, D.M. (ed) Work Life Balance in the Twenty-First Century. London, Palgrave Macmillan.

Jacobs, J.A. and Gerson, K. (2001) Overworked Individuals or Overworked Families: Explaining Trends in Work, Leisure, and Family Time. Work and Occupations, 28, pp.40-63.

Kodz, J. (2003) Working long hours: A review of the evidence. Employment Relations Research Series No.16. London, Department of Trade and Industry.

Robinson, J.P and Godbey, G. (1997) Time for Life: The surprising ways Americans Use their time. In: Campbell, A. and Converse, P. (eds.) The Human Meaning of Social Change. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp.17-86.

Sullivan, O. (1997) Time waits for no (wo)man: An investigation of the gendered experience of domestic time. Sociology, 31 (2), pp.221-40

Sullivan, O. and Gershuny, J. (2001) Cross-national changes in time-use: some sociological (hi)stories re-examined. ISER Working Paper WP 2001-1. Colchester, University of Essex.

Yeandle, S. and Buckner, L. (2008) Carers, Employment and Services: time for a new social contract. Leeds, Carers UK and University of Leeds.

5. Living off state benefits

5.1 References

Dickens, R., Gregg, P. and Wadsworth, J. (eds) (2003) The Labour Market under New Labour. Basingstoke, Palgrave.

6. Work attitudes and motivation

6.1 References

Felstead, A., Gallie, D., Green, F. and Zhou, Y. (2007) Skills at work 1986-2006. Oxford and Cardiff, ESRC Centre of Skills , Knowledge and Organisational Performance.

Gallie, D., White, M., Cheng, Y. and Tomlinson, M. (1998) Restructuring the employment relationship. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

White, M., Hill, S., Mills, C. and Smeaton, D. (2004) Managing to change? British Workplaces and the Future of Work. Basingstoke, Palgrave.

Scott, J. ,Dex, S. and Joshi, H. (eds) (2008) Changing patterns of women’s employment over 25 years. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar

This document has been commissioned as part of the UK Department for Children, Schools and Families’ Beyond Current Horizons project, led by Futurelab. The views expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation.

In the last few decades, the population of Britain has experienced a steady increase which can be attributed primarily to net migration and the declining number of deaths rather than a rising number of births (Office for National Statistics, 2008). With the UK facing a future of the ageing structure shifting to the right, questions naturally rise about the organization of society, the provision of social services and the adjustment of the labour force. Amongst those, the possible role of ethnicity in mitigating the negative effects of the demographic change occupies a primary focus.

Several indications exist how ethnic minority groups may have a beneficial effect upon Britain’s ageing population. First, minorities frequently have a larger number of dependent children in the household than the UK-born White (Office for National Statistics, 2008). Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the delaying of family formation and childbirth characteristic of White British households would affect Asian migrant or Asian British households in the same magnitude (Modood et al, 1997). In this way, it could be expected that the importance of ethnic households for the correction of the downward trends in the number of births would become more pronounced in the future.

Next, the overall ageing of the British population would continue to create job vacancies in all sectors and especially in low-skilled manual work. Unlike skilled work in which the impact of the demographic change can be softened by adult and life-long training schemes and longevity of the employees, unskilled and low-skilled work, with its dependence upon physical conditions, is bound to receive a hard blow. It could be argued that low-skilled jobs would become more and more mechanized, or disappear in certain industries, yet recent research shows that complete substitution of manual labour is hard to envisage in the next 40 years (Handel, 2003). Furthermore, in sectors such as health and social services shortages of skilled labour are felt even now and these vacancies are primarily filled by immigrants. For example, according to the Learning and Skills Council, 679,000 vacancies in health and social work, business services, hotels, catering, and construction were available in 2003 (Selective Admission: Making Migration Work, 2004).

These prospects bring to the forefront the issues of the integration and the successful incorporation of ethnic minority groups – both first and second generation ones. This paper will examine the progress achieved in this direction, as well as commenting on undergoing and possible future changes in the organization of ethnic groups in Britain. This paper will also strive to convey the need for long-term programmes to resolve the gaps between ethnic minorities and UK-born Whites.

The first half of the paper will present the laws governing the processes of immigration and naturalization and will dwell on some characteristic patterns in family structure and labour market performance of the ethnic minority groups in Britain. It will show that segregation continues to operate and that despite the existence of extensive anti-discrimination legislation the labour market performance of the majority and minority groups is still quite divergent even for second generation minority members educated in Britain.

The second half of this paper (sections Social Resources and Host Country Institutions, and the Europeanisation of the Migration Waves) will introduce new evidence of the differentiating availability of social resources on the part of ethnic minority groups and their impact upon their labour market trajectories. The role of host country institutions in facilitating minority members and securing their incorporation will also be discussed and possible future developments will be outlined. In addition, some new research on the latest migration flows – the increasing share of White migrants in the post-1990s migration waves – and the change in societal perceptions and attitudes will be discussed. Finally, some predictions for the future of British minority groups and their labour market inclusion will be offered. Thus, the present paper will give some insight into the ongoing changes within Britain’s ethnic groups and the challenges that might be faced by them in a future of rapid demographic transitions.

Ethnicity in Britain

According to the 2001 Census, the majority of the UK population were White (92%). The remaining 4.6 million people belonged to different ethnic groups. Amongst those, Indians were the largest community followed by Pakistanis, people of Mixed Ethnicity, Black Caribbeans, Black Africans and Bangladeshis. Around half of the non-White population were Asians of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin (Office for National Statistics, 2008).

Table 1: Population of the United Kingdom: by ethnic group, April 2001

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2008

The ethnic composition of Britain thus reflects the strong links between Britain and its former colonies and areas of influence and interest, nowadays known as the British Commonwealth – New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth countries³ inclusive.

Immigration and naturalisation laws

One of the main reasons for the population growth in Britain as already stated is net migration. In mid-2007, the population of the United Kingdom was estimated to be 60,975,000 (Office for National Statistics, 2008). In comparison with 2006, an increase of 388,000 was witnessed which equalled approximately 1,000 people a day. Net migration rather than natural change is responsible for this boom in population growth. For example, in 2002 net migration accounted for more than 70% of the total population change (Office for National Statistics, 2008). Therefore, it is of great importance to understand the operation of the immigration system and its supply and demand sides.

Graph 1: Comparison between the shares of Natural Change and Net Migration in the UK Population Change

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2008.

The main routes of migration to Britain are labour migration, family reunion and asylum. Control over the flow of labour migrants to the UK has been primarily exercised through the Work Permit System. Work permits were first introduced in 1919 to restrict the entry of Non-Commonwealth migrants, but with the enactment of the 1971 Immigration Act they became obligatory for all foreign workers from outside the European Economic Community. The latter act was aimed at curbing the increasing number of Black and Asian Commonwealth migrants. The system has undergone continuous change in the Acts⁴ following the 1971 Immigration Act to meet the shortages of labour in certain sectors such as hospitality and food processing, and has become increasingly orientated towards the facilitation of the entry of highly-skilled migrants.

The current Managed Migration policies of the British Government are best reflected in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002. For example, apart from the main work permit scheme for skilled migrants, the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP) was introduced in 2002 which allows workers to move to the UK without having prior job offers. Low-skilled and semi-skilled workers have been managed by the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme (SAWS); the au-pair scheme, officially a cultural exchange scheme rather than a labour immigration programme; the domestic worker scheme for domestic workers who travel to the UK with their employers, and the Sector Based Scheme⁵ (SBS) which allows UK employers to recruit a limited number of workers to fill vacancies in particular sectors (Ruhs, 2006). All work permit holders are invited to apply for an indefinite period of settlement in the UK after five years. Self-employed entrepreneurs have not been under the obligation to apply for a work permit.

Control has certainly tightened over family migration as well. The 1971 Immigration Act put severe restrictions upon family reunification and chain migration. Different regulations⁶ have also been implemented to lower the number of other dependents, and to limit family migration only to spouses and children (Berkeley et al, 2005).

In contrast, the number of asylum seekers in the UK started growing in the 1990s. The trend holds for the rest of Northern Europe with a high number of asylum seekers settling in Germany and the Netherlands as well. A further increase was witnessed between 1999 and 2002, and in 2002 the number of asylum seekers in Britain peaked to 84,100 (Home Office Research and Statistics Department, 2007). Subsequently, there has been a decrease in the number of asylum seekers due to the stricter regulations of the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. Unlike labour migrants, asylum seekers benefit from facilitated access to state-provided support and accommodation, and there are no restrictions on their period of stay (Gardner, 2006).

On the whole, British governments have moved over the years towards the imposition of more severe restrictions upon all channels of migration. A period of ‘leniency’ has always been followed by a period of tightening of the rules: consider the great number of refugee applications in 2000-2001 and consequential introduction of new restrictions upon refugee entry in 2002. At the same time, no real drop in the number of incoming migrants has been witnessed (Heath and Cheung, 2007), as vacancies within the economy clearly exist and hence the demand remains for migrant labour. That the idea of the integration of migrants is becoming more and more part of the political discourse is evident in the change of legislation to facilitate highly-skilled migrants or migrants who have received British education and have higher awareness of British culture (and in this way will constitute an easily assimilated pool of labour 20 years from now). In contrast, restrictions have been imposed upon low-skilled labour migrants with the introduction of sector-based quotas and the seasonal workers scheme although these vacancies continue to constitute the primary pull of migrants to the UK (Ruhs, 2006).

Many of the latter vacancies are advertised as only permanent openings. The question of how many of the migrants move to another job after the expiration of their contract or reside illegally in the UK, however, remains unanswered. This is an issue of great speculation. After the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and the underestimation of the migration flows from the new EU10 countries, the British media has become more and more focused on migration and problems associated with housing shortages, labour market competition and crime, although the link between the latter and international migration has been only spurious (The Guardian, 2008). Thus, fluctuations in public opinion are likely to arise in the future as well and will depend very much on the group size, level of visibility and integration of the migrants, especially during times of harsh economic conditions. We could assume that in the next 40 to 60 years the understanding of other cultures and increased opportunities for mobility will facilitate the integration of migrants. Yet, the visibility of ethnic groups will not necessarily disappear and if shortages of labour continue to dominate in unskilled and low-skilled jobs, the migrants filling them will not necessarily be drawn from the upper tail of the skill distribution in their countries of origin. This issue will be discussed in greater length in the second section of this paper.

Naturalization

With the 1981 Naturalization Act in operation, children of immigrants born in Britain are no longer automatically British citizens unless their parents are British citizens. Immigrants who have resided in the UK for more than six years can apply for naturalization (only three years should be spent in the UK before application if the applicant’s spouse is a UK citizen).

Ethnic minority households

The Census showed that three quarters (74% per cent) of Bangldeshi households followed by 66% of Pakistani and 50% of Indian households contained at least one dependent child. In comparison, the proportion for British-born White households was 28% (Office for National Statistics, 2008).

Overall, Asian households registered the highest proportion of married couples under pension age as well as the largest proportion of more than one family with dependent children living together. Only 2% of all household in Britain could be classified in that category, whereas the percentage amongst Bangladeshis was 17%.

The level of segregation amongst the ethnic minority communities in Britain is certainly highest amongst South Asians (Modood et al, 1997) and it has been associated with the existence of cultural, linguistic, religious and aspirational differences from the mainstream institutions on the part of South Asians (Simpson, 2004). Self-segregation, however, seems a myth as Census data showed that the growing number of South Asians in certain areas can be attributed to natural growth and not to movement of South Asian residents towards areas of South Asian concentration (Simpson, 2004). Nevertheless, the issue of segregation will always present a problem since, among other reasons, the increasing concentration of minority members in certain areas can put severe constraints upon housing and the provision of social services; and thus further tilt the equality in services, resources and employment between the majority and the minorities.

Labour market performance

An important aspect and evidence for the successful integration of ethnic minority groups is parity in terms of wage and work opportunities between the minorities and the native majority. The demographic changes in the British population and the need for younger workers are likely to further push towards the closing of the existing gaps. Whether that happens easily, however, is a totally different question. In this section, the progress made in the last few decades within the enactment of stringent anti-discrimination laws will be overviewed and some areas of major concern will be highlighted.

It is generally believed that in comparison with the 1960s the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by convergence of the economic profiles of the ethnic minority groups and the White British workforce (Ignaski and Payne, 1996). The immigrants’ labour market performance seemed to improve perhaps with the acquisition of human capital (Fielding, 1995); the arrival of better qualified migrants drawn from the upper tail distribution of the human capital in their home countries (Bell, 1997); the introduction of a series of anti-discrimination laws, and/or simply the nature of the labour market which registered economic expansion (Bell, 1997). Some researchers question, however, these optimistic findings (Modood et al, 1997), arguing that they were based on aggregate data that did not distinguish between first and second generation minority members and consecutively overstated the declining trend in ethnic minority disadvantage. This is to say that ethnic minorities in the 1980s and early 1990s compared to the 1960s might have been taking better jobs, but they were still doing so to a lesser extent than White people with the same qualifications (Modood et al, 1997).

Even if there was a positive trend in the economic profile of minority groups in Britain in the 1980s, it has certainly reversed by the mid-1990s. The findings of the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities carried out in 1994 showed that Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffered substantial employment and earnings disadvantages with almost two-thirds of male respondents from these groups concentrated into manual jobs. In comparison half of the Indians, and two thirds of Chinese men were in non-manual work (Modood et al, 1997). The good representation of Chinese and South Asians, particularly Indians, in professional, managerial and employers position at the time (the 1990s) has been largely attributed to the high rate of self-employment amongst these groups (Clark and Drinkwater, 1998).

Whether integration works very much depends on the performance of second generation minority members in the labour market. The offspring raised in the host country are assumed to be doing better than their parents and to have reached parity with Whites (Chiswick, 1978). Various studies distinguish between the two generations and explore this assumption with British survey data. Simpson et al (2006), comparing the 1991 and 2001 Censuses, found that the net disadvantage of ethnic minorities in the labour market has become greater for men born in the UK. For example, unemployment amongst unqualified men in their thirties was 16% for Pakistanis born overseas, a little more than the unemployment for unqualified White males, but for Pakistanis born in the United Kingdom, it was 25%. Heath and Cheung (2006) using a cumulated sample of the General Household Survey 1979-1999 and 1992-1997 LFS datasets also reached the conclusion that in terms of avoiding unemployment, the ethnic disadvantage was stronger in the second generation rather than the first one. In their study, the disadvantage was highest for Black Caribbeans and Pakistanis. On the other hand, in terms of accessing professional and managerial positions, the ethnic disadvantage was sharply reduced in the second generation and in the case of Black Caribbeans and Indians it became insignificant (Leslie et al, 1998; Heath and Cheung, 2006).

Unfortunately due to data limitations, few studies simultaneously offer control for educational attainment and knowledge of English. An exception is an article by Dustmann and Fabbri (2000)⁷ who found that English fluency reduced the likelihood of unemployment and the earnings differentials between ethnic minorities and Whites. It is nevertheless hard to believe that lack of language proficiency can solely explain the aforementioned patterns of disadvantage as Caribbean migrants arrive with a good knowledge of English (Heath and Yu, 2005), and second generation respondents have been educated in the British system. In the study by Berthoud (2000), the members of the African minority group stayed longer in education than the respective UK-born White and Black Caribbean groups; however, their unemployment and earnings prospects were similar to those of Black Caribbeans.

One of the explanations most commonly associated with the existence of the divide described above is discrimination.

Several steps have been undertaken since the 1950s to establish equal treatment of all ethnic groups in the British labour market. First, the 1965 Race Relations Act banned ethnic discrimination at public places and was followed by the 1968 Race Relations Act which ensured that it was unlawful to discriminate on grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins in recruitment and terms and conditions of employment (Layton-Henry, 1984). This definition of discrimination was extended in the 1976 Race Relations Act to cover forms of implicit discrimination in which there is absence of deliberate intention to discriminate but employers’ practices still put certain ethnic groups at disadvantage (Heath and Yu, 2005). More recently, the Race Relations Act 2000 was instituted to maintain the provisions of the previous act and to encourage public authorities to fight discrimination. Nevertheless, as will be highlighted, field experiments and attitudinal studies indicate that both indirect and direct discrimination continues to shape the labour market outcomes of minority members in Britain.

The Home Office Citizenship Survey, for example, has registered a steady increase in the perception of prejudice and discrimination in the British society from 2003 to 2005 (Home Office Citizenship Survey, 2003, 2005). Arguably, however, the White British population does not exhibit higher levels of prejudice towards a particular Commonwealth group. Waters (1999), comparing the US and the UK, claimed that to be ‘black‘ in Britain entails that the person is simply ‘non-white’ and there is no ethnic hierarchy as observed in the US. However, the evidence in favour of the reduction of the racial distinctions to ‘whites’ versus ‘non-whites’ in the British case is not exemplary strong. The field experiments conducted in the UK on which we can rely for some insight into the operation of discrimination in the hiring process are outdated and have some serious flaws. The majority of them do not distinguish between the different ethnic minority communities, often grouping West Indian and Asian testers under the term of ‘black applicants’ or ‘coloured’ applicants (Firth, 1981). Consider the generality of the evidence provided by the 1966 Political and Economic Planning (PEP) study which found that when comparing ‘coloured’ applicants (presumably Black Caribbeans, Indians or Pakistanis) and White migrant applicants, the latter experienced much less disadvantage (Daniel, 1968). Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970) obtained similar results for white-collar jobs. More recently, Hoque and Noon (1999) claimed that there is little discrimination against Asians in big companies but most of their fake applicants had Hindu-sounding names implying that they belonged to the Indian minority group which renders the extension of Hoque and Noon’s results to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities impossible. It is true that those studies distinguishing between Black Caribbeans and Asians usually have registered the same level of prejudice against both groups (Brown and Gay, 1994) or a slightly higher level of prejudice against Black Caribbeans (McIntosh and Smith, 1974). Yet, better up-to-date data⁸ is needed with detailed ethnic groupings, as so far the conclusion that British-born Whites do not discriminate against a specific migrant group relies on a data that does not make a very clear initial distinction between the minority groups in Britain.

Attitudinal studies and self-reported feelings of discrimination perhaps do not provide as good systematic evidence of discrimination in the employment process as field experiments but they can attest to existent prejudices. In the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, Bangladeshis and Asians reported lower feelings of discrimination, while members of the Black group especially Black Caribbeans had higher levels of self-reported discrimination: over a quarter of the Caribbeans believed that they had been refused a job on racial grounds (Modood et al, 1997). Since there is a direct negative correlation between feelings of discrimination and trust in institutions (Home Office Citizenship Survey, 2005) and for Black Caribbeans the levels of the latter are usually low (Berthoud, 2000), it is still unclear whether these statistics reflect the true levels of discrimination in the host country or simply perceptions and beliefs of it.

Clearly, over the last few decades, despite the development of extensive anti-discrimination legislation, the ethnic minority groups have been exposed to labour market penalties, and parity with native Whites has not been achieved. Moreover, there are some serious gaps in our knowledge of discrimination in the British labour market that must be filled before any specific strategies for the labour market integration of minority groups are adopted. Indeed, a close monitoring of the level of discrimination will be in order if a more homogenous and equal labour market is to be uncovered in the next 20 years.

The next section of this paper will dwell in detail on new research which tries to throw light on ethnic penalties¹⁰ and possible future developments that may present yet another range of challenges to the ethnic organization of the British society.

Social resources and host country institutions

The second half of this paper focuses on some new research pointing out to the challenges in resolving the gap between UK-born Whites and minority members, and the steps that can be undertaken to ensure the achievment of parity. Researchers believe that overt discrimination¹⁰ may not be the only reason for the penalized position of minority groups in Britain. Ethnic minority members might simply lack the resources and the social networks to gain profitable information about vacancies and obtain those (Peterson et al, 2000). Therefore, before examining the issue of whether an employer hires an individual of ethnic minority origin and on what terms, attention should be paid to the question of whether the ethnic minority member has even heard about the job due to his/her limited social resources.

In my doctoral research which uses the job search behaviour of ethnic minority members in Britain as a proxy for the social resources¹¹ available to them, I find that there is a distinct divide between the members of the Black group and South Asians in the use of social ties which is more pronounced in the first generation than in the second. South Asians rely more on social ties, all things considered. Nevertheless, the indication that when social ties have been used in the second generation, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more unlikely to exit unemployment than British-born Whites and members of the Black group; and that South Asian minorities are less successful in reaching the highest occupational positions through social ties compared to British-born Whites suggests that the ties of groups with assumed high levels of bonding capital¹³ are weak and not strong enough to facilitate the gaining of employment.

On the other hand, state employment agencies are a technique very popular among ethnic minorities – even amongst those with a characteristically low possession of English (such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). State employment agencies indeed are institutions designed to cater primarily for the needs of the unemployed, and to offer help and advice; however, they are also likely to provide low-skilled to medium level jobs. The fact that many of the minority groups with control for education continue to rely on them and exit unemployment successfully may indicate that minorities value the reliability of state employment agencies, the quickness with which jobs are offered (including jobs in the public sector), and the strict operation of the government’s non-discrimination laws compared to the general labour market climate; and favour these factors over high remuneration.

In fact, it is in this heightened use of state employment agencies with control for benefit claiming that the government policies of the incorporation of ethnic minority members register a clear success. State employment agencies seem to have a particular understanding of the different needs of ethnic groups. To maintain a contact with Pakistani and Bangladeshi job seekers, for example, Career Offices offered the flexibility of written applications to them (Johnson and Fidler, 2005). Minority members registered with state employment agencies enjoy the beneficial effect of a number of minority orientated government policies (Tackey et al, 2006) – eg finding the applicants jobs within the local area, raising awareness about available facilities in the neighbourhood (crèches and day care), and encouraging desegregation by assisting minority members in their application for jobs in other geographical areas. The latter strategy is certainly less successful with impersonal intermediaries such as newspaper advertisements which are rarely consulted by minority members even in the second generation, as my research shows.

Undoubtedly, the policies channelled by state employment agencies are indicative of the government’s commitment to the integration of minority groups and the acknowledgement of the importance of providing information and resources to minorities. Yet, there are many ways for improvement in the future. State employment agencies usually offer primarily semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, and a few professional positions in the public sector (Tackey et al, 2006). As the current legislation stands, employers have to advertise their vacancies without discriminating on the basis of gender, age or ethnicity, but the medium of magazines and newspaper advertisements, as my research suggests, is not enough to reach the potential ethnic minority applicants successfully. In fact, minorities frequently prefer to have a mediator (Tackey et al, 2006) in their contact with employers, perhaps due to fears of discrimination (which holds in the second generation as well) or simply lack of knowledge about the operation of the host labour market (Friedberg, 2000). Even with the globalization of the world’s labour markets, it is unlikely that the need for consulting agencies and seeking assistance will totally disappear.

Both state and private employment agencies can take up this role. So far, however, private employment agencies – a possible alternative source of information and help for highly-skilled individuals – have not entirely acted as the agent through which professional placements can be secured. Private employment agencies are indeed crucial in the recruitment of migrant work but they are also frequently involved with the placement of the migrants in low-skilled sector-based vacancies such as Social services or Transport and Communications (Ruhs, 2006). In some cases, private employment agencies have been involved in complex schemes of perpetuating irregular migration by offering migrants jobs as sub-contractors for food and packaging companies (The Guardian, 2005). More objective research on these issues is, of course, needed; yet, state employment agencies seem the only host country institutions that strictly operate by the government policies and laws.

Europeanisation of the migrant waves

British immigration policy in the last 20 years has been orientated towards the ‘Europeanisation’ of labour recruitment, and of creating a more coherent labour market in which migrants blend more easily, although the dependence upon Commonwealth labour has continued particularly in health and education (Sales, 2007). The attempts at ‘Europeanisation’ peaked with the decision to grant free labour access to the new accession countries in 2004. In the context of the ageing British population, this strategy seems to ensure the presence of European migrants that are likely to adapt more easily to the British culture and labour market. However, public opinion has not been very relaxed towards these new migrants and many fluctuations within the government policy have also been witnessed.

White migrants have always been considered non-’visible’. Since up to the 1990s they were primarily skilled migrants from EU-15 and Old Commonwealth countries or Irish, they were often also described as less ‘problematic’ (Sales, 2007). This rhetoric, and the fact that even in the 1990s Commonwealth migrants still dominated the migration waves, masked the important changes under way in British society. For example, the share of Old and New Commonwealth migrants diminished greatly from 30% and 32% of the migrants in 1971 to 17% and 20% of the migrants in 2002 (Berkeley et al, 2005). On the other hand, the proportion of Eastern European and Middle Eastern migrants has steadily increased. The latter trend went unnoticed by the general public for quite awhile as in 2001 the number of Eastern Europeans living in Britain was relatively low – fewer than 100,000 or roughly 3% of the population (Office for National Statistics, 2008). Consecutively, in the 2001 British Attitudes Survey, Commonwealth migrants were still recognized as the most visible group of migrants and the reported levels of indirect discrimination were higher against New Commonwealth migrants than against migrants from other European countries (Rothon and Heath, 2003).

Attitudes of the British White majority certainly started to change with the enlargement of the European Union. After 2004, Britain experienced an unprecedented boom of European migrants. Only between May 2004 and March 2005, there were 176,000 applications to the New Worker registrations scheme; 56% of them were by Polish workers and 15% by Lithuanians (Accession Monitoring Report, 2004-2006). Moreover, prior to the enlargement, Central and Eastern Europeans in Britain were regarded primarily as temporary workers whose number was too small to be discussed in the debate over the incorporation of the permanently settling foreign-born. The change in figures and the dramatic increase in group size questioned the lack of ‘visibility’ of European White migrants. The concern about underestimating the number of foreigners has led even The Office for National Statistics to set up an Inter-Departmental Task Force on Migration Statistics. In this way, the enlargement of the EU drew attention to the fact that from the 1990s onwards the number of Other Whites in the UK has been constantly rising; however, their labour market performance has also become increasingly divergent (Berkeley et al, 2005; Haque, 2002; Ruhs, 2006) which questions the Europeanisation as a strategy aimed at the consolidation of the British labour market in the years to come.

The ‘Europeanisation’ of the migration waves did not quite meet the expectations in respect to age structures as well. The age profile of the coming Eastern and Central European migrants is one of a large pensioner dependency rate (Haque, 2002); which can be deemed as a sign of increased chances of return migration but is not particularly likely to assist in the correction of Britain’s ageing population.

Graph 2: Old Age Dependency Rate

Source: Haque, 2002

In terms of labour market performance, my research (Demireva, forthcoming) based on combined 1998-2005 LFS datasets shows that Central and Eastern Europeans are concentrated in skilled manual and low-skilled work. Both groups, however, experience high levels of penalization in terms of their participation rates. In terms of access to Professional positions, the disadvantage of Eastern Europeans disappears after control for education; but EU10 migrants remain continuously penalized. Perhaps, this could be explained with the fall of work permits for EU10 migrants. Under the operation of the Work Permit Scheme, a small proportion of highly qualified migrants are recruited for professional jobs and the rest are recruited for low-paid sector-based or seasonal work. Thus, a pre-selection of the quality level of migrants exists, which translates into a lower disadvantage as to salariat jobs of the work permit holders but over-representation of skilled workers into unqualified positions with little opportunity for social mobility as there are no Intermediate vacancies.

How can the disadvantage of permit-exempted migrants be stronger? According to data from the Accession Monitoring Report of the Home Office for 2004-2006, most EU10 migrants are employed in relatively low-skilled seasonal jobs with great turnover (Accession Monitoring Report, 2004-2006). If indeed EU10 migrants perceive their stay as temporary they might be reluctant to invest in host country specific capital and prefer short-term work with quick returns using the labour market in their home countries as ‘a primary frame of reference’ (Piore, 1979). More research is, of course, needed on this topic and a comparison of the performance of Central and Eastern European migrants before and after accession to the EU can be very interesting and important for the understanding of the work permit policies and their influence in the labour market.

In addition, special attention should be paid to self-employment. Both men and women from EU10 countries, Eastern Europe, Old Commonwealth and Old migrants have greater odds than UK-born Whites to be self-employed rather than have an unqualified job with control for individual characteristics (Demireva, forthcoming). Interestingly, New Commonwealth men and migrants from Hong Kong, China and Japan, who are traditionally associated with self-employment amongst the older migrant cohorts, have lower odds of being independent entrepreneurs than UK-born Whites¹³. Perhaps, this is a result of a saturation effect for Commonwealth and Chinese entrepreneurs in the Distributive sector while new opportunities for self-employment open in Construction predominated by EU10 and Eastern European migrants (Ruhs, 2006). What is more, the disadvantage against New Commonwealth and Chinese migrants (who have arrived after 1990) in the mainstream labour market is lower than the penalization of Central and Eastern European migrants as evident from their participation and employment patterns, and self-employment has always been associated with the more disadvantaged groups (Clark and Drinkwater, 1998). Finally, recent studies have implied that self-employment has been used by Central and Eastern Europeans as a way of circumventing the complicated procedure of applying for a work permit as the rates of self-employment are very high for both men and women in these groups, and many self-employers in Construction are in their turn sub-contracting (Ruhs, 2006).

Although these thriving forms of dependent self-employment have brought increased flexibility to the labour market and benefits for the British economy, the uncertainty in pay, working hours and conditions associated with them make their practice and perpetuation questionable (Boheim and Muehlberger, 2006). The issue should be studied in greater detail as dependent self-employment shows all signs of becoming the future migrant labour market niche, especially if migrant turnover increases.

The next 20 years

On the basis of the heretofore outlined patterns in migration and the incorporation of minority members into the British labour market and society in general, it is likely that over the next 20 years, three major trends will be observed.

First, minority groups will have strengthened their participation in decision-making processes due to a growing representation in authority structures. The ever-expanding size of first and second generation minority communities and their importance for the British economy is, of course, not only a matter of debate in the Home Office, but also within the minority groups; with both the realization of their role in civic society and sensitivity towards social and economic inequality on the rise (Edwards, 1995). This certainly reflects upon the improvement of the minorities’ position in government and local authorities and the described momentum will become a major driving force for changes in the future. For example, according to the annual Race Equality Report for 2008, the Home Office made good progress on the representation of ethnic minority staff, with particularly strong results for the representation of ethnic staff in London and Croydon as a whole (24%), the United Kingdom Border Agency (27.5%) and the Identity and Passport Service (13.6%). In terms of the progress made by ethnic minorities along the ranks of civil servants, in 2008 6% (4 out of 65) of Senior Civil Servants were from minority ethnic groupings¹⁴ (Race Equality Report, 2008). The increase in this representation and its extension to the local administration and councils in the future is high on the agenda of the Home Office (Race Equality Report, 2008) and even the need to achieve proportional representation of different minority groups instead of regarding them as one whole is gradually acknowledged and lobbied for (Field, 2002).

Thus, in 20 years time, I think we will have witnessed some serious steps towards the reduction of inequality, and an improvement in the labour market position of first and second generation minority members that will be largely due to active participation of the minority groups in the debate over, and the management of, the British policy.

At the same time, I envisage certain tightening of the immigration controls. The failure to produce a homogenous immigrant flow through the ‘Europeanization’ of the migrant waves even in terms of age structure will bring about the introduction of more severe requirements for work and settlement in the UK. English language fluency is most likely to be the first added requirement, especially given the warning signs and discussions in the press, and the unanimity of the general public opinion on the issue (BBC², 2007). Whereas, language barriers per se might pose less of a challenge in 20 years time with increased mobility and the presence of English in school curricula throughout the world, the debate about the need of migrants to know English can easily expand into a debate about their knowledge of British culture and suitability to become part of British society. I do not think that the current tests accompanying the process of naturalization will be extended to the entry of migrants in 2028; however, in my opinion, the discussion about the imposition of such tests will be in full force at that moment. Again, I think all minority communities will take a very lively participation in this debate, which is exactly why the institutionalizing of the evaluation of ‘Britishness’ will not happen over night. Moreover, the role of tests in positive migrant selection (Independent, 2003) is likely to be one of the future’s most contingent or at least most recurrent topics. On the other hand, these restricting measures will not be carried to extremes. For example, the imposing of absolute control over the age of prospective migrants even in 20 years time when the ageing of the British society will be felt much more explicitly, for me, remains unlikely given the predicted growth say of migrant communities in the decision-making processes.

Finally, in my opinion, vacancies in health, social services and low-skilled work will continue to afflict the British labour market of the future, which will trigger a persistent need for immigrant labour. In the health sector, particularly in the nursing and associate health professions, attempts will probably be made to raise the pay and improve the working conditions in order to encourage second generation minority members to fill the positions in which they are currently underrepresented (Field, 2002). Such practices can be instituted to placate the public fear of unethical recruitment of nurses and counteract the draining of source countries (Kingma, 2006). Yet, such positive trends are unlikely to extend to all vacancies. Negative selection of migrants and skill downgrading are still to be expected if divergence in the levels of income inequality in the source and host countries continues to exist and in more general terms manual labour is not superseded by automated labour.

Conclusion

With the British population rapidly ageing, there is a growing realization of the important role that both first and second generation ethnic minorities can play in demographic change. A great deal, however, depends upon the integration of the minority members and the reaching of parity between ethnic groups. This paper strived to show that to achieve integration the existence of differential social resources between ethnic groups should be acknowledged and programmes put in operation to correct these patterns rather than simply rely on the permeating force of the global cultural and labour market changes which will take place in the next few decades.

It could be argued that in the next 40 years, migration will not present a problem since new technologies and widespread education would guarantee the emergence of a more mobile, culturally integrated world. At the same time, many signs show that such predictions should be regarded with caution. The enlargement of the European Union is a case in point. Although research shows that migrants are centred in low-skilled and seasonal work that the British-born White have left vacant, a rise in the group size of White migrants made them more ‘visible’ and questioned their previously assumed homogeneity. Thus, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the migration waves still raised concerns about the integration and presence of migrants.

Recently, the Commission for Integration and Cohesion (BBC, 2008) pointed out that language is the single and largest barrier to the successful adaptation of minority members. Without belittling this important issue, it should be acknowledged as the present paper shows that the labour market penalties are high even for second generation minority members who have been raised and educated in Britain, and for Black Caribbean migrants. In addition, migrants are streamlined for jobs according to their skill levels – the highly-educated ones with good knowledge of English occupy professional positions and the rest are concentrated in low-skilled and semi-skilled work. The unavailability of Intermediate positions indirectly guarantees that even better-qualified migrants end up with jobs at the end of the occupational hierarchy. In this way, the problem is not that the nature of White migration has changed from English-speaking Old Commonwealth countries and the US to Central and Eastern European migrants, but the mere existence of unqualified labour.

Moreover, as the living standards are bound to improve within the European Union in the next 40 to 50 years, the ‘European’ migration wave especially for low-skilled work might shift further towards the East and even cease altogether. In which case, the negative selection of migrants is not guaranteed to disappear. A possible resolution of this situation would be to keep large migrant turnover for unskilled vacancies and further restrict settling. Yet, again, travelling distance and high migration costs will make such a decision impractical and in reality unattainable.

Building informed public opinion will also play a large role in the bridging of the gaps between the majority and minority populations. Currently, very little is known about return migration, and many of the temporary migrants are considered potential settlers which raises fears about housing, social services and general anti-migration feelings. However, the recent statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2008) showed that in mid-2007, natural change started playing a greater impact in population change and there was a decline in the net migration rate possibly due to greater return migration. The existing International Passenger Survey (Office for National Statistics, 2008) which records the purpose of stay of people entering the UK and their envisaged date of leaving the country is not enough for the patterns of return migration to be outlined. Likewise, more detailed analyses of the labour market performance of refugees are needed since on the basis of current knowledge, hardly any recommendations can be made about their future integration.

It is clear that a successful adaptation to Britain’s ageing demographic structure cannot happen without ensuring the incorporation of the minority groups already settled in Britain and the extension of the principles of fair treatment to the incoming migration waves. In a way, both are likely to be achieved through the increasing efforts of minority communities to become better represented in public authorities and participate in the decision-making processes; and through the encouragement of research in previously unexplored areas. Nevertheless, migration, equality and inclusion are still very likely to be as hot and as debatable issues in 20 years time in Britain as they are today due to the gradual pace in which the labour market transformations in global as well as local plan take place.

Notes

1. Neli Demireva is a DPhil student in Sociology at the University of Oxford at the end of her studies. Her doctoral thesis is titled “Examining ethnic minority disadvantage in the British labour market – evidence from job search behaviour”. In addition to her post-graduate research, she participated from 2006 till 2008 as a researcher in the Ethnicity and Immigration Research Group of the ‘Economic Change, Quality of Life and Social Cohesion’ (Equalsoc) Network with a specific focus on migrants arriving in the UK after the 1990s. For correspondence: Neli Demireva, St. John’s College, Oxford, OX1 3JP, email: neli.demireva@sjc.ox.ac.uk

2. Bulmer (1996) defines ethnic groups as “a collectivity within a larger population having real or putative ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus upon one or more symbolic elements which define the group’s identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to an ethnic group” (Bulmer, 1996, p35). The term ethnic minority refers both to first and to second generation minority groups.

3. The term Old Commonwealth refers to Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The major sending countries of the New Commonwealth are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean, Kenya and South Africa. For full list of Commonwealth states, see McIntyre, 2001. Old Commonwealth and New Commonwealth migrants constitute the largest immigrant groups both before and after 1990. Changes in their immigrant status, however, render the migrants from these communities arriving after the 1990s more similar to other labour migrants. Recent Pakistani migrants, for example, are also defined as aliens and therefore do not benefit from having special residence and work permits as some of the older colonial generation (Soysal, 1994).

4. Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, and most recently in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006.

5. The SBS currently only applies to nationals from Bulgaria and Romania. The programme was scheduled to be phased out by 31 December 2006, but was retained for both nations upon their accession to the European Union on 01 January 2007.

6. The 1981 British Nationality Act introduced the primary purpose rule under which an immigration officer could deny entry to spouse or fiancee if the primary purpose of marriage was immigration.

7. The study is based on data from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities and the Family and Working Lives Survey for 1994-1995.

8. Empirical economic studies can contribute little to enlighten this matter. At best, they provide only indirect evidence of discrimination by virtue of existing differentials in the wage and occupational achievements of British-born Whites and ethnic minority members. These differentials can in addition be attributed to a number of factors beside discrimination such as the aforementioned strength of social networks or degree of adaptation to the host country. Amongst the quantitative attempts at more direct evidence of discrimination, the studies using matched employer-employee data should be highlighted. Frijters et al (2006), on the basis of data from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey, showed that job satisfaction was significantly lower for White workers in workplaces with a high density of ethnic minorities, and that White male workers required a wage premium of around 12% to compensate for a move from a work place with no ethnic minorities to a work place with a higher density of ethnic minorities (Frijters et al, 2006).

9. The term ethnic penalty has been introduced to account for “any remaining disparity that persists in ethnic minorities’ chances of securing employment or higher-level jobs, or income, after taking account of their measured personal characteristics such as their qualifications, human capital and the like” (Heath and Yu, 2005, p192).

10. Patterns inconsistent with discrimination used as the sole explanation of ethnic penalization are the similar level of self-reported discrimination amongst minorities with various group economic successes (Modood et al, 1997) and the stable-over-time proportion of British-born White employers who are likely to commit basic acts of discrimination (Brown and Gay, 1994; Simpson and Stevenson, 1994). An example for the first is the particularly low level of self-reported discrimination amongst Bangladeshis – the group pointed out by all other ethnic and religious minority groups as most vulnerable – in contrast to the relatively higher perception of discrimination on the part of Indians (Modood et al, 1997). The second trend is not inconsistent with rising awareness of discrimination in the society in general and in the media discourse that will possibly lead to a situation in which the knowledge of existing discrimination outstrips the actual experience of it (Modood et al, 1997).

11. According to Portes (1995), the term social resources could be used in economic sociology to denote both the referral to the social and often co-ethnic networks available to the minority members but also to the use of the institutional settings of the host country.

12. Bonding social capital refers to relationships between similar persons (for example, those alike with respect to sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics), while bridging social capital refers to relationships between dissimilar persons at the same level of hierarchy (Putnam 1995).

13. The sample consists of 1998-2008 datasets. The New Commonwealth migrants referred to have arrived in Britain after the 1990s.

14. Although it should be borne in mind that only 65 out of 118 Senior Civil Servants acknowledged their ethnicity.

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Tackey, N.D., Cabourne, J., Aston, J., Ritchie, H., Sinclair, A., Tyers, C., Hurstfield J., Willison, R. and Page, R. (2006) Barriers to employment for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain. Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report No360

Waters, M. (1999) Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities, New York, Sage publications

This document has been commissioned as part of the UK Department for Children, Schools and Families’ Beyond Current Horizons project, led by Futurelab. The views expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation.

The 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of a number of now well known community studies of family life in Britain. Two particularly influential studies included Michael Young and Peter Wilmott’s (1957) classic study of family and kinship in a working class area of East London, and Colin Rosser and Christopher Harris’ (1965) study of family and social change in Swansea. These studies, amongst others (Firth, 1956; Townsend, 1957) were extremely influential, revealing as they did the continuing significance of extended kinship networks in the daily life of families. As a testament to their continued importance, both studies were revisited in the early 21^st century, promising, in so doing, to shed light on half a century of social and community change (Dench et al, 2006; Charles et al ,2008). What is of particular significance, however, is how in undertaking these restudies, the researchers were faced with the challenge of “returning” to communities which had undergone considerable ethnic diversification. Thus Dench et al’s work Family and Kinship in East London becomes The New East End: Kinship, Race and Conflict. Charles et al’s restudy also had to incorporate Swansea’s minority ethnic population. These two particular case studies merely indicate that it is increasingly difficult to truly consider the nature of diversity and change in families in Britain without placing questions of ethnicity and multiculturalism at the centre. It can be argued that the framework of class and community has been replaced by the framework of ethnicity and multiculturalism. Either way, they provide local illustrations of how ethnic diversification resulting from international migration has become a major feature of social structure and personal relationships both in Britain and across the world.

Over a period of two decades after the Second World War, people from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and the Caribbean migrated to Britain in large numbers as a result of postwar labour shortages. Later, during the 1970s, people of South Asian origin came from Africa in response to the Ugandan and Kenyan governments’ Africanization policies. Since then, the legal entry of unskilled, non-white people has been limited to the dependents or spouses of these earlier immigrants. There has also been significant immigration of Black Africans since the 1980s. According to the 2001 census, the UK has a non-white minority ethnic population of 4.6 million, representing 7.9% of the total population. Those categorized as “Asian or Asian British” (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and other Asian) numbered 2.3 million, comprising 4% of the UK population, whilst those termed “Black or Black British” (including Black Caribbean, Black African and Black Other) comprised 1.1 million. Not insignificant proportions (15%) of non-whites are classified as “Mixed”, around a third of whom are from white and Black Caribbean backgrounds.

The focus in this paper will be on Britain’s Asian and Black Caribbean populations making up as they do around two-thirds of the minority population. However, it is important to note that the ‘white’ category comprising 92.1% of the population also contains ethnic differences, for example, white Irish and Poles who have also migrated in large numbers over the course of the 20^th century. Rarely, for instance, do the Irish community appear in ethnically sensitive monitoring, despite evidence of their acute disadvantage. To some extent this is captured via recently added distinctions between White British, White Irish and White Other. This is likely to have added significance given the arrival of Eastern European labour migrants to the UK since EU enlargement, some of whom are becoming parents in the UK, whose children are currently attending primary schools, and who may be joined by other family members. Thus minority ethnic people should not be simply equated with non-white people.

Certain urban areas across the UK have become commonly, perhaps pejoratively, associated within the popular imagination with a strong minority presence – African Caribbeans in Brixton, South London; Punjabi Sikhs in Southall, West London; Bangladeshis in parts of East London; as well as distinctive Black and South Asian communities in the Midlands and North of England. Other ports, such as Cardiff, Liverpool, and Bristol have had notable Black populations since at least the mid 19^th century as a result of the enforced migration of Black people as part of the slave trade. It has been argued that the housing and settlement patterns of ethnic minorities have served to maintain or reproduce their sense of ethnic solidarity vis-a-vis the wider society. Community-based solidarities emerge as forms of protection against their experience of structural disadvantage, exclusion and racism. These communities, as well as voluntary organizations within them, form an important social resource for minority ethnic families; for example, offering valuable support for parents who have arrived in Britain but who have no network of support among their own family or friends living nearby. A crucial issue for policy and research is whether and how recent migrants of African or Asian background, including those who have migrated later in life, are tapping into these built-up networks. Despite the relatively younger age structure of Britain’s minority ethnic population, the generation of Black Caribbean and South Asian post-war migrants to Britain is now moving into retirement age and this raises further important social policy questions about their informal support networks, and the capacity of care and service providers to be culturally sensitive to their needs in old age (Blakemore and Boneham, 1994; Nazroo, 2006).

The presence of these communities has challenged (and continues to challenge) conventional notions of British national belonging, identity and culture and have, to some extent, contributed to a greater understanding of multicultural citizenship in the UK (Parekh, 1999). Most British-born children and grandchildren of Caribbean and South Asian migrants would consider themselves to a greater or lesser degree as British, whilst still maintaining an attachment to their parents’/grandparents’ country or region of origin. Consequently, as young adults, they may adopt and actively maintain a trans-national meaning of family, which extends beyond those residing in Britain. What is of importance is to consider how their family values and relationships reflect both their ethno-cultural background, as well as their adoption of ‘westernized’ British values. “Minoritised families” in which there has been a history of migration leading to trans-national networks thus constitute a key point of differentiation within British families. However, many of the changes occurring in minority ethnic families are also happening to varying degrees within all families, and thus are not simply specific “ethnic” features. The notion of families as exhibiting ethnic differences which are distinct from the majority entails both accurate representations and misrepresentations of reality. As a result, and before turning directly to this, it is first necessary to provide a general background to the patterns of change and diversity that are affecting all families.

Changing Families: The General Picture

In recent decades, Britain, like many countries across the developed world, has witnessed an evolving pattern of change in the nature of family structures, roles and relationships. In particular, there are significant demographic changes taking place that are having a direct influence on patterns of family formation, as well as on relationships between family members. These include shifts towards fewer marriages, more cohabitation and more births outside marriage; increases in divorce, remarriage and reconstituted families; and an increase in the proportion of lone parent and smaller families. In addition to these broad trends, population ageing and the extension of the life course, point to a renewal of multi-generational family relationships, particular with regard to the role of grandparents.

It can be argued that the major trend in current 21^st century families has been a transformation in relation to marriage. Today’s family picture reflects a shift away from the married couple family that dominated for much of the 20^th century. While it remains the case that over half of adults still live as married couples, their percentage is declining. Census figures over the second half of the 20^th century show marked declines from 68% in 1971 to just over 50% in 2001. Alongside this, and as in many European countries, the average age of marriage has increased. Parenthood is also occurring later. Kiernan (2004, p118) has shown that in the mid 1970s, the average age of first time brides in Britain was clustered in the 22-24 years old range, whereby by the year 2000 they are clustered in the late 20s, predominantly at age 27. It should also be noted that this masks considerable variation in the age of first time mothers defined by social class and education.

One of the important drivers behind these trends is the concomitant rise in cohabitation, which doubled between the 1991 and 2001 censuses. While men and women living together outside marriage is certainly not new, there are clear rises in incidence, since the 1980s, of young people living together for sustained periods either as a precursor to, or instead of, marriage. A proportion of cohabiting couples are same sex couples. Since the Civil Partnership Act came into force in January 2005, there have been over 20,000 such partnerships. The number of people living alone has also more than doubled between 1971 and 2005, from 3 to 7 million (Social Trends, 2007).

One change which has received much political and media attention, and which also forms a central aspect of arguments around family breakdown, relates to patterns of divorce. In Britain, rates of divorce have increased steadily since the 1970s, culminating in the current disbanding of around 40% of marriages (Harper, 2003). Although, as Harper (2003) goes on to state, this is counterbalanced by the fact that those marriages that do not end in divorce will be longer because of increased life expectancy for both women and men. Accordingly, divorce, along with the greater number of children born outside marriage, has contributed significantly to changes in household and family composition. On one hand, the proportion of children living in lone parent families in Britain more than tripled between 1972 and 2006 to 24% (Social Trends, 2007). On the other hand is the rise in the number of step- and reconstituted families. Although precise figures are difficult to come by, there is little doubt that numbers have been growing as a consequence of divorce and remarriage (Allan and Crow, 2001).

Demographic changes, along with new family forms, are also impacting upon the position of older people within families. It is increasingly argued that families will be increasingly characterized by multi-generational bonds beyond the household, particularly between grandparents and grandchildren. Recent UK figures suggest that around a third of the population are grandparents and will remain so for an average of 25 years (Harper, 2005). Moreover, three-quarters of the UK population will at some stage attain grandparenthood (Dench and Ogg, 2002). With the expansion of the grandparent role across the span of an individual’s life, it is likely to occur while people are still engaged in numerous other social roles including work, associational and other family roles. In the United Kingdom, this context is reflected by current policy concerns over the role of grandparents (Dench and Ogg, 2002), particularly around childcare (Wheelock and Jones, 2002) and as a resource allowing lone mothers greater participation in the labour market (Harper et al, 2004).

Taken as a whole, these trends illustrate the point that fewer people live in a household characterized in terms of a “simple” nuclear family comprising a heterosexual couple and their two dependent children. In attempting to make sense of the increased diversity and fluidity in family relations, at least two key ideas from family sociology emerge – “individualization” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) and “negotiation” (Finch and Mason, 1995). According to the individualization thesis, individuals, over the latter half of the 20^th century have been gradually emancipated from traditional norms and, as a result, are able to exert a greater degree of control over their lives. This may be reflected in changing normative understandings about when is the “right” age to marry, about greater sexual freedom, challenging gender norms, and increased opportunities for educational, labour market and social mobility for women. Evidently there is much more flexibility in becoming a couple and whether people co-reside. Younger people are marrying less and are doing so at older ages. There also appear to be more choices around family and work, albeit choices which are gendered. People are far more able to choose the kinds of intimate relationships that are important to them, and are more likely to end them if they no longer accord with their personal preferences and objectives.

Coupled with the notion of “individualization” is the idea of “negotiation”. Relationships between men and women, parents and children, to a greater degree, involve negotiation. Families are not simply “givens” but need to be worked at, particularly when the issue of who is and who is not “family” is fluid and subject to change over time. In addition, relations between parents and (adult) children are increasingly characterized by democratization, mutual agreement, respect and reciprocity, and disclosure of information. Like individualization, the breakdown of ascribed social norms provides a degree of space within which to negotiate. This point is particularly evident when we consider the role of grandparents. As alluded to above, research evidence points to considerable solidarity between the generations within families, and this is reflected in high levels of support provided by grandparents to their children as parents. The current generation of grandparents is healthier and wealthier in their later life. This provides opportunities for them to develop meaningful and reciprocal relationships with their children and grandchildren, not least around education and learning. However, these bonds, whilst strong, still require negotiation. Most grandparents want to help out, but they do not necessarily want to provide child care on a full time basis. This is exemplified in recent debates around grandparents’ rights as well as grandparent support groups offering advice as to how establish ground rules with parents around childcare (see, for example, Hill, 2008). Grandparents can no longer be taken as “door mats”. Thus we see the emphasis upon continuing family responsibilities but in the context of negotiation and choices with other work and leisure roles.

Changing Minority Ethnic Families: Challenges and Trends

Are these changes in family life also impacting upon minority families? Is their influence more or less similar or different to that identified within majority families? Indeed, survey research has identified both similarities and differences in these patterns across ethnic groups. In the 2001 census, among all families, those headed by a person of a non-white ethnic background are much more likely than white families to have children living with them. Nearly 80% of Bangladeshi families had dependent children compared to just 40% of white families. Bangladeshi and Pakistani families tend to be larger than families of any other ethnic group. Mixed, Black Caribbean and White families with dependent children had the largest proportion of cohabiting couples, but cohabitation is less usual amongst Asian and Chinese populations. In turn, over 45% of Black Caribbean, Black African and mixed families were headed by a lone parent, compared with 25% of white families. According to the 4^th National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Modood et al, 1997; Berthoud, 2005), only 39% of Caribbean adults under the age of 60 are in formal marriages compared to 60% of white adults under 60. Conversely, South Asians are characterized by higher rates of marriage with around three-quarters of Pakistani women in partnerships by the age of 25, compared with about two-thirds of Indian women and just about half of African-Asian and White women (Berthoud, 2005).

The most common method to help understand and explain ethnic differences in family formation has been to compare the degree to which minority ethnic families are following the path of “individualization” (as illustrated above by, amongst other things, rising patterns of cohabitation, divorce, less children, lone parenting) that is seen to be characterizing white majority families (see Beishon, 1995; Berthoud, 2001, 2005; Modood et al, 1997; Shaw, 2004).

Berthoud (2005), for example, posits a single scale running from “old fashioned values” to “modern individualism” as a way of interpreting ethnic variations with Pakistanis and Bangladeshis at the traditionalistic end and Caribbeans at the individualistic end and ahead of whites. Berthoud goes as far as to say that “the Caribbean family, in the traditional sense of a Caribbean man married to a Caribbean woman, may be dying out” (2005, p249). In contrast, South Asians remain strongly adhered to “old-fashioned values” with very few people cohabiting from an Asian ethnic background. This said, whilst South Asian adults are less likely to be living outside marriage, there is and has been a good number of Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis living alone temporarily due to migration processes which go unreported in surveys. For instance, men may be separated from their families by lengthy immigration procedures and in these cases women may become de facto lone parents for several years and, as a result, not in receipt of the support and benefits available to them.

Ethnic minority families also differ in relation to norms of responsibity towards older family members. As the American Sociologist Talcott Parsons noted some 50 years ago, in white families, an adult’s responsibilities towards partner and children are given precedence over existing obligations towards other kin. This tendency, however, is not so evident in minority ethnic families. Among some of Britain’s Asian population in particular, greater priority is given to parental ties in adulthood. There is much more sharing of the home across three generations, often in the form of common housekeeping. Multi-generational ties, both within and beyond households, have particular resonance amongst South Asian families, and to an extent Chinese families, in which couples continue to live with their parents after starting their own families. For example, around two-thirds of British resident Indian elders live with one of their adult children, compared with just 15% of white elders (Berthoud, 2005). However, young Asian families tend to live more often with the father’s rather than the mother’s family, meaning that, unlike the dominance of maternal grandparents commonly observed amongst whites, it is the widowed paternal grandmother who is most likely to live with the family.

Despite the differences between them, all ethnic groups, including South Asians, are viewed as moving towards the “modern individualism” end of the continuum, with lower rates of marriage and higher rates of cohabitation and single parenthood, albeit at different rates. Berrington (1994), over a decade ago, finds that whilst almost all Asians do get married, the second generation are marrying later than their parents, suggesting some assimilation in patterns towards those of the white population. Arranged marriage is a common form of marriage amongst South Asian groups. However, these patterns are also impacted upon by “western” notions of individual choice, with the individuals who are marrying being given more opportunities to influence partner selection than previously (Crow and Allan, 2001, p60).

It may be too simplistic however to view different ethnic groups in terms of their position on a continuity between modern individualism and traditionalism, but which are all shifting inevitably in the same direction. The result is a tendency to consider minority ethnic families in terms of their deviation from the “norm” or from the “standard white model” with Muslims as the most “culturally different” and resistant to change (see Smart and Shipman, 2004 for a critical discussion). In order to understand the significance of ethnic differences, a deeper understanding of the social and cultural context underlying these trends, of how distinctive cultural traditions and socio-economic pressures are shaping family patterns, is needed.

Shaw (2004) has identified how the family forms and relationships of Caribbeans and South Asians continue to reflect issues and concerns that relate to their respective regions of origin. For instances, Black Caribbean families in Britain reflect similarities with changing patterns of kinship in the Caribbean itself, with high rates of single motherhood, significant grandmother care, and a large proportion of children born outside marriage. Given the cultural continuity of these patterns between Britain and the Caribbean, it is difficult to see how they arise from the pressures of “modern individualism”. Of course, these trends have all appeared in debates surrounding the “problematic” nature of Black single motherhood. However, such a focus also overlooks the importance of ties beyond the household, both in the UK and trans-nationally. Reynolds (2006) has also criticized the stereotypical view of African Caribbean families as reflecting heightened individualism, indicated by weak kinship ties and a fragmented family structure, leading to youth crime, educational under-achievement and high youth unemployment. In fact, Caribbean families continue to demonstrate strong reciprocal ties and bonding both within local communities and across transnational networks (see also Gouldbourne, 2008). Trans-national kinship links continue to be significant for young people. In addition, family roles and relationships may be an important source of identity for young Caribbean men, who may be more likely to be unemployed and suffer ill-health. There is some evidence that family roles such as fatherhood gives these men a sense of purpose and value that is otherwise not available to them. Similarly, Shaw (2004) explores the differences between South Asian families, particular around marriage patterns, suggesting that attempts to group these populations together are unhelpful and overlook internal contradictions.

Certainties and Uncertainties in the Evolving Patterns of Change in Families

The conclusion of many scholars is that characterizations of current and future generations of minority families as moving towards “modern individualism”, and assimilating to the norms and values of the host society, may be misplaced. As has been noted, close trans-national links may actually be increasingly sustained by both the greater social mobility of young Caribbeans and South Asians in Britain, as well as by further developments in communication technology.

If these trends around the globalising of family relationships continue, then one would expect individuals and families to be less rooted around local place and in relation to the communities in which we were born or grew up. They will involve the maintenance of ties across greater distances between Britain, Europe and the World. But there are contradictory trends and we should be careful not to over-generalize about the impact of globalization. There has also been a parallel rise in the importance of the local, the increase in ethnic group solidarity, and different forms of project identity. This will emphasize active family and community togetherness, not free floating individualism. In this sense, physical contact may become even more, rather than less, salient in the form of family gatherings, celebrations and the passing on of traditions and rituals. The global fascination with genealogy and family trees may stem from the need for self-understanding and belonging in a globalizing world where identities can become easily blurred and where choices seem overwhelming.

It would also be erroneous to view the changes referred to above, as often happens in debates about the family, as evidence of instability or as a decline in the importance of family. That family responsibilities based on ascribed traditional norms of responsibility can no longer be assumed is only one side of the story. All the research evidence shows the considerable hard work, time and effort that people put into maintaining their connections to other family members across boundaries and differences and who may live in other countries. Rather than changes driving people apart, making the family more fragile and people more self-focused, we see people continuing to invest considerable energy and value into their personal relationships. As the boundaries of family life become more complicated, we see a greater emphasis upon the communication and “display” (Finch, 2007) of familyness, as the means by which families are established. We also see more attempts to seek out family histories through genealogical software and historical societies, and an interest in resemblances and heritability (Mason, 2008).

All this said, previous misplaced claims about how the family will look today, such as those around family breakdown and fragmentation also serve as warnings against the pitfalls of over-generalisation and unwarranted extrapolation of current trends into the future. Inevitably, visions of possible futures will draw selectively from the range of evidence available. Any predictions around the particular direction that families will take are questionable to the extent that they overlook the scope for diversity. Furthermore, the degree to which current trends represent sharp qualitative breaks with the past is highly questionable. In focusing primarily upon change, we risk overlooking significant consistencies and continuities that would be equally important in understanding how families in the future will unfold. For example, there remains a degree of uniformity in families because of the persistence of structural factors, such as the labour market. There is also little change in gender relations in the household, despite the growth of married women’s paid work. This relates to normative constraints, but also to other issues such as labour market differentials between men and women, as well as gendered assumptions implicit within welfare policies (eg parental leave), which continue to reinforce rational decision making between couples regarding who does what.

The Role of Science and Communication Technology in Shaping Contemporary and Future Family Relations

Developments in communication networks and information technology are already shaping family relations, not least amongst minoritised families dispersed by international migration. The rising availability (and affordability) of air travel, telecommunications and other new digital forms of communication are further encouraging the development of trans-national ties on a global scale. This is occurring, however, not just amongst those with a history of migration, but among a wider range of families whose children, siblings, parents and/or grandparents are living and working for varying amounts of time abroad.

In some families, we will see the internet and other new and advanced telecommunication systems acting as the principal means by which family members and friends establish frequent and regular contact. Recent developments such as SKYPE and VONAGE may be responding to, as well as normalizing, these demands. SKYPE claims to have 309 million registered members worldwide and 12 million users at peak times (BBC News, 2005). Like SMS messaging previously, SKYPE is becoming part of the everyday terminology of family and friends. Again, the availability and affordability of this software is key. Increasingly these facilities will be used by both children and parents to contact each other. However, while we know that these will form an increasingly important role in how family members communicate, there remain uncertainties as to the extent of this change, how it will affect the nature of relations and the meanings people ascribe to family life. There are at least three areas where the effects of technology are already evident and which have particular salience for the future:

Resolving work and family conflict?

One tangible impact of technology on family life is the shift in the work-home relationship. For example, as a result of digital forms of communication people are increasingly able to take their work home, and to combine working from both office and home to suit their family and caring obligations. This has become a particular trend within dual earner families. Conversely this may lead to a colonization of family space and time by work space and time, for example, in “mum is working” times or working during the post-bedtime shift. At certain moments, the space between working and not working becomes blurred, for example, internet searching, and reading newspapers and magazines. Work and family domains are also blurred by the expectation, generated by these technologies that individuals are, and should, be available all the time. Thus, there remain several unanswered questions around how these developments in flexible working conditions will impact upon family life. On one hand, they may provide people with choices in order to resolve work and family conflicts, allowing more and more people work from home and in locations that allow them to combine responsibilities. On the other hand, they may encourage employers to put even more pressure on workers to work further away and spend more time away from home. These developments will undoubtedly impact upon domestic gender divisions and decision making processes within the family. Time pressures can lead to stress for working parents and how people negotiate work and family roles becomes an increasingly important issue.

“Intimacy at a distance”?

There will also be transformations in the relationship between emotional closeness and physical contact. Family members scattered across continents will view themselves as emotionally close because they are making the effort to stay in touch despite their considerable spatial barriers. In turn, the possibility of video calls, which already account for a quarter of all traffic on SKYPE, could change the way in which family members perceive and understand intimacy and the link between physical contact and emotional closeness. It is interesting to note that people who use these facilities regularly will use terms and phrases like ‘intimate’, ‘close’, ‘just like being in the same room’ to describe these forms of communication. What role do they play in how people form relationships? Do they produce necessarily more fragile relationships? Will they enable people to sustain relationships that would otherwise break down and end? Families are creating a ‘networked’ sense of connectedness, for example, by making and sending videotapes and emailing distant relatives, family histories are recorded and distributed across the globe. These are already occurring, but we see them happening on a much grander scale, leading to more fundamental shifts in what being intimate and being close means.

Parenting and children: More or less control?

The rise of more democratic forms of parent-child relationships means that children are taking an even greater interest in, and having an input in decision making. New forms of digital communication will represent a key medium through which these decisions are made. For example, parents may already be encouraging the purchase and use of mobile phones by their children at a young age to the extent that they allow them greater control and monitoring of the children’s activities and whereabouts. They may allow parents to act as “virtual chaperones”, monitoring activity and safety within an increasingly “risky” environment. On one hand this implies more equal partnerships. On the other, the control and monitoring of children’s behaviours may be extended, beyond the physical, at the virtual level. How will potential technological developments by Google around live satellite pictures at street level shape this? How are new forms of communication shaping the democratic openness of how monitoring and supervision works in families?

Education, Ethnicity, Changing Families and Intergenerational learning

As outlined above, demographic changes as well as changing family forms, such as dual income and lone parent families, place a greater emphasis upon the intergenerational relationship between children and their grandparents. The increasing amounts of time children spend with their grandparents raises direct questions about education and its relationship to intergenerational learning that takes place within families as well as in schools (see also Gregory et al, 2007; Kenner et al, 2007). The role of grandparents can often alleviate the time pressures faced by working parents, and in certain situations may substitute parents’ time investments in promoting children’s education. While intergenerational transfers of time, care and money tend to work downward – from grandparents to grandchildren – the nature of intergenerational learning is a reciprocal one. There has been anecdotal evidence for some time regarding how children teach their grandparents to use computers, internet and other technological developments.

We know that the family provides opportunities for frequent interaction between young and old, and this has become an important aspect within debates about age segmentation and segregation. A key area to consider is the role of schools in fostering this. Evidence from intergenerational programmes also suggests that schools need to be more aware of the opportunities available for mutual learning between children and older people, and the wider societal benefits this provides. Changing attitudes towards older people, including grandparents, need to be recognized within educational and learning paradigms – not as conveyors of out-dated traditional forms of knowledge but as agents with skills and knowledge that compliment children’s formal education.

Intergenerational learning also has particular implications for minority ethnic families and citizenship. Previous conventional understandings of citizenship had assumed that acculturation of minorities to the host society values was an inevitable process. The orientations of 2^nd and 3^rd generation migrants would be firmly orientated to the host society as opposed to the country of origin. Most of the UK research evidence has shown this to not be the case. The mutual learning that occurs between grandchildren and grandparents can also act to promote citizenship amongst older people. The current government has initiated a number of policies aimed at citizenship education and the better integration of new citizens to the UK.

Schools represent the key domain through which the state is able to actively foster national values to its citizenry. Yet as patterns of migration change (for example, people migrating during middle and later life), citizenship education needs to be broadened in order to form part of lifelong learning. To what extent will previous migrants, such as those who came during the 1950s and 1960s, act as role models for more recent migrants of a similar age group? The adaptation of new migrants also requires a much broader notion of citizenship education – not simply with regard to civic values, democracy and Britishness – but also with less abstract forms of knowledge which impact directly upon their mobility, eg qualifications, labour market issues, entitlements and service provision, and issues to do with intercultural communication.

Globalization has extended and intensified the flows of migration between societies and this has been met with concerns over the integration and needs of the new and diverse migrants. A good deal of their societal adaptation can be learned from previous and existing migrants, thus there need to be spaces for mutual learning within civil society, for example, through community and adult education centres.

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This document has been commissioned as part of the UK Department for Children, Schools and Families’ Beyond Current Horizons project, led by Futurelab. The views expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation.