

# **Review of future of paid and unpaid work, informal work, homeworking, the place of work in the family (women single parents, workless households), benefits, work attitudes motivation and obligation**

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## **1. Introduction**

Projecting trends into the future, or even just discussing them, is fraught with issues and problems. All too often predictions based on a particular single topic turn out to be dramatically untrue or, at best, gross exaggerations. Examples of this in the area covered by this paper include predictions in the early 1980s that vast numbers would move to home working and teleworking; also during the 1990s we were said to be heading for becoming a nation of self employed; and we regularly hear predictions that the post war era of 'jobs for life' has ended, never to return –the implication being that everyone will have a number of jobs over their lifetime (or a portfolio of different jobs). Clearly one issue that makes specific predictions difficult is that economies and societies are complex interrelated systems. When one bit of them changes there are ramifications which spread to the rest and sometimes one change can produce an equal and opposite response which moderates the effect of the first change, or may reinforce it. But changes in many walks of life only occur very slowly. We are not always able to see change when it is happening, only in retrospect and when grossed up to aggregate levels. However, external large-scale, even one-off events or disasters, which were unpredicted, and even unpredictable, can also change the direction of trends in society.

On the subject matter of this paper, there is already an existing review attempting to look forward over the first 20-25 years of the twenty-first century world of work (Moynagh and Worsley, 2005). It was commissioned in order to think forward from the results of the ESRC's large-scale investment, *The Future of Work* research programme. Some of the findings of this review are incorporated below. Moynagh and Worsley (2005) suggest that the future will revolve around four themes:

- about moving more jobs up the value chain, a trend that has been happening already, but is predicted to increase
- about tight labour markets, more in some regions than others, which will result from a net growth in jobs alongside a demographic decline in young people in the population and growth in demand for certain high value skills, the so-called 'knowledge workers
- about how people are working (rather than how they are employed or contracted) through the growth of flexible working, part-time hours, more paid work at older ages, self employment, varying locations of work and an expansion of mobile work, and increases in low paid work drawing in more of those who are marginal to the workforce, and
- new management techniques which will involve giving more discretion to employees, a tension between control and decentralisation, greater stress on commitment and winning hearts and minds, recruiting workers who are aligned with the employer's values, and a broadening of the concept of reward to include a menu remuneration package

However, some of Moynagh and Worsley's (2005) projections, despite being only three years old, are already starting to look dated and even unlikely. Their projections, and the research on which they were based, were born out of an almost unprecedented era of growth which is now over. The net growth in jobs that underpins some of their projections looks very dubious from the perspective of October 2008. At the time of writing this Review, the collapse of national and world banking systems, and stock market crashes are the talk of the day. Clearly the scale of these events, still unfolding, and the global recession on the horizon, make it already clear that there are serious consequences ahead for the previously taken-for-granted workings of capitalism, and for the world of paid work resting on it. The consequences of these events may not just be short to medium term changes. These events cast a shadow over making predictions about the future world of work and make a downturn in the business cycle with large-scale unemployment the likely context for people's paid work in the short- and medium-term future. Ultimately the trends may not be derailed by recessions, but the progress along them will certainly be slower than it might otherwise have been.

**Keywords:** employment, work, home, family, women, benefits

## 2. Trends in paid work

There are two types of trend to examine (a) the numbers of employees and (b) the percentage of the eligible workforce employed.

Total numbers of employees in GB and the UK have continued to increase steadily in the past 25 years since 1983. But within this overall total there are a number of different trends. Men's numbers in full-time employment dipped from 1990 and stayed lower until the end of the century, but have since picked up to early 1980s level and are now stable again. The number of men in part-time employment has been on a very gradual but steady increase.

The percentage of working age men in employment fell between 1975 (87.8%) and 1993 (74.8%) but has since risen and remains fairly stable around (80%). The employment rate for older men fell substantially between 1950 and 1995. Men's employment rates have remained above women's employment rates, but women have been progressively closing the gap.

The picture of men's employment has been one of relatively little change, some fluctuations with the business cycle, and some decline through a restructuring of the economy in which men's jobs felt the brunt of the change. The restructuring of the

economy away from manufacturing to predominantly services hit men the most and produced the decline in their employment after 1980 and the concomitant growth in men being economically inactive, long term-sick and increasingly in receipt of incapacity benefit. This trend also had strong regional differences.

More recent trends among men have been an increase in men working part time, especially at the youngest and oldest (50+) ends of the lifecycle, and a slight increase in both men's employment rates beyond 65, and women's beyond 60 since 1993.

The number of women employed has been on a steady upward trend for the past 25 years and longer. Numbers of women in full-time employment mirror the total in that the trend is consistently upwards. Numbers of women in part-time employment only increased very slightly in the 1980s and 1990s, after much faster increases in the earlier decades, and since the turn of the century appears to have levelled off.

The percentage of women in employment has also been on an upward trend for four decades, and has shown no fluctuations with the business cycle as was evident in men's trend employment figures. Over the post-war period the proportion of jobs held by women has shifted from one third to nearly one half. A strong driver of the increase in women's employment has been the growth in women obtaining degrees, and women in partnerships with young children spending less time out of work to have children. The gap to have children has declined over each successive generation of women reaching working age and then giving birth. In 1979, 25% of female employees having a baby resumed paid work within a year of the baby's birth. By the Millennium the proportion of mothers returning by 9-10 months was approximately 50%.

The increase in women going into higher education has meant that they have not accumulated as much work experience as those from earlier generations, or those who left school at an earlier age. They have also delayed starting their child bearing into their thirties. Spending longer in full-time education, as well as having made larger investments in their qualifications, and being more ambitious than earlier generations, have all contributed to pushing back the age at which women have their first child.

So the big labour market story has been the women's story. Women now make up half, if not more, of the workforce, but they do not work half of the total working hours since around 44% of women work part-time hours. Women are still over represented in lower level, low paid occupations, compared with men. Although they have increased their presence in the top occupations, they are still under-represented at the top end of the occupational hierarchy.

Underneath these aggregate level and macro trends are a number of other trends of note:

The sectoral restructuring of the UK economy has increased the demand for labour intensive activities but has also pushed many jobs up the 'value chain'.

A growth in the intensity of work has been occurring, especially in some sectors.

The content of jobs has changed more than their duration over time, suggesting that the claim about 'no more jobs for life' is vastly overstated. One job per person has stayed the norm and permanent full-time work remains the dominant pattern for men. Workers are not moving more often from one employer to another.

The type of skill distribution across the economy has changed with a large growth to 40% in the proportion of managerial and professional jobs. Despite this rise in skills, there has also been a decline in task discretion in some jobs, especially among women and those working part time.

The level of qualifications that jobs require has been on an upward trend, as has the extent of qualifications in the workforce. While half the workforce had no qualifications in 1970 now there is a target for half to have a degree. The rapid growth in qualified workers has not been matched by the same rate of growth in jobs requiring the qualifications they hold. There has also been an increase in numbers of people, particularly graduates, holding qualifications at a higher level than those required for getting their job (eg 40% in 2006 had qualifications higher than required compared with 35% in 2001).

There has been a growth in the percentage of jobs where employees say they keep having to learn new things.

There has been a growth in jobs which use automated or computerised equipment, in those who think it is an essential part of their jobs, and in use of the internet at work. However, this growth slowed in the 21st century, and the wage premium attached to such jobs has shrunk over time.

Skill surveys have pointed to there being an increasing deficiency in demand for intermediate skills. This leaves few opportunities for employees who start out in the lowest job rungs to move upwards over their working career, and leads to increasing division in career prospects. Greater polarisation is already being reflected in the widening distribution of earnings that has been seen since the 1980s. It may not be entirely accurate to call this a 'demand deficiency'. Such results come from surveys of employers, dominated by larger employers. Many of the so-called intermediate skills have traditionally been filled by male, self employed, skilled, manual workers, providing necessary services (plumbing, carpenters, etc.). These are the sort of very small employers or sole traders who do not appear in skills surveys of employers. There is other evidence that such skills are in great demand from the general public, but unfulfilled supply. The problem may be more about the lack of successful training routes to provide both the skills and the capability to run one's own business in order to supply these skills (and hence the growth in immigrant labour filling this employment gap).

In 1980, 7 in 10 employees (including managers) had their pay set by collective bargaining between employers and trades unions. By 1998 the proportion was only 4 in 10, the majority of whom were in the public sector.

### **What does the future hold?**

Men's participation rates are likely to stay fairly stable with a slight upward trend. While there is a current push to get more men into paid work, by tightening up on conditions for receiving incapacity benefit, the effects of these measures are likely to be relatively small. Any upward trend in the number of employed men is likely to come from older men working longer but also more flexibility over retirement ages, and immigrant men; the latter, are predominantly all of working age. This employment growth is likely to occur at much slower rates than in the past through the new and more selective conditions for entry for immigrants.

The supply of younger workers, based on current demographics will fall (and in addition current policy is to get more of them to remain in full-time education). However, immigrant workers who brought their families to the UK could boost the balance of young people in the workforce.

Women in employment are likely to continue to increase in numbers and percentages. This is because more women graduates are going to be coming through into the labour market and these are the women with the highest participation rates. There are some groups where gaining degrees is only just starting to increase, meaning that they have some way to go before reaching their natural peak of participation; for example the

much improved success rates in schools of Bangladeshi girls will start to increase their presence in higher education and eventually in employment. The gradual spread of family-friendly policies in workplaces is also likely to add to women's lifetime participation by making the combining of work and caring easier. The incentives for lone mothers to enter employment will also add to the size of the women's workforce but such inducements are unlikely to get lone mother's employment rates as high as those of mothers in couples, partly because lone mothers tend to be substantially lower qualified on average than women living in couples. The growth in the rate of childless women may now have peaked since birth rates have been starting to rise again. These increases in women's employment will all level off before 2025 and probably remain fairly stable for years from then on.

There have been enormous changes in workplaces in the UK with women moving into male dominated positions to make them 'integrated occupations'. The number of male dominated industries and workplaces has fallen. This has all happened gradually. Occupational segregation is likely to decline further, although I suspect it will not disappear entirely since many men and women prefer doing different jobs. One might say that legislation for equality has opened up these pathways, but all the signs point to legislation and statutory provision following changes in behaviour rather than leading it. However, once enacted, legislation does help to drag along reluctant employers, and it also makes behaviour more uniform (eg peaks in return to work dates after childbirth around the statutory entitlement limits).

Other projections include:

Human interactions will continue to be a growing component of many jobs (containing an increase in time spent interacting with people); this is sometimes called the 'emotional literacy', and represents an increase in jobs where interpersonal skills are valued and important. The care economy is one place where these skills are used, but other customer-facing jobs also contain this skill. Life skills are also a growing part of the paid work market

A widening gap between good and bad jobs is likely, with fewer in the middle. Those in low paid jobs will have fewer rungs of the ladder ahead to provide them with upward career prospects, or to motivate their ambitions.

Immigrant numbers are not likely to reduce, and there is likely to be an increasing supply of immigrant labour, and increasing employer demand for more to be admitted. Immigrants will undoubtedly continue to increase the diversity of British society. Migration is also likely to strengthen the informal economy.

Given some evidence points to a growth in the intensity of work, issues of stress at work and occupational health will grow in strength and employers will have to pay more attention to these issues. It is likely that they may even face legal challenges based on health and safety regulations and duties of care.

Job segregation is likely to break down further, especially among the highly qualified, but some job segregation is likely to remain, especially in lower paid jobs. It will be based on differences in preferences of men and women over the characteristics they seek in a job, and their preferences about the culture of workplaces, and employers' preferences.

It is likely that women will reach men's employment rates, although this equality will not be in hours of work; women, mothers in particular, are still likely to work part time to a far greater extent than men.

The earnings gap between men and women will shrink further, probably to the point where there is no unexplained gap.

There is likely to be growth in couples where the woman earns more than the man, resulting from girls doing better than boys at school, although this trend may also lead to more single women, and fewer partnerships being formed.

Change is likely to continue to occur more in job content than in frequency of moves between jobs. Workers will continue to want stable employment for financial reasons, and employers will want the same, since high turnover and recruitment is very expensive for employers, especially for highly skilled employees.

## **Issues for men's employment**

There are a number of issues raised by future trends in men's employment.

2.1 One issue relates to sub-groups of men who are out of employment and pose threats to society in a number of ways. Lack of employment is very high among some ethnic minority groups of men (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African) and high among younger men in these groups, as well as being concentrated in certain local labour markets in larger cities in London, the North and the Midlands. Among prime age men in partnerships, many Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are working only part-time hours with their wives not being employed. The concentration in certain areas make these breeding grounds of discontent and disaffection with mainstream society.

2.2 The second issue about men's employment is the feeding through to the labour market of underachieving white working class boys from the education system. The structure of employment has changed towards services, and the need for unskilled work has shrunk. Boys who leave school without any qualifications do not find many opportunities to build a career that would support a family even if they wanted to. However, there is a clear need for skilled manual work and with training, such work would not be outside the competence of these boys who are only without qualifications because of lack of motivation rather than ability.

2.3 Barriers to work beyond retirement are likely to remain in many workplaces and dampen the growth in working for those beyond retirement age. Older workers are usually more expensive workers.

### *2.4 What can be done to provide career prospects out of low quality jobs?*

The opportunities to train in intermediate jobs like skilled manual professions have not been available to young men since the apprenticeship system collapsed by 1980. Nothing has successfully taken its place. There is an excess demand for manual skills in the UK; yet it is very recent EU immigrants who are largely meeting this need and not white working class boys, or young men from minority ethnic groups mentioned above. This problem clearly starts in schools with disengagement from formal education which is disruptive to others. Britain desperately needs a good quality vocational education option to run along side the academic stream in the schooling system. It also needs a successor to the apprenticeship system to train young working class men (white and minorities) in skilled professions. Such a system needs to start before the end of compulsory schooling to avoid disaffection and low motivation setting in amongst such boys. Solving this problem would also help address some of the other societal challenges in the UK. It would increase the number of marriageable young men who could offer economic support to a family, and reduce the threat of social unrest in certain localities.

## **Issues for women**

### *2.5. Will women ever reach equality with men in the labour market – and do they mind anyway?*

Although there have been enormous changes in women's position in the labour market, the pace of change of women getting into the Board Rooms, being top executives and top managers is slow. There are now plenty of individual women running their own

successful companies who are millionaires. However, most commentators and forecasters about whether and when employed women will match men in their proportions in the top occupations and with equal pay suggest they are still a long way off, even another 20 years. It is clear that such jobs require women to face the cut and thrust of competition, accept the long hours culture in workplaces, and possibly a jet-setting lifestyle, rarely at home. The majority of women do not have ambitions for these types of jobs. Probably there are a few who will want them and probably they will get them. But the ratio of men to women in such jobs is always likely to look bad. But I suspect it is not going to be a problem and will mostly reflect the lack of desire by the majority of women to hold such positions. Women are doing well along side men in the next layer down, and making gradual inroads into the statistics ratios. Even at these lower levels, women and men prefer different types of jobs. This maintains a high degree of occupational and workplace gender segregation, much of it by choice, although less so than used to be the case. Occupational segregation is likely to reduce gradually over time, but not go away completely. However, on pay women are still behind men in the upper part of the wage distribution, but more equal and even better than men at the lower parts of the wage distribution. Again their position at the higher wage levels is likely to be because women are less likely to demand pay rises in an individualised performance reward system, and less likely to use threats to quit in order to get a pay rise. Women will have to learn to be more aggressive about pay rises if they want to match men's pay. The new pay audits which will be taking place in the public sector will help to equalise women's and men's pay in the public sector, but gaps are likely to continue in the private sector.

*2.6. Do women have to become like men if they are going to have a chance of full equality? Will they have to accept working long hours, being prepared to travel further to work, and be mobile between workplaces in different geographical locations in order to climb the career ladders? Or is there a chance of changes occurring in the way work is organised such that men and women work fewer hours, with employers stopping the practice of forcing employees to move locality to get wider experience.*

I don't see changes in the way work is organised occurring in the UK economy on the scale required. The Netherlands has moved considerably in this direction, but even there, it is only a minority of men who work part time. Those who feel they have responsibilities for caring will always be less likely to gain promotions, and these are likely to remain disproportionately women and mothers. However, movements toward gender equality in the labour market is still likely to take place, partly due to the current relatively high proportion of childless women who will give men a good run for their money. Also the introduction of pay audits and pay reviews will give women more information on which to make a case for equal pay. However, gender pay ratios at the very top of the occupational and wage distributions will plateau out before reaching full equality since there are fewer employed women than men who want the top jobs and top wages.

*2.7. Can there be equality between part timers and full timers in pay and conditions, and can women who work part time reach the top jobs? I think this is something women are likely to push harder for and achieve.*

2.8. What can be done to provide career prospects out of low quality jobs? This is an issue for women as it was for men.

2.9. Parents at the low paid end of the wage spectrum will face problems of coping financially and child poverty will remain an issue. In the low paid sectors, employment is more insecure and has higher turnover – and this is likely to continue. This will make coping financially at the low income end even more challenging. Lone parents are likely to remain employed at lower rates than mothers in couples, and in worse jobs as they are less qualified – with a consequently greater risk of their children living in poverty.

2.10 Problems of work life balance among couples who both work full time are likely to increase. There is a tension with women having equality in circumstances where both partners work full time – accepting the male model of labour market participation. Children will not have either quality time or quantity time with over tired (or stressed) parents and may suffer and have poorer relationships.

### **Education implications**

- Solving the need for effective training in skilled manual skills vocational training and in due course starting and managing one's own business which includes coping with uncertainty and managing fluctuating income.
- Consider welfare system's response to handling uncertain income flows.
- Considering the proposed expansion of graduate qualifications when the economy is not keeping pace with the need for such qualifications, and the risks of discontent this will create in the workforce as well as potential moves further away from gender equality.
- Preparing the workforce for jobs that require continual learning, and preparing the appropriate training courses.
- Continuing to supply learning on IT skills and internet use.
- Incorporating learning on emotional literacy, interpersonal skills, and negotiating skills into learning curricula or at further and higher education levels.
- Education to tackle bullying cultures
- Particular initiatives in local labour markets with high unemployment among ethnic minorities.
- Education aimed at breaking the cycle of disadvantage – discussed further under section 5 below.
- Majority of children coming into compulsory school (5+) in future are likely to have had childcare from age under one year old. Children entering school may be more socialised in future. It is likely to be still a minority who have had full-time child care from less than one year old. If this turns out to be damaging to children (as debated) there may be more problems for teachers from this trend.
- High divorce rates and high lone parent rates imply (if studies are correct which suggest there is damage to children from marital breakdown) suggest that a high proportion of children, possibly increasing, will have emotional problems during their school life. For same reason, statistical correlations showing intergenerational transfers of marital breakdown also likely to keep the flow high.

## **3. Trends in homeworking**

Going under the heading of 'mobile forms of work', there are at least 3 main types of homeworking and the trends of each differ. Employees and some self employed can work *from* home (eg mobile engineers, sales representatives) using their home as the base. Alternatively employees and some self employed can work *at home*, carrying out all of their work in their own home. This type of work has a long history of people doing textile work or sewing and garment making in their own home. But modern day working *at home* can also involve IT use, called teleworking or manual electronics work (eg assembling PCBs). Thirdly, employees who work primarily at their employer's workplace can have occasional (even weekly) days at home to do their work. Unfortunately, the statistics do not always differentiate between all of these types of homeworking. Nor are they published as a matter of course. They rely on bespoke analyses being carried out by researchers. (There is also the gradual spread of employees continuing to work at home after they have left the office, by checking emails and taking mobile phone calls. In this way the boundary between work and home, and work and leisure are being eroded for some employees. But this type of working at home is not routinely recorded, and is not discussed any further here.)

The trends are as follows:

There has been a steady increase in more mobile forms of work since 1980, both among employees and in terms of the percentage of employers who use these types of working arrangements.

Working mainly at home increased in numbers and as a percentage of the labour force between 1981 and 1992. Since 1992, it has stayed a stable percentage of the workforce (around 2.2%-2.4%), but the numbers employed working mainly at home have grown considerably.

Working mainly elsewhere but also working at least one full day 'in own home' has stayed at around 4% of the workforce, although increasing numerically from 1997 to 2002.

Working mainly 'in different places using home as base' increase from around 3% in 1981 to nearly 8% in 2002, the numbers of employees growing very substantially over this twenty year period.

One third of establishments had employees who work from home for some part of the week and 8% of establishments had employees who worked all or almost all of normal working hours at home (WERS 98). In 2004 WERS04 found that 6% of workplaces engaged people who worked for the establishment at or from their own homes but who were not employees (Kelsey et al, 2006).

WERS04 found that 26% of employers made homeworking available to some employees in 2004. This was an increase from 12% on the same question in 1998. Homeworking was slightly more common in workplaces where women were not the majority of employees. In 2004, 14% of employees thought that homeworking was available to them, varying by employee characteristics; women with children aged 18 and under were more likely to report having access to homeworking than women without dependent children (Kersley et al, 2006). Men (16%) were more likely than women (12%) to consider they would be able to work at home if they needed to.

The open plan office has clearly replaced the private small office in a large number of workplaces, with hot-desks growing to replace dedicated spaces with shared spaces.

### **What will the future hold?**

Improvements in IT are likely to continue and would make working from or at home as teleworkers increasingly viable. Staying at home can be less stressful, cheaper and reduce transport congestion compared with going to the employer's offices, if this involves commuting or a long journey. But the isolation this creates for employees also means that most employees will not wish to do this for long periods, or more than occasionally over the week or month. There are also the limitations to the number of people whose homes can be easily converted to be suitable to be office spaces. Working wholly at home is not likely to expand to any great extent.

The indicators suggest that there are limits to open plan and certainly to hot-desking which suggest it will not continue to grow and may even fall back. Employers' stories about hot-desking describe employees arriving earlier and earlier on their days in the office to claim their favourite spot, and place potted plants and other possessions around to stake out their territory.

On teleworking, the few existing studies suggest there are limits to the use of this form of working by employers. It poses management problems for employers whose managers cannot be sure employees are working. It does not save as much space as

employers initially expected and many employees do not like it (Felstead et al, 2005; Dex et al, 2000).

There are tensions here between employers' and employees' interests, but more in periods of growth than during recessions. The extended growth period of the UK economy has pushed up property prices and rents, making employers want to encourage employees to stay at home. But this only saves them money if employees do not need dedicated office space at the employer's offices. Employees prefer to have their own space at work. Work is part of the identity of most employees and their working location matters to them. The conventional office is unlikely to disappear.

Spheres of work and leisure will become less distinct for those who spend more of their time working at home. New forms of employer management will need to evolve to cope with employees doing more work from home or in mobile locations. This is likely to be part of a more general issue of employers coping with the tension of giving employees more autonomy and retaining control and supervision. Employees will need more time management skills and be able to manage the boundaries of their work and life as well as work-related health issues.

## **Issues**

3.1 Rises in the price of office space will undoubtedly create pressures to reduce costs by greater sharing of space, especially in large conurbations. This may lead employers to pressurise more employees to use their own homes as offices in a way that may be inappropriate either to their home circumstances or their psychological make up.

3.2 The growth in flexible jobs on the margins of the labour market has not been associated with an overall downward movement in their quality. The growth of the flexible sector has suited the needs of the workforce that has filled these positions (eg students; people coming up to retirement; lone parents with major caring responsibilities). While there are differences in conditions of work between regular and non-standard or flexible working these have not got worse over time, and there are signs that the gap may reduce through legislation. But further large increases from this position are not likely to be filled by voluntary labour supply, except immigrants. This will produce further tensions and ethnic conflicts with existing UK unskilled workers who will see this as a threat, even though they want better jobs for themselves.

3.3 Similarly, the growth of women's work in the low paid 'flexible' periphery segment is nearing its end, due to the large highly qualified workforce of women that is going to increasingly dominate this source of labour supply.

3.4 The class divisions that are already embedded in the labour market division between core and periphery workers is likely to strengthen and become more polarised, with conflicts growing between the white working class, minority ethnic and immigrant workforces.

## **Educational implications**

- Working at or from home relies heavily on time management skills, but also on being able to draw boundaries between work and non-work time to have work-life balance.
- People who do this kind of work need to be psychologically profiled and trained to check they can cope with the isolation and boundary issues and recognise emerging health problems.
- Educating to occupy space rather than possess it.

## 4. Trends in unpaid work

Unpaid work covers domestic work in the home, and caring work for those inside and outside the home. Domestic work could be broken down further, as can caring work. These forms of work are often aggregated together in discussions and thought to have a gender bias with women doing most of this form of work. But not only is caring work distinct from other domestic chores, there is a range of types of work within domestic work. Information on unpaid work comes from two main sources. Time budget studies provide the most detailed breakdowns, but survey questions are common in which female and male partners are asked about who does the most, or whether there are equal shares of the main housekeeping and caring tasks. The survey question findings are easiest to summarise. The majority of both women and men say that women do more than men in areas of caring for children, cleaning, washing and shopping tasks. However, the proportions of men who give this response is less than the proportion of women who give it. So, women as a whole tend to claim they do more of unpaid work in the home, than men agree they do. It is agreed that men do most of the DIY, gardening and car maintenance work in households. A few small-scale studies have found that women can act as gatekeepers and they can determine which jobs and how much men do. Women also act as the managers of household work, and also do most of the so-called *emotion work* in households.

Evidence on the trends in unpaid work from time budget studies suggests that:

- Adding up women's and men's paid and unpaid work leads to near equality in the amount of total work done by men and women, or men doing slightly more total work than women (Jacobs and Gerson, 2001; Harkness, 2008). Such figures show that claims of the 'double burden' carried by women who are employed and do the larger share of unpaid work are not often supported. In fact Sullivan and Gershuny (2000) have shown that there is little evidence that the double burden exists for the vast majority of women. If anything, it is a temporary phenomenon or one based in perceptions rather than in amounts of time spent in total on both paid and unpaid work.
- The average amounts of domestic work and paid work vary by country as well as by gender (Geist, 2008; Gershuny, 2000).
- Although women appear to do more of the unpaid work hours, and have a larger share, than men, the calculations of the amount of hours spent on unpaid domestic work have also been found to depend on which tasks and work items are included in the calculations. When gardening and maintenance or odd jobs are included, the gap between men and women in number of weekly hours spent on unpaid domestic work narrows substantially (Gershuny, 2000).
- There are no notable gender divisions in time spent in personal care or in shopping (Gershuny, 2000).
- There have been changes over time and by country in the amounts and the shares of unpaid work (Gershuny, 2000; Robinson and Godbey, 1997; Jacobs and Gershon, 2001). The time spent on domestic household work by women has been declining over time in many countries (Gershuny, 2000; Harkness, 2008; Bianchi et al, 2000). The time spent on domestic work by men has increased, but not as fast as the increase in women's paid work.
- Early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, increases in women's paid work were matched by a decrease in time spent on domestic work. However, for every two hours increase in paid work, domestic work declined by one hour. Later in the century this

process continued with every two hours increase in paid work being associated with 1.5 hours decline in unpaid work. More recent 21<sup>st</sup> century British data suggest that declines in women's domestic work are continuing but now the decline in domestic work time exceeds the increase in paid work time (Harkness, 2008).

- Gershuny describes this combination of changes in women's and men's paid work and domestic work times as movements towards a convergence in time spent on the different types of work by men and women. He also presents evidence that this move towards convergence is apparent in a large number of countries.

One conclusion we could draw from these detailed analyses of time-use diaries is that over time, and without any particular state policy intervention, women's unpaid domestic work has been declining while men's contributions have been growing. The changes in men's unpaid contributions have admittedly been smaller than changes in women's paid work, but they have changed nonetheless.

The forces that appear to have brought about these changes, as far as commentators can tell, are as follows. It has been suggested that technological change in household appliances have offered labour-saving efficiency in carrying out some of the core domestic tasks. However, detailed attempts to measure the time gains from labour-saving appliances have not identified definitive gains (Bittman et al, 2004). Another suggestion is that declining fertility has led to smaller families across the industrialised world and this has reduced the amount of unpaid domestic work. Numbers of children as well as their ages have been found to be positively correlated with amounts of time spent on unpaid work (Gershuny, 2000). It is also possible that women have reduced their unpaid work because of doing paid work, either because they are more tired, have lowered their domestic standards, or can afford to outsource more jobs. However, declines in domestic work are also visible among women who do part-time paid work and among those who are not employed (Gershuny, 2000). Lastly, economic mechanisms have also been offered as part of the explanation of the changes. Here the mechanism is that as women's wage rates have increased in response to their greater education and human capital, the opportunity cost of doing unpaid work instead of paid work increases and women are likely to switch from one to the other. However, there have, over time, been relative price changes, particularly price increases, in purchased goods and services (paid cleaners or housekeepers). This price rise would lead us to expect that women would substitute their own cheaper housework production for the more expensive purchases of goods and services. But the increasing incomes that have also occurred over time mean that people will prefer leisure to unpaid work and will switch to purchasing goods and services to reduce their own housework. It is the greater effect of increasing incomes that has been winning over substitution effects. This argument, essentially, is that the progress of modern economies has built into it, given technological progress but subject to business cycle fluctuations, forces that are leading to declining work (paid and unpaid) and increasing leisure. These forces are not policy driven and are likely to continue into the future without policy assistance. However, there are groups who do not fit this pattern, especially in the USA and the UK. Increasing weekly hours of paid work are evident among some groups of managers and professionals (Jacobs and Gershon, 2001; Kodz et al, 2003) even if the majority are having greater leisure.

Caring for children is a task that falls predominantly to women. Even when they are working, they are more likely to be the ones to take time off to look after sick children (Dex, 2003). However, caring for older adults is a task that is likely to involve as many men as it does women, although women are likely to do more hours of such caring than men.

Although there is unpaid caring work, substantial amounts of care work has moved into the paid economy, and sometimes into the informal economy where people are paid in cash or kind, but not in such a way that it is recorded in national statistics. The informal economy has been estimated to be 6.8% of the UK economy in 2004. The growth of paid caring has been substantial as families out-source their child care and in some cases their care for older adults. Some of these developments, particularly the growth in care work for older adults is linked to growth in immigration.

### **What does the future hold?**

A further shift in the division and share of domestic work, and caring between male and female partners within households, is likely to grow as more women gain degree qualifications and are in employment and gain higher earnings and more equality with men. Men are likely to continue to do more domestic work with women doing less, and so this will move in the direction of equality. Gershuny's idea of lagged adaptation may be used to describe this movement towards equality. This is the idea that it takes time, after women starting doing more paid work, for men to get the idea that they need to share more of the unpaid work in the home. However, equally, the reduction in women's domestic work could be understood in economic terms as the increase in opportunity cost of domestic work for women as they gain more qualifications, work experience and career prospects which will reduce the quantity of such work they do.

It is unlikely that men's and women's amounts of domestic work will always be equal since women are still likely to tend to work fewer paid hours of work than men. Also, there is still likely to be a division between the types of domestic jobs men prefer doing and those women will accept to do – even if they do not prefer them, and women showing they prefer to do caring (Houston and Marks, 2005). Men's and women's involvement in caring for children is likely, therefore, to continue to be biased towards women doing more of this.

Men and women are likely to continue to care equally for older adults, although with women likely to continue to care for more hours than men.

There is the general expectation of demographic change with people continuing to live longer due to continuing improvements in the technology of health care, and in nutrition at early ages. This would suggest that caring responsibilities of adults for their elderly parents and relatives will increase. However, this increase is likely to take place after the retirement ages of adults, and in this way, it is not likely to increase the care burdens of the workforce substantially.

Increases in migration are likely to continue as a way of doing some of the less desirable care work in the UK, for example, caring for the elderly, as the volume of such work grows through the ageing of the population. Migration is also likely to strengthen and increase the informal economy

### **Issues**

4.1. The provision of a paid workforce to do the increasing care work for older adults is a major challenge. Imported labour is currently being used to fill this growing labour force gap. The issues relate to providing both the quantity and quality care workers. Immigrants whose English language skills are poor do not make ideal carers for elderly, vulnerable and confused people. It is arguable whether it is genuine *care* that is provided in such instances.

4.2 Issues relating to the quantity and quality of the child care workforce are also not fully resolved, but these are much further advanced than is the case for care for older adults.

## **Educational implications**

- Training up a care workforce for older adults, which might be heavily dominated by immigrant labour, for quality care provision.
- Educating the younger generation about the costs of care for older adults, what care is, and society should solve this growing problem of care in an ageing society.
- Educating for a more equal gender balance in the amounts of informal care hours for older adults provided by households.
- Formal flexible working arrangements for employees to cope with care needs of older adults.
- Some attention to child care provision to make sure quality grows and becomes more uniform and accessible in all areas, through systems of quality control, or licensing or inspections.
- Attention to the uniformity across local areas in quality and quantity of after-school and holiday care for school aged children,

## **5. Living off state benefits**

The extent of living off state benefits, either because of being unemployed, sick or inactive tends to be cyclical with the business cycle. However, there are some notable trends which have not followed a cyclical pattern as set out in the volume by Dickens et al (2003) and they include:

- A substantial rise in men's inactivity rates since the 1970s, alongside a notable fall in women's inactivity rates which previously were much higher through women looking after their families.
- The rise in men's inactivity rates has been seen in many age groups although higher rises were visible in 25-54 year old men than in under 25 year olds and there were also higher rates in the bottom of the skill distribution.
- The majority of inactive men (70%) reported themselves as having a limiting health problem.
- Analyses have linked this rise in inactivity rates to the substantial decline in male manufacturing industries in some areas, with a lack of replacement jobs, and where the former industries left a health scar on the working population, for example in mining areas. However, the operation of the invalidity benefit system is also cited as a reason for the growth in men's inactivity rates. Since the government changed the benefit rules, inactivity rates among men have started to fall.
- Unemployment rates have risen among older workers since 1998, despite unemployment among other groups being low in a buoyant period of the UK economy. The higher unemployment rates occurred disproportionately among those in their 50s, women and the more highly qualified.
- New Deal for Young People policies also appear to have had some success getting unemployed young people out of unemployment – although they have been operating over a period of economic growth which has undoubtedly helped their progress. While some of the young people targeted have gone into work, the largest decline in unemployed young people has been as a result of getting them into education and training.
- Unemployment among ethnic minority men is still persistently high, and higher than unemployment rates among equivalent white men. During the recent period of economic growth, while the unemployment rates of some minority ethnic men fell, the gap between white and both Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean men did not reduce.

Another group who have had high rates of living off state benefits are lone parents, the vast majority of whom are lone mothers. Their rates of employment have been much lower than those of women living in couples. The Working Families Tax Credit from 1999 followed by the Working Tax Credit in 2003 were attempts to remove any disincentives lone parents had to stay out of the labour market. These schemes were presented as aiming to tackle child poverty, by getting parents into paid work. These were financial attempts to make work pay for the low paid and they have gone alongside tax credits for child care and other personal assistance from DWP's Job Centre staff. This battery of measures does appear to have had some success in getting lone mothers into work, and their employment rates have doubled since the benefits and other schemes were initiated.

Up to 1996, the number and percentage of workless households grew at the same time that there was a growth in two-earner households. Workless households reached approximately one fifth of working age households by 1996. This represents a growing polarisation in the distribution of work across UK households. However, government measures to intervene and get people back into employment reduced the workless household figure after 1996. This fall is mainly due to single parent (workless households) moving into employment.

### **What does the future hold?**

It is unlikely that employment rates of the over 50s will fall voluntarily in the future as discussed under paid work above, given changes in demographics and pensions. (However, they are likely to be affected by cyclical changes in the business cycle, and fall in the short and possibly medium term for reasons of recession.)

Higher male unemployment rates among minority ethnic groups, especially Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi men, are unlikely to be resolved and may grow even worse in future recessions, assisted by their concentration in local labour markets with typically high unemployment rates.

The battery of policies to reduce workless households is likely to hold any increase at bay, but is not likely to be able to reduce the size of this group substantially.

### **Issues.**

5.1 High unemployment rates among some minority ethnic groups of men is a worrying element since it is located in certain geographic areas and it can lead to social unrest or fuel discontent and even terrorism.

5.2 The UK is likely to experience growing unemployment rates for a period following the credit crunch and associated global recession. The severity and length of this downturn may be more difficult to cope with than earlier downturns, partly because many of the current generation have hardly experienced recessions and have expectations linked to continual growth.

5.3 At the same time that the government is successfully trying to get more of those on benefits into work, they are not stemming the inflow into these categories (eg. divorce rates being high thereby fuelling a flow into lone parenthood).

5.4 One of the biggest remaining issues acting as a barrier to getting more people off benefits into work is Housing Benefit. Qualitative studies have shown for some time that Housing Benefit offers valued security to people and families who are out of work in the long term, and who have low levels of skills such that they would only be likely to gain low paid, insecure work were they to enter the labour market. Although the tax system has been changed to make work pay for such groups, giving up the security of Housing Benefit for a low-paid insecure job is not seen as rational by those being encouraged to

make this transition. This is especially the case where they have larger families and benefit more from the Income Support system's child multiplier.

### **Educational implications**

- Education aimed at breaking the cycle of disadvantage
- Some suggest parenting classes are key to tackle low achievement and the effects of disadvantage in the young. This might have implications for all age schools. (Some churches practice this where all age groups attend a Sunday School class.) This could also foster a culture of lifelong learning among the young as well as among adults.
- Parenting classes made mandatory for prospective parents when pregnant, as part of their antenatal 'clinic'.
- Proportion of children from disadvantaged background coming through school likely to be increasing since the poor are having more children and the rich are having fewer, if any. Similarly, for the same reason, children from teenage pregnancies may increase in percentage share, even though past trends show there is not much change in their numbers over time.
- Current policy case for early intervention into the cycle of disadvantage at pre-school ages 3-4 is not likely to go away, and it may be necessary to spend more on this if the percentage of such children from disadvantaged families goes up, as is quite possible.

## **6. Work attitudes and motivation**

There have been a number of trends in attitudes towards work and motivation of workers. Young people display the largest amounts of change in attitudes at any one time and older people display the least. There is a general recognition that the many changes in workplace practices and policies, as well as changes in employment contracts outlined above, have had their impact on employees' subjective experiences of work, although not always as much as might have been clarified.

### **Trends in the quality of work experience**

The quality of work experience can be measured by job involvement, work strain, and psychological distress. Some studies also use job satisfaction as a measure and this gives a different picture than job involvement measures of the trends occurring.

In the 1960s it was forecast that there would be a decline in the traditional work ethic, and this would be replaced by an instrumental approach to work (jobs then would be seen primarily as a way of generating income to have better family income or higher cost leisure activities). There is no evidence that this change occurred. There has been no change since the 1980s in the extent to which people were committed to paid work, irrespective of the financial benefits, sometimes called work as a central life interest. Choosing jobs has continued to place high importance on intrinsic aspects of work and having interesting work. Having a job with high income was ranked much lower down the scale. This continuing relationship is thought to have been upheld by increases in the qualifications held by the workforce, since higher qualifications are associated with higher job involvement. Also higher levels of task discretion are also associated with higher levels of job involvement. These changes are thought to be responsible for the stable or upward trend in quality of work experience for many employees.

Rates of job satisfaction appear to have been on a downward trend over time.

Alongside the trend increases in job involvement and job discretion has gone a trend increase in work strain (mental tension, physical fatigue or worry), due to work intensity and the pressure for higher levels of work effort. This has been more marked among women employees.

One consequence of unemployment rates widening to include professional workers in the early 1990s was that there has been a growth in worries about job insecurity even among those in work, and a growth in the importance school leavers attached to having a secure job. This is manifested in increased physical distress among people in work, not just people out of work.

Studies suggest that rates of organisational commitment, or commitment to the organisation's values, are very low among employees in Britain around the turn of the Millennium, despite, or possibly because of, increased efforts by management to generate such feelings. This low commitment was evident in organisations where there was little employee participation in decision making, or lip service was paid to participatory employee involvement. Contrary to this general state of affairs affecting both public and private sectors, employees were more committed and loyal where they felt employers cared about the welfare of their employees, or where they saw their activities as having use and value for society.

### **Trends in attitudes to work and skills development**

By 2006, the vast majority of employees ranked intrinsic elements of their jobs essential or very important, much higher than the rank given to having good pay. Felstead et al (2007) found no evidence of a decline over time in the importance attached to intrinsic features of jobs by employees and rather found the reverse, that expectations and importance attached to these elements of jobs had grown from 1992 to 2006.

There is evidence of growing convergence in men's and women's preferences about jobs, from 1992 to 2006, on the importance attached to being able to use initiative in your job, and have good training provision. Nonetheless, initiatives for training came mainly from employers.

In 2006, three quarters of employees wanted training in the future but only one quarter expressed a strong desire for it. The type of training most commonly wanted was acquiring new vocational or professional qualifications – primarily in order to offer job mobility, a sense of achievement and improved performance in their job.

There has been a general societal decline over time in deferential attitudes towards authority figures. This has its counterpart within workplaces in attitudes towards managers. The top down model of command and control now feels uncomfortable, and has been replaced by flatter organisational structures, greater autonomy and discretion for many employees. This change has also gone alongside changes in human resources policies and practices which encourage and reward employees who have internal and individual motivation to work hard and show commitment to the organisation.

The overall decline in union membership, despite an increase in women members, is evidence of a decline in the value attached to collective representation. The decline in male manufacturing industry employment, which were trade unions' traditional strongholds, was a major contributory factor to membership decline. Commentators suggest this is part of a more general rise in individualism in society.

Evidence has started to emerge more recently that suggest cultures of bullying are growing in workplaces. This may not be a change in the extent of bullying. It is likely that this new trend is, in part, a feature of employee aspirations and expectations having changed such that they are less prepared to accept workplace bullying than in the past, they place a greater emphasis on having good interpersonal relations at work, and they are more prepared to voice their concerns in a climate that proclaims commitment to equal opportunities.

## **Trends in women's attitudes towards women working**

In the early 1980s the British were fairly conservative in their views about women working. While attitudes have changed among both men and women, the change is modest on many measures. One of the larger changes has been in attitudes towards women engaging in paid work. It is now accepted and even advocated that women with children should be allowed, even expected, to do paid jobs. Men are slightly less likely to hold such views than women, but this view is held by the majority of both women and men.

There was a shift between 1980 to 2002 towards greater egalitarianism in both nurturant and instrumental roles of women at work. *Nurturant roles* are those indicated by questions about whether women's employment is harmful to children, whether family life will suffer if women work, or whether women will be happier if they go out to work. *Instrumental attitudes* indicate the level of agreement with whether work is really what women want (or mainly a home), whether a husband's job is to earn money and a wife is to look after the family, or whether both husband and wife should contribute to family income, and whether a job is the best way for women to be independent.

There was evidence of a slowing down of the move towards egalitarian attitudes in nurturant roles in the 1990s, reaching a peak in 2002, from where it has now fallen back a little, especially with the movement away from egalitarian views on whether pre-school children suffer from mothers going out to work. There is also increasing doubt about whether jobs allow women to be independent.

By 2002 there is still considerable support for a gender-role divide and concern that maternal employment may compromise family and child well being. There has also been mounting concern about work-family balance.

## **Trends in men's attitudes towards women working**

Women have tended to be more egalitarian than men, with one exception. Support for dual earner households started out with women more in favour than men, but since the mid 1990s, men are as likely as women or even more likely to support two earner households.

## **What does the future hold?**

It is unlikely that commitment to the intrinsic value of work will decline in future, but more likely it will be upheld by the majority of the workforce. (Workless households are a group where such values may be absent.)

Movement towards egalitarian attitudes in the labour market seems to have stalled and may reverse further among both women and men. This may be due to the growth in work strain among employees, particularly women.

Further decline in trade union membership is forecast. This may also symbolise a further increase and acceptance of individualised values and concerns with an equivalent fall in support for collectivism at work and in society.

The growth in jobs needing to have constant learning is likely to increase, so workers who are eager to embrace learning at work will also need to grow.

The trend towards so-called *humanization* of work is likely to continue with more jobs having increased autonomy and opportunities for self development, alongside greater employee involvement.

The seeming shift from control to commitment is already showing signs of strain, and it is likely that, in future, these new management methods will become more obviously

new forms of control and work intensification. At that point there will be a downward turn in motivation and commitment and even more decline in employee participation in workplace decision making. Growing affluence among the top half of the workforce will also increase the desire for time for leisure and fewer working hours.

Feelings of job insecurity are likely to increase among the workforce with the financial uncertainty, redundancies and global recession following after the stock market crashes and financial crises.

## **Issues**

6.1 Conflict between creating jobs with higher employee involvement and the increased work strain that goes with such jobs, or between better quality jobs but with higher work intensity. This creates the challenge of generating jobs with higher demands on skills and performance but which have tolerable levels of work strain.

## **Educational implications**

- The loss of deference in society is already showing itself in schools, but this is likely to continue and has implications for how schools are organised, how they are run, the aims and manner of conducting school inspections. Evidence from the workplace suggests that participatory models produce better results.
- Balancing control and autonomy in the classroom will equip children better for the world of work.
- Educating for identifying and handling stress.
- The premium on learning and self direction will be high in the workplace
- Education to promote personal development and lifelong learning

## **ANNEX**

### **Evidence and references**

#### **1. General**

Moynagh, M. and Worsley, R. (2005) *Working in the twenty-first century*. Swindon: ESRC and The Tomorrow Project.

#### **2. Trends in paid work**

##### **2.1 Women's and men's paid work**

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###### **2.1.2 Datasets**

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### **2.2.1 Datasets**

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## **2.3 Employers**

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## **2.4 Skills**

### **2.4.1 References**

### **2.4.2 Datasets**

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## **3. Homeworking**

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### **3.2 Employers and teleworking**

A survey of a random sample of employers found that one in twenty had at least one staff member dependent on working at home and dependent on IT. A survey of a random sample of 1000 employers in 1994 found that 1 in 10 had at least one home-based worker (Huws, 1994). The Reed (1995) survey found that 14% of firms were using teleworkers in 1995. IDS (1994) suggested that between 5% and 15% of firms were using teleworkers and the size depends upon the definition used. There are often relatively few teleworkers in any one firm. Telecottages, largely in rural areas are increasing but they are in their early stages of development (IDS, 1994). In 1994 there were 90 but it is not clear how many have a long-term future.

Some studies have found telework to be concentrated in financial and business services (IRS, 1994b), and in the public sector (IRS, 1994b) whereas others have found most use of teleworking in manufacturing (Reed, 1995) and least in health. Teleworkers are also concentrated in the South East. Studies agree that the larger the organisation, the more likely it is to use this as well as other forms of non-standard forms of employment. The

differences between the results on the size of teleworking show up the problems of generalising from what, in some cases, are very small sample sizes and the extremely low response rates which characterise these surveys.

Self employed home workers were used by relatively few employers in each industry. The highest proportions using self employed home workers were found in manufacturing (16%) and construction (17%). The proportions of employees working mainly from home were similarly small and the largest proportions of establishments were found in transport and communications (11%) and again in manufacturing (7%). Much larger proportions of establishments were found who used employees working from home some of the time in 1998; between 24% of establishments in the distribution industry and 25% in construction up to 74% in energy and water and 47% in banking and finance.

### **Telework**

The advantages to employers of teleworking are reviewed by IDS (1994) and Haddon and Lewis (1994). They pointed to the reduction in overheads, productivity improvements, and help in recruiting and retaining staff as the main benefits. Huws's (1994a, 1994b) survey of employers' use of teleworking found its main advantage to be its flexibility and convenience and its ability to reduce costs and solve travel problems. Managers expressed high levels of satisfaction with teleworkers whom they thought were more productive, more reliable, more loyal, produced better work and had lower rates of turnover and absenteeism than on-site workers (Huws, 1994a, 1994b).

There have been some notable attempts to try out teleworking and it is from these studies we have the most information about this form of work. The EU has also been promoting teleworking (IDS, 1994). The IDS (1994) study and Haddon and Lewis (1994) review the trials instigated by British Telecom, a leading insurance group, Digital Equipment and others. Whilst many were satisfied with the outcomes and thought the advantages to employees were significant other lessons were learnt from these exercises. Teleworkers need to be restricted to those who can work alone in a motivated way and to those who do not miss the social relationships at work too much. There is often less saving on office space and overheads than might at first appear since employees still need to come into the workplace regularly. Also, some managers obviously find the management issues more difficult to handle.

### **Employers' reasons for Teleworking**

The main advantages of telework for employees have been argued to be savings on commuting time and increased flexibility or autonomy at work. However studies have shown that the disadvantages are also significant, namely those of feeling isolated at home and missing the social contact of office life (IDS, 1994; Haddon and Lewis, 1994).

## **3.3 Employees**

### **3.3.1 Statistics from the 1998 Labour Force Survey:**

4.7% of employed women and 2.9% of men worked at home in 1998; 3.3% of employed women and 9.5% of men worked from home, in 1998; 6.5% of employed men and 3.8% of women were teleworkers for some of their work time in 1998.

\* Teleworking as a share of total employment is greatest amongst men working in banking finance and insurance (13.4%) followed by men working in other services (11.7%). Teleworking is relatively uncommon amongst men working in manufacturing (3.8%), and in transport and communication (3.8%). The share of teleworking in total employment is greatest amongst women working in agriculture (11.1%), construction (10.9%) and banking, finance and insurance (7.5%). Teleworking is relatively uncommon amongst women working in distribution (1.8%) and transport and communication (2.7%).

\* Teleworking as a share of total employment was highest for men and women working in professional occupations; 14.1% of men's and 9.1% of women's professional employment. Teleworking was also well represented amongst men's associate professional and technical jobs (11.5%) and amongst managers and administrators (8.8%). Women in associate professional occupations (7.2%) and managers and administrator occupations (6.6%) also had amongst the highest shares of teleworking jobs amongst women. Teleworking is relatively uncommon in men's clerical and secretarial (2.2%) and plant and machine operative (1.2%) jobs and amongst women's employment in personal and protective services (1.1%) and sales (2.1%).

### 3.3.2 Employees' reasons for homeworking

The reasons that women, the main homeworking group, are homeworkers include:

- it is work they can perform whilst they have dependent children at home or whilst they are in ill-health (Huws, 1994)
- it is suitable employment when language or cultural reasons make it difficult to go to a workplace
- it can be part of the traditions of communities (Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987).

The disadvantages of working at home to these women were the very low pay, the isolation, the environmental hazards, and the mess it creates. One in ten of these homeworkers also suffered health problems from homework; neck or back ache and eye strain were commonly cited. Bisset and Huws (1984) found that some new homeworkers attached importance to the less tangible benefits of homeworking than those in more traditional homeworking jobs. For example, they appreciated the flexibility to schedule their work and the reduction in the stress of commuting to work.

### 3.4 Employers' data

Table 1. Prevalence of flexible working patterns among British and UK employers by source and date.

*Per cents of employers in sample*

	<b>WERS survey of employers, 1998 *</b>	<b>DfEE Work-life balance baseline survey 2000 **</b>	<b>DTI employer survey on support for working parents 2000 **</b>
Working from or at home	33%	38% occasionally	18%
Working from or at home + (non-managerial employees only)	13%		

\*\* Sample: Establishments with 5+ employees.

\* Sample: Establishments with 10+ employees

+ In the case of WERS data, on the question indicated, the availability is for non-managerial employees only.

Table Percentage of Employers using Non-Standard Employment (weighted data)

	<b>1987 (from ELUS '87)</b>	<b>1998 (from WERS '98)</b>
<b>self-employed:</b>		
-freelance	27 n/a	n/a 11.8
-working for an establishment at or from own home but not as an employee of the establishment	n/a	7.7

-employees ever work from home	n/a	32.8
-employees work all or almost all normal working hours from home	n/a	8.0
<b>no. of establishments, N</b>	877	2191

n/a: not available

Table Non-standard employment by industry (WERS' 98, weighted data)

Industry	Percentage of employers in each category using employees who are:			
	self-employed home workers	employees ever work from home	employees work mainly at home	N, total
Energy & water	2.9	74.4	4.2	5
Manufacturing	15.6	35.6	7.0	292
Construction	17.4	24.9	0.3	94
Distribution	6.4	24.2	3.4	430
Transport & Communication	2.7	33.2	11.3	101
Banking, finance, insurance, etc.	10.6	46.8	6.1	321
Public admin, education & health	5.4	34.6	1.1	707
Other Services	2.8	35.7	2.2	114
All	7.7	32.7	3.5	2191

Table Percentage of Employers of a Certain Size who use the Stated Pattern of Employment (WERS '98, weighted data)

	establishment size:					total
	1-49	50-99	100-199	200-499	500+	
<b>self-employed:</b>						
-freelance	17.8	5.3	15.7	9.1	10.1	10.5
-working for an establishment or from own home but not as	0.0	0.0	10.3	2.6	4.6	4.4

an						
employee of the establishment						
-employees ever work from	33.1	36.9	32.9	24.4	30.9	30.9
home						
-employees work all or almost	0.0	14.0	4.1	3.2	2.2	2.9
all normal working hours from						
home						
<b>no. of establishments, N</b>	58	77	98	117	1177	1528

### 3.5 Employees' data

Table 1. Prevalence of flexible working patterns among British and UK employees by source and date.

Per cents of employees in sample

	<b>WERS survey of employees, 1998 ++</b>	<b>LFS 1998 Felstead et al, 2000</b>	<b>LFS Spring 2000 UK</b>	<b>DfEE Work-life balance baseline survey 2000 **</b>
Part time			25%	25%
Flexitime	34%		10%	24%
Term time only			4%	12%
Job share	18%		1%	4%
Working from or at home	11%	Approx. * 25%		
Parental leave	28%			
Annualised hours				2%
Compressed working week				6%

LFS – Quarterly Labour Force Survey

\* LFS has three questions covering the amounts of work at or from home. If aggregated they give the closest comparable definition to the less well defined questions in the other surveys.

\*\* Employees in workplaces with 5+ employees.

++ Employees in workplaces with 10+ employees.

Table Prevalence of flexible working patterns among British employees by source and date.

Per cents of employees in sample offered arrangement

	<b>WERS GB survey of employees, 1998 ++</b>	<b>DfEE First Work-life balance baseline survey 2000 ** GB</b>	<b>DTI Second Work-life balance study 2003** GB</b>
Working from or at home on regular basis	11	20	20

++ Employees in workplaces with 10+ employees in Workplace employee Relations Survey.

\*\* Employees in workplaces with 5+ employees. (Results quoted for first and second survey are those published in the second 2004 publication (Stevens et al, 2004) adjusted to be as comparable as possible for definition and sample population changes based on populations of all employees and including those who said they worked using this arrangement as well as those who did not use the arrangement but said it was available

Table Estimates of working at home and working on the move 1981-2002.

	Working mainly 'in own home'		Working mainly elsewhere but also working at least one full day 'in own home'		Working mainly 'in different places using home as base'.	
	N,000	%	N,000	%	N,000	%
<b>1981</b>	345 920	1.5			641 900 2.8	
<b>1992</b>	660 793	2.7			1201 102 4.8	
<b>1993</b>	618 606	2.6			1358 326 5.7	
<b>1994</b>	641 702	2.6			1497 994 6.2	
<b>1995</b>	616 955	2.5			1571 158 6.4	
<b>1996</b>	628 533	2.5			1565 887 6.4	
<b>1997</b>	611 835	2.4	1066 386	4.0	1552 859 6.2	
<b>1998</b>	642 746	2.4	934 231	3.5	1828 318 6.8	
<b>1999</b>	609 366	2.2	1025 766	3.8	1979 600 7.3	
<b>2000</b>	634 312	2.3	1113 308	4.0	2006 683 7.3	
<b>2001</b>	637 387	2.3	1211 999	4.4	1958 528 7.1	
<b>2002</b>	672 949	2.4	1242 383	4.4	2130 458 7.6	
<b>%change 1981-2002</b>	+94.5				+231.9	
<b>%change 1981-1992</b>	+91.0				+87.1	
<b>%change 1992-2002</b>	+1.8				+77.4	
<b>%change 1997-2002</b>	+10.0		+16.5		+37.2	

Source: Felstead et al (2005) Table 3.3 p.55. Labour Force Survey data

Table. Percentages of employed mothers/fathers with access to flexible working arrangements, by country.

Flexible Working Arrangements	Country				% All UK Total	
	% England Mums Dads	% Wales Mums Dads	% Scotland Mums Dads	% NI Mums Dads	Mums	Dads
Working at or from home, occasionally	22.3 30.2	16.8 20.3	16.6 25.6	10.8 17.1	20.9	28.8
Working at or from home, all the time	6.0 8.1	3.8 6.1	4.8 7.3	1.5 3.9	5.5	7.7
<b>Maximum (N) unweighted</b>	<b>4439 6054</b>	<b>1168 1421</b>	<b>1153 1285</b>	<b>940 850</b>	<b>7700 9610</b>	

Sample: All Millennium Cohort Study main respondent mothers and partner respondent fathers (natural, foster, adoptive, step) who are in paid work. A oneway anova for each flexible working arrangement offered by country, the majority of values are less than or equal to  $p=0.01$  suggesting systematic differences in the extent of working arrangements offered to both employee mums and dads by country. # These values are not significant at  $p=0.05$  suggesting that there are no significant differences in the extent of working arrangements offered to employee mothers and fathers by country.

Table Men's and women's homeworking employment as per cent of all employed, 1998

	Men 1998	Women 1998
<b>Home workers</b>		
all	12.4	7.9
teleworkers	6.5	3.8
<b>N thousands</b>	14,261	11,253

Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1998

Table Men's and women's homeworking employment by industry, 1998

Industry	Men all	Homeworkers teleworkers	N (000s)	Women Home workers:		N (000s)
				all	teleworkers	
Agriculture & fishing	48.5	7.5	299	47.7	11.1	92
Energy & water	6.3	(4.4)	219	(1.3)	(2.3)	54

Manufacturing	5.0	3.8	3,540	7.7	3.4	1,256
Construction	32.8	8.9	1,652	22.3	10.9	161
Distribution	9.1	4.3	2,010	4.3	1.8	1,872
Transport & Communication	8.1	3.8	1,279	5.9	2.7	415
Banking, finance, insurance, etc.	15.5	13.4	2,109	10.4	7.5	1,682
Public admin, education & health	4.6	5.5	1,929	5.8	3.1	4,204
Other Services	20.3	11.7	702	16.7	5.6	798
All	12.5	6.5	14,211	7.9	3.8	11,237

Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1998

*Table Men's and women's homeworking employment by occupation, Per cent of gendered employees in occupation , 1998*

Industry	Men Homeworking		N (000s)	Women Home workers:		N (000s)
	All	teleworkers		all	teleworkers	
Managers and administrators	12.9	8.8	2,758	13.4	7.2	1,329
Professional	11.4	14.1	1,628	6.4	9.1	1,057
Associate professional & technical	14.9	11.5	1,298	11.5	6.6	1,269
Clerical and secretarial	2.9	2.2	976	5.7	3.2	2,837
Craft and related	21.9	6.0	2,878	13.3	(2.8)	268
Personal and protective service	4.2	(1.0)	927	8.9	1.1	1,844
Sales	18.0	9.5	731	4.8	2.1	1,264
Plant and	5.1	1.2	1,978	4.5	(1.0)	456

machine operatives						
Other	10.3	1.4	1,047	6.4	(0.0)	917
All	12.5	6.6	14,222	7.9	3.8	11,241

Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1998

Table . Access to flexible and family-friendly working arrangements, by sector and gender.

	Private sector	Private sector	Public sector	Public sector	
	Men % of employees	Women % of employees	Men % of employees	Women % of employees	All employees % of employees
<b>Working at or from home</b>	10	6	13	9	9

Base: All employees in workplaces with 25 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based on responses from 25,491 employees. **Source.** Cully et al (1999)

#### 4. Informal and Unpaid work

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## **6. Work attitudes and motivation**

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